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How Scenarios Became Corporate Strategies tracks the transformation of 
scenario planning, a non-calculative technique for imagining alternative futures, from 
postwar American thermonuclear defense projects to corporate planning efforts 
beginning in the late 1960s. Drawing on archival research, the dissertation tells a history 
of how different corporate strategists in the second half of the twentieth century 
attempted to engage with future uncertainties by drawing heterogeneous and sometimes 
contradictory rational and intuitive techniques together in their developments of 
corporate scenario planning. By tracing the heterogeneity of methodologies and 
intellectual influences in three case studies from corporate scenario planning efforts in 
the United States and Britain, the dissertation demonstrates how critical and 
countercultural philosophies that emphasized ‘irrational’ human capacities like 
imagination, consciousness, and intuition—often assumed to be antithetical to the rule-
bound, quantitative rationalities of corporate planning efforts—became crucial tools, 
rather than enemies, of corporate strategy under uncertainty after 1960.  
The central argument of the dissertation is that corporate scenario planning 
projects were non-calculative speculative attempts to augment the calculative techniques 
of traditional mid-century strategic decision-making with diverse human reasoning tools 
in order to explore and understand future uncertainties. Consequently, these projects 
were intertwined with an array of sometimes contradictory genealogies, from technical 
postwar military planning practices to countercultural intellectual resources that 
questioned the technological imperatives of modern life. Yet, by the mid-1980s, 
 iii 
corporate scenario planning efforts transformed from contemplative strategies for 
exploring uncertainties into a method associated with the capacities of “thought leaders.” 
It was through the rising thought leadership industry of the late-twentieth-century that 
scenarios gained legitimacy, enabling multinational corporations to rely upon the 
charismatic authority of scenario practitioners in the face of unknowable futures. In 
making this argument, the dissertation revises assumptions in the history of postwar 
science and technology and science studies that pivot on the importance of impersonal, 
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‘Surely planning can’t be worthwhile in these uncertain times’ 
is the usual reaction to hearing that one is a corporate planner. 
People talk about increasing uncertainty, but on what basis?  
Life is no more or less uncertain than it has ever been. The future was, is 
and always will be uncertain. What has changed is the general  
consciousness of uncertainty brought about by feelings of insecurity  
during a period of major social transition and disruption.  
 
-P. W. BECK, Planning Director, Shell UK Limited, 




In December 1969, the American think tank Hudson Institute initiated a study on “The 
Future of the Corporation and the Corporate Environment.”2 It was spearheaded by the 
director of the Hudson Institute, the notorious American defense strategist Herman Kahn. 
Kahn made a name for himself with his audacious arguments detailing how 
thermonuclear war was not only possible, but also survivable.3 By the mid-1960s, 
however, Kahn had broadened his approach to “thinking about the unthinkable” from the 
                                                
1 P.W. Beck, “Corporate Planning for an Uncertain Future,” Long Range Planning, Vol 15, No 4 
(August 1982): 12.  
 
2 Program on “Orientation to Hudson’s Corporate Environment Study,” Hudson Institute 
(December 5, 1969). Hudson Institute Archive, National Defense University.  
 
3 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
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narrow confines of war for the American military establishment to economic, social, and 
political issues for governments internationally, and eventually, multinational 
corporations.4  
As Kahn explained in the “Future of the Corporation and the Corporate 
Environment” brochure: decision-making under uncertainty required that corporations 
learn to understand the long-term dynamics of their external “corporate environment,” 
made up of changing “technological, economic, social, cultural and political” forces.5 
Contrary to what one might expect from postwar business strategists, the study did not 
promote the latest probabilistic calculus from sophisticated data gathering and analyzing 
techniques in the fields of long-range and strategic planning. In the wake of rapid 
technological innovations, large-scale geopolitical turmoil, and rising critiques of modern 
industrial society from countercultural movements in post-1968 America, even 
corporations wrestled with the shortcomings of their technological tools in the face of 
what they envisioned to be a discontinuous future. Management scholars and corporate 
executives asserted that calculative forecasts, the mainstays in decision-making for the 
mid-century corporation, were only capable of predicting “continuity that extends 
yesterday’s trends into tomorrow.”6 In the words of one former Shell Planning Director, 
                                                
4 On “thinking about the unthinkable,” see Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable 
(London: Wieldenfeld and Nicholson, 1962); on the RAND Corporation’s move from military to 
social and political projects, see David Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder: The Rand Corporation’s 
Diversification into Social Welfare Research, 1946-1968,” PhD dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1996.    
 
5 Hudson Institute, “The Corporate Environment, 1975-1985,” Futures (June 1970): 180; Herman 
Kahn, “On Studying the Future,” Hudson Institute (June 1975).  
 
6 Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (Transaction Publishers, London: 1969), xxx; Beck, 
“Corporate Planning for an Uncertain Future,” 14-16; Hudson Institute consultant Robert Ayres 
wrote “forecasting in general is beset by hazards for the would-be prophet. Most of these 
hazards—the uncertainty and unreliability of data, the complexity of “real world” feedback 
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the “whole basis of modern planning”—which included the quest for rationally informed 
decision-making, and the heavy emphasis on sophisticated computer-assisted 
mathematical models—became “increasingly suspect” at the end of the 1960s.7 Hudson 
Institute suggested that corporations needed ways to effectively deliberate the 
uncertainties, ambiguities, and discontinuities that would ultimately enable them to have 
an advantage against their competitors.  
By the end of the 1960s, many corporate planners contended that corporations 
had invested millions in futures that would never come.8 The problem, according to 
many corporate planners, stemmed from the fact that their forecasts were recklessly 
“present oriented,” loaded with economic data based on recent performance, such as 
Gross National Product (GNP) measures, consumer spending, energy estimates, earnings 
summaries and cash flow.9 These forecasts were unable to account for alternative 
possibilities that might arise from the dramatic social and political transformations and 
technological changes that defined the era, forces assumed to be incalculable. More than 
                                                
actions…apply to all forms of forecasting.” He continues, “there are some pitfalls due to the 
special characteristics of invention and innovation as social processes.” Robert U. Ayres, 
Technological Forecasting and Long-Range Planning (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1969), 18-28.  
 
7 In the dissertation, I refer to the jointly held Anglo-Dutch petroleum company Royal 
Dutch/Shell—a merger between Shell Transport and Trading and the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company—as “Shell” for simplicity. However, it is often also called the Royal Dutch Shell 
Group of companies. See, Keetie Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, vol. 3 
of A History of Royal Dutch Shell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Beck, “Corporate 
Planning for an Uncertain Future,” 13.  
 
8 For example, the energy industry heavily invested in the chemicals industry and nuclear power 
in the 1960s because of forecasts suggesting growth of these industries, leading to “chronic 
overcapacity.” Beck, “Corporate Planning for an Uncertain Future,” 14.  
 
9 Burt Nanus, “Profiles of the Future: The Future-Oriented Corporation,” Business Horizons 
(February 1975): 5-12.  
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this, many considered forecasts to be caught up in short-term planning horizons that were 
months and possibly years ahead, neglecting the long-term future decades and even 
centuries ahead. Thus, these forecasts did little to help corporations realize the alternative 
courses of action they promised to provide management. That is, even before the 
economic turbulence of the 1970s collapsed the rates of economic growth in the United 
States, multinational corporations were concerned with their forecasting techniques. 
These forecasts—undergirded by mathematical tools that gave planners and economists 
too much confidence in probabilistic distributions and economically ‘stable’ futures as 
they narrowly focused on abstract numbers and rigid rules—according to many 
management theorists and corporate planners, were incapable of properly considering the 
changing dynamics of social and political phenomena.10  
  Given this awareness that calculative tools were ill-equipped to understand an 
“unknown and to some degree unknowable future,” how were corporate planners to 
make sense of the ambiguous direction of their changing long-term environment?11 
According to the Hudson Institute at the turn of the 1970s, it was not solely through 
mathematical planning models. Kahn alleged these calculative techniques overtook 
earlier postwar corporate planning efforts, thwarting judgement, insight, and optimism in 
favour of data generation and pessimism.12 In the face of future uncertainties, Hudson 
                                                
10 Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity; Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 
1971); Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
 
11 Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, “The Use of Scenarios,” in The Year 2000: A Framework 
for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 262.      
 
12 Herman Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate” (Hudson Institute, 22 November 
1963), 59-60.   
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Institute promoted a methodology called scenario planning that developed in the fringe 
field of speculative military “futurology” immediately following World War II.13 
Scenario planning is a form of strategic thinking that creates “plausible” stories about the 
future in an effort to explore future uncertainties.14 In Herman Kahn fabrications, 
scenarios trained staid positivist planners to become imaginative strategists. Scenarios 
were stories that focused on “new concepts and possibilities, fine distinctions, and subtle 
nuances,” making them “essential training” for corporate planners in the last quarter of 
                                                
13 In the dissertation, I avoid using the terms futurology and futures studies, as many corporate 
scenario planning practitioners do not describe their efforts in this way. Additionally, the term 
itself is subject to a considerable degree of dispute. While many scholars use futurology to refer 
to the more ‘scientific’ efforts to prognosticate the future that were on the rise in the 1950s and 
60s, like forecasting, others use the term in a way more aligned with its originator, the German 
Marxist futurist Ossip Flechtheim. In his 1949 article “Futurology: The New Science?” 
Flechtheim argued that the discipline of futurology should be a systemic utopian attempt to 
reflect on present, not a science of prediction: “In the absence of written or unwritten records, 
however, Futurology must make use of a different method of approach. It cannot work with the 
chronological sequence of detailed facts. Instead it will avail itself of interpretation, 
generalization, and speculation to a considerably higher degree. In this respect, its kinship to 
cultural anthropology, theoretical sociology, or even social philosophy becomes apparent,” Ossip 
Flechtheim, “Futurology: The New Science?” The Forum, April 1949, 208; Towards the end of 
the 1960s, the more critical strands of futurology became futures studies. See also, Jenny 
Andersson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” The American Historical 
Review 117, no. 5 (2012): 1411-1430; Jenny Andersson and Egle Rindzevičiūtė’s The Struggle 
for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging the Future (New York: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francus, 2015). 
 
14 Plausible futures, as opposed to probable futures, tend to be a defining feature of scenarios. 
Though, Oxford scenario practitioners Rafael Ramirez and Cynthia Selin suggest this 
relationship is more complicated. Rafael Ramirez and Cynthia Selin, “Plausibility and Probability 
in Scenario Planning,” Foresight 16, no. 1 (2014): 54-74. Though the origins are disputed, this 
feature existed in Herman Kahn and Hudson Institute’s original definitions of scenarios in the 
1960s. See, Kahn and Wiener, “The Use of Scenarios,” 262-264. Former Shell chief economist 
Michael Jefferson has argued that it was a feature of the post-Keynesian economist G. L. S. 
Shackle’s work as early as 1947 in his book Expectation in Economics. Michael Jefferson, “The 
Passage of Time: Shackle, Shell and Scenarios,” In P.E. Earl et al., G.L.S. Shackle (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 204; “Imagination,” reflected Herman Kahn, “has always been 
one of the principal means for dealing in various ways with the future, and the scenario is simply 
one of the many devices useful in stimulating and disciplining the imagination.” Herman Kahn, 
“Some Strange Aids to Thought,” in Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, 145.  
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the twentieth century.15 Sponsored by nearly 100 multinational corporations, including 
Coca-Cola, General Electric, and International Business Machines (IBM), the Corporate 
Environment Study assured for Hudson Institute the corporate marketability of scenarios, 
speculative stories of the alternative ways the future might play out. In Hudson Institute’s 
campaign for corporate scenarios, they pulled together a jumble of contradictory 
techniques, including formal, rule-based technical techniques from World War II military 
strategy advancements with creative and critical theories concerned with human 
reasoning, and socio-technical studies of science and technology from the fields of 
sociology, history, and philosophy. Importantly, scenarios were performative. They 
included a mixture of storytelling complete with sprawling charts, heady metaphors, and 
catch phrases, shaping the way that corporate strategy has been conceived into the early 
twenty-first century.16  
Since the 1980s, corporate scenario planning methodologies have proliferated. 
Though there are multiple genealogies and methodological approaches to corporate 
scenario planning, many boast of the importance of the scenario practitioner’s 
imaginative capacities to conjure multiple plausible futures in order to explore their 
                                                
15 Herman Kahn, “The Objectives of Future-Oriented Policy Research,” in Paul Dragos Aligica 
and Kenneth R. Weinstein, The Essential Herman Kahn: In Defense of Thinking (Lantham: 
Lexington Books, 2009), 156. 
 
16 As I will discuss in Chapter 2, Hudson Institute’s Corporate Environment Program became 
popularized through its association with sociologist Daniel Bell’s “end of ideology” discussions. 
Historian of science Elena Aronova has argued the “end of ideology” turned the social-economic 
and political studies of science into a central topic of concern in Cold War America, providing a 
pre-history of the discipline of science studies. Elena Aronova, “The Conquest for Cultural 
Freedom, Minerva, and the Quest for Instituting “Science Studies” in the Age of the Cold War,” 
Minerva 50 (2012): 307-337. 
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strategic options.17 In the mid-1980s, Harvard Business School management strategist 
Michael Porter advocated for scenario planning in his canonical business strategy text, 
suggesting that the technique’s ability to enhance judgement and consider alternatives 
aided a company’s “competitive advantage.”18 The California-based management 
consulting firm Global Business Network (GBN), now part of the global consulting firm 
Monitor Deloitte, dedicated their consultancy services to scenario planning, as they rode 
the wave of optimistic uncertainty and excess cash flow during the dot-com boom in the 
1990s. Prestigious American business schools, like Harvard Business School and The 
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, include scenario methodologies in 
their contemporary efforts to train the next generation of business strategists to develop 
insights on a wider range of options in order to “take advantage of the unexpected 
opportunities.”19 Even mainstream management consulting firms like McKinsey & 
Company and Bain & Company utilize scenario methodologies to help their clients 
deliberate strategic options by identifying and evaluating the kinds of uncertainties 
plaguing future options.20 At Oxford Saïd Business School, corporate leaders pay 
                                                
17 Researchers use the term “scenario practitioners” to differentiate those, like planners and 
managers, who put scenarios into action in their corporations and organization and the academics 
that study scenarios in an effort to develop a scholarly field of scenario planning. In this 
dissertation, however, I use the term to refer more broadly to individuals that have put scenario 
planning into practice, including academic scenario planners.  
 
18 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New 
York: Free Press, 1985).  
 
19 Paul J. H. Schoemaker, “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking,” MIT Sloan 
Management Review (Winter 1995); David A. Garvin and Lynne Levesque. "A Note on Scenario 
Planning," Harvard Business School Background Note 306-003, November 2005. (Revised July 
2006.) 
 
20 Hugh G. Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and S. Patrick Viguerie, “Strategy under Uncertainty,” 
McKinsey Quarterly (June 2000); Martin Toner, Nikhil Ojha, Piet de Paepe and Miguel Simoes 
de Melo, “A Strategy for Thriving in Uncertainty,” Bain Insights (12 August 2015).  
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thousands of pounds to learn the scholarly “Oxford scenario planning approach” in order 
to “reframe their long-term strategy by developing several plausible scenarios” in future 
situations defined as turbulent, uncertain, novel, and ambiguous.21  
This dissertation tracks the transformation of scenario methodologies aimed at 
long term decision-making in uncertain future environments from American 
thermonuclear defense strategy to corporate planning efforts beginning in the late 1960s. 
Drawing on archival research, the dissertation tells a history of how different business 
strategists in the second half of the twentieth century attempted to creatively engage with 
future uncertainties by drawing heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory rational and 
intuitive techniques together in their developments of corporate scenario planning. By 
tracing the heterogeneity of methodological approaches and intellectual influences 
involved in corporate scenario planning, the dissertation demonstrates how critical and 
countercultural philosophies that emphasized ‘irrational’ human capacities like 
imagination, consciousness, and intuition, and others that questioned the technological 
imperatives of modern life—often assumed to be antithetical to the rule-bound, 
quantitative rationalities of corporate planning efforts—became crucial tools, rather than 
enemies, of corporate strategy under uncertainty after 1960.  
Though the methodologies and rationales behind the diverse corporate scenario 
planning efforts differed, where they overlapped was in their critiques of calculative 
forecasting strategies, ones they believed were ill-equipped to exclusively inform the 
                                                
 
21 Rafael Ramirez, Steve Churchhouse, Alejandra Palermo, and Jonas Hoffman, “Using Scenario 
Planning to Reshape Strategy,” MIT Sloan Management Review (13 June 2017); These 
contextual conditions are referred to by Ramirez and Wilkinson as TUNA. Rafael Ramirez and 
Angela Wilkinson, Strategic Reframing: The Oxford Scenario Planning Approach (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016).  
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development of future corporate strategies. At the same time, corporate scenario planners 
did not outright reject the rule-bound conception of rationality even as they moved away 
from the quantitative, predictive dimensions. Instead, many sought to harness ‘irrational’ 
subjective human reasoning capacities—perception, judgement, insight—in disciplined, 
systematic ways.   
The central argument of the dissertation is that corporate scenario planning 
projects were non-calculative speculative techniques that sought to augment the 
calculative techniques of traditional strategic decision-making with diverse human 
reasoning tools in order to explore and understand future uncertainties. Consequently, 
these projects were intertwined with a complex array of often contradictory genealogies, 
from technical postwar military planning practices to countercultural intellectual 
resources that challenged the traditional values and assumptions that governed American 
modern industrial society. Yet, by the mid-1980s, corporate scenario planning efforts 
transformed from contemplative strategies for exploring uncertainties into a technique 
associated with the capacities of “thought leaders.” It was through the rising “thought 
leadership” industry of the late twentieth century that scenario planning gained 
legitimacy, enabling multinational corporations to rely upon the “charismatic authority” 
of scenario practitioners in situations where the way forward was unknown.22 In making 
this argument, the dissertation revises assumptions in the history of postwar science and 
technology and science studies that pivot on the importance of impersonal calculative 
strategies and technical capacities in uncertain conditions.  
                                                
22 I build from historian of science Steven Shapin’s expansion of Weber’s “charismatic authority” 
in bureaucratic industrial science of late modernity in Chapter 4. Steven Shapin, The Scientific 
Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
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Since the early twentieth century, economists and planners have recognized the 
unknowable character of future contingencies as an important, if unacknowledged, 
component in economic decision-making practices from macroeconomics to long-range 
planning.23 In the 1920s, it was “Chicago School” economist Frank Knight who 
distinguished measurable “risk” from unmeasurable “uncertainty.”24 For Knight, even 
though both uncertainty and risk were shaped by the unknowns of the future, risk was 
confined to circumstances susceptible to measurement, whereas uncertainty was reserved 
for unmeasurable phenomena, a necessity Knight identified for the production of profit.25 
This history of corporate scenario planning is one example of the attempt to explore 
uncertainties in corporate decision-making.26 Though many critical scholars have 
examined the necessity of uncertainty for markets to function, most have focused on the 
                                                
23 For example, even John Maynard Keynes, so-called father of macroeconomic theory, 
acknowledged that economics could not account for “uncertain knowledge.” [There are matters 
about which] there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. 
We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as 
practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact…” John Maynard Keynes, “The 
General Theory of Employment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 51, 2 (Februrary 
1937): 213. Though, Keynesian economists generally neglected this claim, one exception was the 
post-Keynesian economist G.L.S. Shackle, See Charles Fredrick Carter, G. P. Meredith and G. L. 
S. Shackle (Editors). Uncertainty and Business Decisions: The Logic, Philosophy, and 
Psychology of Business Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: A Symposium (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1957); another advocate of this concept was operations researcher B. 
O. Koopman, “Fallacies in Operations Research,” Operations Research 4, no. 4 (1 August 1956): 
423.  
 
24 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921).   
 
25 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.  
 
26 Scenario planning, unlike forecasting, sought to account for forces previously imagined to be 
unmeasurable, like cultural change and geopolitical turmoil. This technique differs from those, 
like macroeconomic GDP calculations, that scholars like Michelle Murphy and Timothy Mitchell 
have argued helped to conjure “the economy” as a distinct sphere. Scenario planning used stories 
in order to make sense what was previously considered unmeasurable. Michelle Murphy, The 
Economization of Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of 
Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  
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manipulation of uncertainty in the context of contemporary financial and climate crises, 
domains where uncertainty translates into an object for the rational calculation of 
potential threats and opportunities amenable to profit creation.27  
Different from postwar calculative efforts seeking to reduce and contain 
uncertainty as “risk” in order to make it more manageable, this dissertation understands 
corporate scenario planning methods as epistemological tools to explore and exploit 
uncertainty. Crucially, corporate scenario planning efforts emerged in corporate planning 
departments and consulting firms alongside other calculative techniques as a rebellion 
against the failures of computing technologies and their inability to consider the 
unknowable. In this, it follows historian of technology Edward Jones-Imhotep’s 
contention that technological breakdowns, malfunctions, and failures—where failure is 
defined as a “condition that machines experience” rather than a “class of technologies”—
play an important, and undertheorized, role in the history of modern technology.28     
 In the late 1970s, the Post-Keynesian economist George Shackle used the term 
“unknowledge” to describe the impossibility of assigning probabilities to a future capable 
of unexpected change.29 Shackle embraced corporate scenario planning efforts in his 
                                                
27 See, for example, Melinda Cooper, “Turbulent Worlds: Financial Markets and Environmental 
Crisis,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 27, 2-3 (2010): 167-190; Brian Massumi, “National 
Enterprise Emergency Steps Toward an Ecology of Powers.” Theory, Culture & Society 26, 6 
(2009): 153–85; Jerome Whitington, “The Prey of Uncertainty: Climate Change as Opportunity,” 
ephemera 12, ½ (2012): 113-137; Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the 
College de France, 1978-1979 (New York: Picador, 2010). These approaches follow sociologist 
Ulrich Beck’s description of “risk society,” a characteristic of modern society that adapts risk 
management strategies designed to minimize the chances of future dangers. Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
 
28 Edward Jones-Imhotep, The Unreliable Nation: Hostile Nature and Technological Failure in 
the Cold War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), 10-13.    
 
29 George Shackle, Imagination and the Nature of Choice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1979), 135.  
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crusade against the “instrumental rationality” of mainstream economics.30  That is, 
Shackle opposed traditional economic theory, predicated on rational self-interest and 
general equilibrium, arguing instead that economists and planners were overly 
subservient to their mathematical tools.31 In doing so, this dissertation expands the 
understanding of future speculation in business beyond the rational calculation of risk 
that pervade science studies and the history of science literature.32 Corporate scenario 
planners relied just as much on qualitative, sociological techniques like Kurt Lewin’s 
field theory, and cognitive psychological techniques, focusing on perception and 
imagination. They also employed poets, critical theorists, and artists, to not only help 
make sense of non-calculative social domains but to fill in the indecipherable future of 
the business environment. Put differently, there are a multitude of ways that corporate 






                                                
 
30 Jefferson, “The Passage of Time: Shackle, Shell and Scenarios,”; George Shackle, Epistemics 
and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1972), xiv.   
 
31 Shackle, Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines.  
 
32 Anthropologist Caitlin Zaloom makes a similar argument for re-conceptualizing risk in 
financial markets that exceeds the negative valence, as only protection against future dangers, in 
her study of futures markets. Caitlin Zaloom, “The Productive Life of Risk,” Cultural 
Anthropology 19, 3 (2004): 365-391.   
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Cold War Rationality and the History of Science and Technology  
 
 This dissertation is indebted to historians of science and technology and science 
studies scholars that have investigated the heterogeneous epistemologies making up 
decision-making tools during and immediately after the postwar period, including but not 
limited to the disciplines of economics, operations research, management science, 
systems analysis, and cybernetics.33 However, this dissertation does not seek to follow 
the majority of scholars in the history of science that focus on the strict, quantitative, 
rule-bound concept of “Cold War rationality,” one that is closely associated with postwar 
military advancements and command-and-control projects.34 Yet, by no means does the 
dissertation claim to be the first to attempt to “deflate” Cold War rationality.35 This 
widespread version of rationality is generally understood to be based upon the 
overconfident belief in the technical tools of science and technology, or scientism, as the 
guiding force in postwar decision-making efforts from the social sciences to economics. 
This version follows science studies scholar Paul Edwards’ claim in his The Closed 
                                                
33 See, for example, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science 
of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); William Thomas, Rational 
Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2015); Hunter Crowther-Heyck, Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: 
Sketches of Another Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Orit Halpern, 
Beautiful Data: A History of Vision and Reason since 1945, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2015).  
 
34 For a prime example, see Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorrain Daston, Rebecca Lemov, How 
Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013). 
 
35 For the best overview of the limits to Cold War rationality, see Michael Pettit, “Deflating Cold 
War Rationality,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016): 46-49.  
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World (1996), that the computer instigated a technocratic worldview that enclosed 
subjects, subjecting them to “one in which calculations and abstractions mattered more 
than experiences and observations.”36 It informs historian of economics Phillip 
Mirowski’s examination of the military origins of neoclassical economic models in 
Machine Dreams (2002), and historian of technology Thomas Hughes’ argument in 
Rescuing Prometheus (1998) that empirical, technocratic epistemologies emerging from 
the military-industrial complex governed large-scale systems engineering projects in the 
postwar era.37 More recently, in the collaboratively written How Reason Almost Lost Its 
Mind, historians of science Lorraine Daston and others, assert that after World War II, a 
disembodied, rule-bound concept of “rationality” meant to guide decision-making rose to 
prominence, leaving behind the Enlightenment concept of “reason,” itself based upon 
human capacities like judgment and imagination.38 As this dissertation will show, this 
clean separation between a rule-bound concept of rationality and irrational human 
capacities, like consciousness and intuition, was not the case in the history of corporate 
scenario planning. After World War II, corporate scenario planners from the Hudson 
Institute to the American multinational conglomerate corporation General Electric aimed 
to explicitly cultivate the role that diverse human imaginative and intuitive capacities, as 
                                                
36 Paul Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War 
American (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 120.  
 
37 Phillip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Thomas Parke Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus: Four 
Monumental Projects that Changed the Modern World (New York: Pantheon, 1998).  
 
38 Erickson et. al, How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War 
Rationality, 8-9.  
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well as rule-bound techniques, played in shaping visions of an ultimately unknowable 
future.39  
 To date, this sharp distinction between rationality and reason also guides the 
historiography of decision-making techniques aimed at making sense of the longer-term 
future that began in the 1960s.40 Though, crucially, these decision-making techniques 
extended from interwar developments in operations research in American and Britain.41 
Historical literature generally divides these ‘futurists’ into one of two camps. First, there 
are the forecasting futurists, who imagined the future as a generally knowable space, 
made up of quantifiable elements. In this group, military strategists, corporate planners, 
and economists, put their faith in the tools of scientific modeling—like the postwar 
Delphi Technique, quantitative risk assessment, and game theory—to capture the future, 
and reduce it, in order to control decision-making for military and corporate interests.42 
This version typically highlights the work of midcentury RAND researchers, like Olaf 
Helmer, and his claims that new calculative practices, aided by increasingly capable 
computers, would solve the socio-political problems in the future.43  
                                                
39 See, for example, Ian Wilson, “Futures Forecasting for Strategic Planning at General Electric,” 
Long Range Planning (June 1973): 39-42; for a larger history of the role that psychological 
techniques played in midcentury corporate management, see Kira Lussier, “Personality, 
Incorporated: A History of Psychological Capital,” PhD dissertation in progress, University of 
Toronto, 2017.  
 
40 Andersson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World”; Andersson and 
Rindzevičiūtė, The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging 
the Future.  
 
41 Thomas, Rational Action.  
 
42 Andersson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” 1426.   
 
43 Olaf Helmer, “The Future of Science” (Rand Corporation, 1967).  
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Second, there are the ‘philosophical’ futurists who criticized the forecasters, 
demanding that only human imagination and creativity could rescue the future from the 
grips of military-industrial complex. Here, philosophers, social critics, and activists, 
inspired by the tools of continental philosophy and literature, sought to open the world to 
radical future possibilities for society while waging critiques against unrestricted 
technological growth, capitalism, and modernity.44 In this group one finds European 
futurists, like Bertrand de Jouvenel, who considered speculation about the future to be 
more an ‘art’ than a ‘science’ in his The Art of Conjecture (1967).45 It also includes Fred 
Polak, who in his The Image of the Future (1973), claimed that the potentials of positive 
images of the future were necessary to guide society.46 Critical midcentury intellectuals, 
like Lewis Mumford and Marshall McLuhan, who were also involved in the futures 
studies movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century, have generally been 
categorized under this approach.47  
Neither characterization, however, appropriately describes the corporate scenario 
planning techniques and epistemologies bound up in the history told in this dissertation. 
Thus, this dissertation demonstrates how the history of corporate scenario planning 
unsettles the distinction between the epistemological strategies guiding the closed futures 
                                                
44 Andersson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World.”  
 
45 Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (New York: Basic Books, 1967).  
 
46 Fred Polak, The Image of the Future, trans. Elise Boulding (Amsterdam, 1973). 
 
47 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970); 
Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Message (New York: Bantam, 1967). Both Mumford and 
McLuhan were members of the World Futures Studies Federation, an organization dedicated to 
introducing “critical future oriented thinking in all branches of knowledge.” Andersson, “The 
Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” 1429.  
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of the forecasters linked to military and industrial futures and the emancipatory open 
futures of futures studies after the late 1960s. Rather, scenario techniques were 
predominantly attempts to build new visions of corporate futures through a critical 
engagement with tools highlighting the irrational subjective and intuitive capacities of 
humans. For example, in the early 1970s at Stanford Research Institute (SRI), the 
mythologist Joseph Campbell wrote about imaginative transcendental futures in the 
research report Changing Images of Man (1974) that then circulated to multinational 
corporations through SRI’s Business Intelligence Program, a future business 
environment consulting arm.48 By the mid-1980s, the multinational energy and 
petrochemical company Shell partnered with critical biologists— like the atmospheric 
scientist James Lovelock and the Chilean neurobiologist Francisco Varela—in order to 
use their theories of biological and machinic self-organization as intellectual resources 
for rethinking nondeterministic corporate planning; at the same time, critical theorists 
applied these resources as counter-epistemologies to capitalism.49 In cognitive scientist 
Warren McCulloch’s 1945 experimental biological model for decentralized neural net 
communication—what he called “heterarchy”— scenario planning consultant Jay Ogilvy 
saw a nondeterministic logic of relations that could serve as an ideal for complex 
organization not only in the mind, but also in the self and in the corporation in the late 
                                                
48 See Chapter 3 “The Transcendental Scenario.” Arnold Mitchell, “Life Ways and Life Styles,” 
Business Intelligence Program (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1973): 32. Art Kleiner 
Collection, Box 2:2, Folder 1, Futures Library, University of Oxford.  
 
49 For more on James Lovelock and Francisco Varela’s relationship to corporate scenario 
planning efforts, see the conclusion.   
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1980s.50 As such, the history in this dissertation presents an occasion to reflect on the 
tangled genealogies that exceed the characterizations passed down by the historiography 
of postwar history of science.  
In contrast to the majority of work on the postwar sciences of decision making, 
historian of science William Thomas has argued that strategists in fields from operations 
research to management science in the mid-twentieth-century embraced a variety of 
goals and methodologies aimed at improving complex decision-making as they claimed 
to be acting “rationally.”51 Thomas argues that before the postwar period, these 
strategists did not perceive the tools of science as the reigning intellectual authority; 
theoretical techniques, like game theory and simulation, were not imagined to be capable 
of overcoming cultural and political differences or providing the ultimate solutions to 
complex problems. Moreover, even if at times during the postwar period decision-
making researchers relied on their scientific credentials to bolster their expertise, the 
definition of “science” was not a given or without dispute. However, Thomas continues 
to emphasize that the quest for rationality as the guiding epistemology, even as he seeks 
to expand the definition of rigid, rule-bound scientific rationality to include the diverse 
methodologies aimed at improving complex decision-making.  
In this dissertation, I expand the focus on rationality leading the historical 
literature on postwar decision-making processes by including the combinations of 
                                                
50 Jay Ogilvy, “The Postmodern Business,” The Deeper News 1, no. 5 (Global Business Network, 
1989). Stewart Brand Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University; on heterarchy, see 
Warren S. McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); also, Bretton 
Fosbrook, “Evolution through Heterarchical Organization,” Roundtable on Management after 
Organization Man, Business History Review Vol. 90, 4 (2017): 719-725.       
 
51 Thomas, Rational Action.  
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affective, intuitive, mystical, and psychedelic epistemologies that also guided corporate 
scenario planning techniques. As historian of science Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi has 
argued, atomic weapons initiated a massive shift in authority for the sciences of war, 
from the wisdom of decorated generals to the intuitions of defense scientists, as they 
produced the unimaginable threat of human annihilation, and initiated deep anxieties that 
gripped American society.52 During the end of his tenure as a systems analyst for the Air 
Force think tank the RAND Corporation between 1947-1960, Kahn dove into the 
uncertainties of the future by crafting scenarios that joined avant-garde performance art 
and “sick jokes” in an attempt to discuss the unthinkable subject of hypothetical 
annihilation.53 At the Global Business Network in the late 1980s, poststructuralist 
philosophy professor turned consultant Jay Ogilvy presented theories of relations as 
nondeterministic frameworks for scenarios in order to bridge, in his words, “the 
rationality of Enlightenment thinking” with the irrational processes of “consciousness, 
intuition, and affective sensitivity.”54 This dissertation thus builds from feminist 
theorists, and feminist sciences studies scholars in particular, who have called attention to 
how imaginaries, affects, and intuitions are also products of postwar techniques, 
                                                
52 Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn.  
 
53 Kahn, On Thermonuclear War.  
 
54 At a 1989 corporate gathering of executives and intellectuals called “People in the Nineties,” 
Ogilvy discusses his earlier Many Dimensional Man. In the book, Ogilvy wrote against the 
arguments espoused by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (1964)—that capitalism in 
advanced industrial society demands one-dimensional, rigid identities and bureaucratic 
hierarchies. Jay Ogilvy, Many Dimensional Man: Decentralizing Self, Society, and the Sacred 
(New York: Doubleday, 1977). Ogilvy’s 1969 dissertation—under the supervision of philosopher 
Paul Weiss, a doctoral student of Alfred North Whitehead’s—from Yale University, “Relations,” 
was a metaphysical tome dedicated to the idea that to be is to be related. See, Fosbrook, 
“Evolution through Heterarchical Organization.”  
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technologies, and tools of the social sciences, engineering, and military projects.55 Like 
these scholars, this dissertation attunes to affects, attitudes, beliefs and disbeliefs, visions 
and despairs that corporate scenario planning projects both conjured and attempted to 
explicate.   
The diverse American countercultural, environmental, and civil rights movements 
of “long 1960s” heightened and focused the interests of scientists and engineers toward 
human subjective experience and existential philosophical engagement.56 Historians of 
science have indicated how diverse American countercultural movements engaged with 
the tools of science and technology, having an influential impact on what it meant to do 
science and technology in American after the 1960s.57 As historians of technology, like 
Matthew Wisnioski and Cyrus Mody, have shown, critiques of technology—that argued 
                                                
55 Sarah Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” Social Text 22, 2, (2004): 118–39; Natasha Myers, 
Rendering Life Molecular: Models, Modelers, and Excitable Matter (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2015); Joseph Masco, The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold 
War to the War on Terror (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Murphy, The Economization 
of Life.  
 
56 On the “long 1960s” as a critical moment of tumultuous changes in divergent fields that 
exceeds the periodization by decade, see Jon Agar, “What Happened in the Sixties?” British 
Society for the History of Science 41, 4 (December 2008): 567-600.  
 
57 For example, on engineering reformers and technological change, see Matthew 
Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012); on hippies and quantum mechanics, see David Kaiser, How the 
Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival (New York W.W. 
Norton, 2011); on humanistic psychologists and the scientific study of human subjective 
experience that appealed to counterculturalists as well as ‘the Establishment,’ see Nadine 
Weidman, “Between the Counterculture and the Corporation: Abraham Maslow and Humanistic 
Psychology in the 1960s,” In Groovy Science: The Counter-Cultures and Scientific Life, 1955-
1975, ed. David Kaiser and W. Patrick McCray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 
109-134; on California feminists and reproductive technologies, see Michelle Murphy, Seizing 
the Means of Reproduction: Entanglements of Feminism, Health, and Technoscience (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012); and, on the Black Panther Party and free medical clinics, Alondra 
Nelson, Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight Against Medical Discrimination 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).  
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modern technology was technocratic and in service of the American military-industrial 
complex—as well as concerns about the proper applications of technology, animated 
student activists as well as scientists and engineers housed in prestigious engineering and 
physical science departments.58 In Groovy Science (2016), historians of science David 
Kaiser and W. Patrick McCray acknowledge that after the “long 1960s” American 
science was no longer monolithically defined by militarized mainframes and missiles 
built in the large-scale government programs and corporate research lab, nor the pursuit 
of “sterile technocracy” and impersonal “Big Science.”59 Importantly, this work collapses 
the division passed down from countercultural ‘guru’ Theodore Roszak between 
countercultural movements—assumed to be against rationality and technocracy—and 
scientific experimentation.60 While meticulous when it comes to the nuances in the 
different strands of counterculture and science, however, these scholarly efforts are 
generally one-dimensional when it comes to business, relying on, as is the case in 
Groovy Science, a narrative of commodification specific to 1970s advertising articulated 
by Thomas Frank in his 1997 book The Conquest of Cool.61  
Studying the history of corporate scenario planning efforts thus provides an 
occasion to think through the fraught relationships between American countercultural 
                                                
58 Matthew Wisnioski, “Inside ‘the System’: Engineers, Scientists, and the Boundaries of Social 
Protest in the Long 1960s, “History and Technology 19 (2003): 313-33; Cyrus CM Mody, "How 
I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, the nuclear reactor, the computer, ham radio, and 
recombinant DNA," Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38, no. 3 (2008): 460. 
 
59 Kaiser and McCray, eds., Groovy Science: The Counter-Cultures and Scientific Life, 2.  
 
60 Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society 
and Its Youthful Opposition (New York: Doubleday, 1969).  
 
61 Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip 
Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
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ideas, technological visions, and business after 1968. As media theorist Fred Turner has 
shown, it was a combination of military researchers, countercultural communalist, and 
journalists, businessmen, and entrepreneurs that introduced new computing technologies 
as tools for liberation into American mainstream consumer culture of the 1990s.62 
However, Turner argues that it was the California countercultural and entrepreneurial 
figure Stewart Brand and his Whole Earth networks, including the countercultural Whole 
Earth Catalog, the online virtual community the WELL (Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link), 
and Wired magazine, that bridged scientific researchers and their collaborative 
workstyles developed in World War II military laboratories with countercultural critiques 
of bureaucracy, “command-and-control” strategies, and hierarchy from the 1960s.63 I 
build from Turner’s historical work while suggesting that Stewart Brand was a symptom 
of a much larger synergic, but also tensional, relationship between countercultural 
critiques from the 1960s, systems rhetoric from World War II laboratories, and business, 
not an origin point. 
Thus, the corporate scenario planning episodes examined in this dissertation 
provide evidence to support historian of science Hunter Heyck’s argument that the faith 
in the “high modern social sciences”—a period between the mid-1950s and the mid-
1970s when American social scientists predominantly approaches their subject through 
the language of structures within complex, hierarchical systems— “fractured” in the 
                                                
62 Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, 
and the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
 
63 Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 31-32. 
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1970s.64 Corporate planners came to scenarios methods through a general disillusionment 
with the tools of the high modern sciences in management and economics, tools that 
many corporate planners understood to have failed to deliver effective decision-making 
techniques for long term strategies. Many of the corporate planners were trained as “high 
modernists”— and many originally believed in the formal modelling of social systems 
and rationalizations of procedures that defined what Heyck has called the “bureaucratic 
worldview.”65 Yet, when these ideals failed to adequately prepare corporations for the 
turbulent economic futures of the 1970s, many planners looked to alternative methods, 
like scenario planning.  
 
 
From “Planning” to “Strategy” in Strategic Management  
 
Strategic management, the interdisciplinary study and managerial practice of 
business planning and strategy formation that rose to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s 
in corporate planning departments, management consultancies, and business schools, 
plays an important role in this dissertation. This dissertation situates corporate scenario 
                                                
64 Specifically, Heyck argued that “high modern social scientists” approached their subjects “as 
complex, hierarchical systems defined more by their structures than by their components. They 
sought to construct formal models of systems behavior, and they worked with eager conviction to 
embody those models in computer programs and simulations,” Hunter Heyck, Age of System: 
Understanding the Development of Modern Social Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
2015), 198-199; Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); 
see also, Hunter Heyck, “Leviathan and the Ink Blot: The Politics of the Mind and Its Sciences in 
Cold War America,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 
53 (2015): 117. 
 
65 Heyck, Age of System, 10-12.  
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planning efforts within disputes animating a split between what some called the 
“deliberate” school of “strategic planning” and the “emergent” school of “strategic 
management” in the last quarter of the twentieth century.66 In doing so, the dissertation 
treats mid-to-late-twentieth century strategic management, a discipline filled with 
amorphous knowledge-making techniques, as a site for knowledge production worthy of 
consideration in the history of science. I make this claim while acknowledging that to 
establish concretely what constitutes strategic management is much easier said than 
done.67 The business strategists that utilized corporate scenario planning techniques in 
the think tanks and corporate planning departments analyzed in this dissertation came 
from assorted intellectual backgrounds. Many trained in the physical sciences—like 
engineering and physics—or the social sciences—like economics, sociology, and 
cognitive science; however, their corporate scenario planning efforts were fundamentally 
interdisciplinary. Contrary to what one might assume, none of the scenario practitioners 
were trained in business schools, a tradition historically driven by the case method.68  
                                                
66 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles of Planning, 
Plans, Planners, (New York: Free Press, 1994); Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of 
Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6 (1985): 257-272; 
others, like business strategist Pankaj Ghemawat calls it a difference between “static” and 
“dynamic” thinking. See, Pankaj Ghemawat, "Evolving Ideas about Business Strategy," Business 
History Review 90, no. 4 (2016): 736-737.   
 
67 Contemporary management scholars have discussed this. See, for example, Michael E. Porter, 
“Industrial Organization and the Evolution of Concepts for Strategic Planning: The New 
Learning, Managerial and Decision Economics, 4, 3, Corporate Strategy (September 1983): 172-
180; Bruce Ahlstrand, Joseph Lampel, and Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour 
Through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); Pankaj 
Ghemawat, “Competition and Business Strategy in Historical Perspective,” Business History 
Review 76 (2002): 37-74.  
 
68 On the history of business school management training, see Rakesh Khurana, From Higher 
Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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The disputes animating the field of strategic management are best articulated by 
the academic management theorist Henry Mintzberg’s The Rise and Fall of Strategic 
Planning (1994), a widely influential book based upon a 1978 article in Management 
Science that criticized the hegemony of midcentury strategic planning efforts, defined as 
“a deliberate conscious set of guidelines that determine decisions into the future.”69 In 
turn, Mintzberg distinguished “emergent” strategic management as those techniques 
containing outcomes that are realized but not always intended.70 Professor of Business 
Strategy Pankaj Ghemawat argues that emergent strategies—what he calls “dynamic”—
are capable of informing decision-making by “both thinking through time and thinking 
over time.”71 It is this historical conception of “emergent” strategy formation, an 
alternative to the shortcomings of “deliberate” approaches, that the dissertation focuses 
on.  
Though the study of strategy followed a much longer tradition in military analysis 
that many trace as far back as 500 BC, corporate strategic planning has important 
intellectual ties to innovations in the field of interwar operations research and the early-
twentieth-century study of “business policy.”72 In the 1950s, it was General Motors chief 
executive Alfred Sloan that first recognized the need for a formal approach to strategy 
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based upon evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of corporate competitors, like 
Ford.73 Alfred Chandler, in his 1962 classic Strategy and Structure, built from Sloan’s 
account in his history of the development of the vertically-integrated, multidivisional 
corporation, as he campaigned for management hierarchies to coordinate diversifications 
and decentralization.74 However, as business journalist Walter Kiechel has contended, 
the concept of corporate strategy as an overarching explanatory framework for 
understanding what corporations were doing did not arise until the early 1960s as 
management consultants consolidated, packaged, and sold an “arsenal of concepts, 
techniques, tools, knowledge, practitioners, and spokesmen.”75  
Former RAND mathematician Igor Ansoff, one of the originators of the field of 
strategic planning, offered one of the first formal definitions, one that is most 
traditionally associated with the work of contemporary corporate planners. In his 1965 
book Corporate Strategy, Ansoff defined corporate strategy as a “prescriptive logical 
analysis of how business firms should think through their adaptation to the 
environment.”76 This effort was generally consolidated at the executive level of a 
corporation, in the aim of growth and profit. Many strategic management practitioners 
followed Ansoff’s rational approach, believing that it was possible to systematically 
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Enterprise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962).    
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anticipate future threats and opportunities from a flexible, but ultimately knowable and 
controllable, business environment. In the 1960s, predominantly quantitative planning 
and forecasting models, theories, and techniques emerged claiming to better enable 
corporations to stay competitive amidst complex technological changes and 
diversification efforts through “analytical steps.”77 Techniques included those from 
Harvard Business School Professor Francis Aguilar’s Scanning the Business 
Environment (1967), which taught managers how to scan the business environment made 
up of economic, technical, political, and social factors that impacted future business 
operations.78 By the 1960s, managers were also trained to analyze the “strengths” and 
“weaknesses” (what many called “its distinctive competitiveness”) with the 
“opportunities” and “threats” the company faced in the business environment, a 
framework that came to be called SWOT.79 Others used proprietary tools sold by 
management consulting companies—like the popular Boston Consulting Group growth-
share matrix— to plot potential investments on a two-by-two matrix for easy 
comparison.80 In the mid-1960s, the energy and petrochemical company Shell developed 
their own sophisticated financial forecasting systems, Unified Planning Machinery 
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(UPM), an embodiment of system thinking, that attempted to captured an entire 
succession from oil extraction to consumer gas delivery into single-lined financial 
predictions.81 It was discarded after less than five years in operation.  
When science studies scholars and historians of science have attended to 
twentieth century corporate planning techniques in their investigations, they have 
generally focused on what many consider strategic planning techniques.82 These include 
techniques of planning, budgeting, and financial forecasting, all based on the idea that 
future direction could be controlled by original plans. Or they have focused on particular 
efforts that relied upon quantification and rational analysis as means of management. 
They emphasized the role of the computer and centralized command and control models 
that prized quantification and rational analysis.83 The central goal of this approach to 
planning is based on a well-known assumption explored in the history of science and 
science studies, summed up by the management theorist Henry Mintzberg: “the messy 
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world of random noise, gossip, inference, impression, and fact must be reduced to firm 




Figure 1. The Fall of Strategic Planning85 
 
Generally, however, science studies scholars have overlooked the internal 
critiques from corporate strategists and corporate executives of the “deliberate” approach 
in the mid-to-late twentieth century. As such, we have failed to notice that many late-
twentieth century corporate strategists were not only aware of the critiques of various 
strategy tools as “technologies of rationality,” many have waged their own challenges to 
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the centrality of rationality and the hegemony of calculative strategies in long-term 
decision-making.86 Disillusionment with strategic planning efforts appeared in the 
writings of corporate planners in the early 1970s as many were able to see the failures 
more than successes.87 Others acknowledged the ability to control one’s future direction 
as an illusion, as most strategies and successes could only be articulated in hindsight.88 
Among corporate planners, critiques also existed of strategic planning tools from the 
Department of Defense that spread to American government and corporate efforts, 
including Robert McNamara’s infamous Planning-Programming-Budgeting System 
(PPBS)—an analytic technique introduced in 1961 that promised to rationalize budgeting 
cost-benefit process and decision-making through systems analysis—that corporate 
strategists like Mintzberg partially blamed for the failures of the Vietnam War.89 Instead 
of offering command-and-control strategies, corporate scenario planners aimed to set the 
context of the decision-making process through stories about what the future could look 
like. By situating corporate scenario planning in the school of emergent strategy, the 
dissertation aims to demonstrate how corporate scenario planning methods and 
epistemological strategies in science studies are not as distant as imagined.  
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Alternative Futures  
 
Scenarios, also called “alternative futures,” and in other places “alternative worlds” or 
“future histories,” were collections of “plausible” stories meant to “describe in more or 
less detail some hypothetical sequence of events.”90 They are internally consistent 
narratives about not what the world will look like, but what the world could look like in 
the future. Sometimes, the narratives organized around uncertain elements by asking 
“what if?” in order to articulate different future pathways that might unfold. Before the 
mid-1960s, scenarios were used primarily for the uncertain and threatening American 
political-military efforts closely associated with the RAND Corporation. However, by 
the mid-1970s, scenarios were embraced and reformulated by corporations in order to 
support their competitive strategy efforts.  
 Scenarios have been defined in many ways. Starting in the late 1950s at the 
RAND Corporation, analysts introduced the production of scenarios as one way to 
generate “relatively plausible contexts” in the considerations of “future weapons” and 
“war-fighting strategies” that were overlooked by the prevailing quantitative 
methodologies of the period, including but not limited to game theory, Monte Carlo 
simulations, and probabilistic forecasts.91 Former Global Business Network scenario 
practitioner Peter Schwartz defined scenarios as “a tool for ordering one’s perceptions 
about alternative future environments in which one’s decisions might be played out.”92 
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And former Shell planners Angela Wilkinson and Roland Kupers suggest: “Scenarios 
maintain the future as an open, but not an empty space, where facts, expectations, and 
perceptions intermingle, and a combination of critical, creative, and analytical thinking is 
essential.”93 
While recovering one history of scenario planning, I seek neither to rescue 
corporate techniques nor industrial interests from the wrath of critical historians and 
critical theorists and their social and political critiques. I take seriously such assessments: 
the long-standing violence of calculative—and non-calculative—techniques in corporate 
structures continues. While corporate power and dominance are difficult to 
underestimate, so is it too easy to cast all corporate techniques, and the associated 
imaginaries and practitioners, within the well-worn theoretical molds attaching naïve 
scientism to industrial and capitalistic interests under the shadows of the closed world of 
the last half of the twentieth century. Corporate scenario planning efforts were not 
singularly about commanding and controlling futures through the authority of science to 
sustain industrial interests or free markets, or to reinforce racial and economic 
inequalities, though perhaps, it did not challenge such efforts either. It was also an 
attempt to enable organizations to understand and explore uncertainty, which meant 
preparing unsuspecting executives to think differently about future growth, technological 
change, politics, and social values. In building alternatives, corporate strategists pulled 
together a multitude of contradictory techniques that have yet to be fully grappled with 
by historians.  
                                                
Organizations: How to Create, Use, and Assess Scenarios (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, Inc., 2011), 14.  
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This is especially important as science studies scholars turn their attention 
towards alternative futures in an age of financial and ecological crisis. Our hesitation—as 
critical historians of science and science studies scholars— towards an association with 
the sciences of war and/or the dynamics of capitalism, and the instrumentality and 
alienation they exert, is one of the reasons for such caricatures. We, as historians and 
critical scholars, excel at imagining ambitious corporate strategists violently wielding the 
tools of scientism against our futures in search of profit. But such exaggerations block us 
from dealing with our strange, entangled bedfellows. I am inspired by critical theorist 
Maggie Nelson’s suggestion that critical positioning be opening, as opposed to the 
rigidities that often follows this line of intellectual study.94 Regardless, where many 
historians struggle is in piecing together complicated analyses that do justice to the 
power dynamics and the diverse techniques and imaginaries involved. Corporate scenario 
planning efforts occasions just such a rethinking. 
 
 
Method and Organization 
 
This dissertation does not tell the entire and definite history of corporate scenario 
planning. As scenario practitioners Angela Wilkinson and Rafael Ramirez explain, 
scenario planning can mean many different things to different organizations: approaches, 
techniques and methods, and intellectual inspirations, are varied, fragmented across time 
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scholarship. Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts (Minneapolis: Graywolf Press, 2015).  
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periods, intellectual communities, and industries.95 Unlike many other scientific or 
planning professions, there are no professional qualifications required to conduct 
scenario planning, and there are no formal organizations dedicated to vetting the work of 
scenario planners.96 With this, there is also considerable dispute over what constitutes 
effective scenario planning, a debate this dissertation does not engage in.97 Instead, I 
focus on three distinct, yet interrelated, “historical episodes” in corporate scenario 
planning’s history that highlight the wide range of contradictory intellectual influences 
brought together through this corporate technique—at the Hudson Institute in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, Stanford Research Institute in the late 1960s and 1970s, and Shell in the 
mid-1970s to the 1980s.98 Expanding historian of science Joel Isaac’s term, I use 
“interstitial corporation” to describe these liminal intellectual spaces between 
institutional and disciplinary environments and corporations beginning in in the mid-
century that gave rise to corporate scenario planning techniques.99 In my analysis I pay 
attention to the methodological considerations, and do not focus on debunking, in order 
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to see the grand aims of the diverse corporate scenario strategists, as well as their 
nuances and contradictions.100  
 The dissertation is a study of the techniques of corporate scenario planning. 
However, by techniques I do not mean to confine the investigation to the norms of 
experimental practice from laboratory science or the empirical, rule-bound procedures of 
technological experimentation from science studies and the history of science.101 Nor is 
this a study of how specific scenarios were utilized by corporations.102 Instead, this 
dissertation examines the “methodological” techniques of scenario planning.103 That is, 
this dissertation is a study of how corporate scenario planners framed the methods of 
scenario planning.104 Though corporate scenario planning was first and foremost a 
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quotidian matters: performances, comportments, training regimes, and so on…” Joel Isaac, 
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theoretical technique for creating sets of stories, scenario planners were meticulous in 
their articulation of the process of how one could make knowledge about uncertain 
futures. These methodological considerations contain important “epistemological 
narratives” that were integral to the technique: they helped scenario planners to identify 
and legitimate themselves and their speculative methods.105 In the analysis, I focus on a 
range of social practices in order to understand how the techniques of scenario planning 
helped to give shape and coherence to corporate scenario planners’ commitments to anti-
positivism: the narratives about their epistemological methods—including the related 
citational practices and pedagogical training in how scenarios were to be performed;  
gatherings within the “interstitial corporation”; and performances.  
 By use of dispersed published and archival records, as well as interviews, this 
dissertation aims to recover corporate scenario planning techniques that developed across 
an array of think tanks, consulting firms, and multinational corporations through a 
diverse group of researchers. This effort to historicize corporate scenario planning has 
been made difficult by organizations that prefer to commission their own internal 
histories, and often deny scholars entry into their archives. I consulted hundreds of boxes 
of Hudson Institute archival material —including letters, memos, transcripts, conference 
and presentation agendas, financial statements, meeting notes, and paper drafts—that are 
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housed, though only partially catalogued, at the National Defense University in 
Washington, D.C. I also reviewed archival materials, like electronic correspondence, 
articles, and paper and conference drafts, on Stanford Research Institute and Shell in 
Special Collections at Stanford University, that were dispersed in the uncatalogued 
Global Business Network papers, as well as the personal collections of Steward Brand 
and Fred Turner. The most extensive collection on corporate scenario planning is housed 
at the Oxford Futures Library at Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford, a 
collection that contains the personal files of Shell scenario planner Pierre Wack and the 
business journalist Art Kleiner. Some archival sources came from the personal 
collections housed in dusty basements and garages of corporate scenario planners and 
their family members, especially to fill in the holes of Stanford Research Institute’s 
futures ventures and Shell’s Group Planning efforts, a generous gesture for which I am 
grateful.  
 The body of the dissertation begins with Chapter Two, “The Paradigmatic 
Scenario.” This chapter articulates the early history of scenario techniques. It tracks how 
Herman Kahn and the think tank the Hudson Institute modified scenarios from national 
thermonuclear defense strategy and presented them as advantageous to larger analyses of 
future economic, social, and political phenomena that gained popularity in the business 
world in the late 1960s. Instead of using high-speed computers in forecasting or 
operations research, the Hudson Institute concentrated on producing collections of 
narrative scenarios: explicit synoptic frameworks of alternative future worlds from 
technocratic fantasies to post-apocalyptic nightmares, and worlds in-between. These 
scenarios came in the form of consistently modified sets of charts, and took shape 
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through Kahn’s free form, staccato presentations in isolated executive retreat centers. 
Secondarily, I campaign for a more complex portrait than Cold War rationality by tracing 
the way that sociologist of science Robert Merton’s paradigm guided the creation of 
scenario methods for Kahn. 
Starting with Kahn’s earlier methodological reservations about the limits of 
computing techniques to adequately formulate problems at RAND, this chapter argues 
that the objective of early scenarios was primarily methodological, rooted in military 
planning, and yet, substantiated by non-calculative sociological strategies and 
epistemological concerns shared by early work in the sociology of science. Hudson 
Institute’s scenarios differed from calculative forecasts and simulations; they were a kind 
of speculative sociological technique specific to the second half of the twentieth century. 
In this, scenario planning broadens the historiography of the Cold War rationality. While 
scenarios emerged out of the ideological struggles of Cold War deterrence strategy in 
American defense-related think tanks, they were importantly animated by a critical sense 
of the limitations of computing techniques to adequately calculate social and political 
conditions. Kahn sought to develop scenarios as heuristic tools capable of flexibly 
modelling conceivable behaviour. It was as much a reaction to the closed and 
mechanistic systems of forecasting tools as it was a response to the ‘ideological’ anti-
Establishment critiques from the New Left. The chapter demonstrates how at the end of 
the 1960s, Kahn and the Hudson Institute expanded the scope of scenarios, building on 
their unexpected popularity in the business world, as corporate leaders, anxious about the 
major social transformations and technological disruptions of the period, were interested 
in ways to think strategically about the uncertainties of the long-term future.     
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Chapter Three, “The Transcendental Scenario,” concerns the development of 
alternative futures by Willis Harman and associates at Stanford Research Institute 
starting in 1967. Specifically, it looks at the way that corporate scenario planning at SRI 
emerged from Harman’s alternative futures research, which drew diverse countercultural 
mystical and psychedelic epistemologies together with rationalist mathematical 
engineering methods typically associated with midcentury corporate planning.  
In doing so, the chapter puts forward two arguments, one central to the 
development of the larger dissertation on the history of corporate scenario planning, the 
other a modest disciplinary claim in conversation with the field of science studies. First, 
the chapter contends that corporate scenario planning constitutes a more extensive 
gathering of genealogies, including LSD experimentation, parapsychology, and 
“Eastern” philosophy, than are typically associated with mid-to-late twentieth century 
corporate techniques. In this, SRI’s scenario techniques provides an example of the way 
the “rationalities” of mid-to-late twentieth century corporate strategy were created 
through diverse and contradictory genealogies that exceed the normative sense of 
calculative rationality understood by the history of science. Secondarily, corporate 
scenario planning developed in conversations with postwar critiques of science and 
technology, epistemologies that animated the early history of science studies as well as 
business strategy. That is, critiques of technoscience arose from business leaders and 
bureaucrats that were struggling to deal with the unintended consequences of 
industrialization beginning in the late 1960s, pointing to a more entangled and complex 
portrait of the legacies of the discipline of science studies.  
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Chapter Four, “The Reperceptive Scenario” highlights how the rising industry of 
“thought leadership” journalism of the late twentieth century transformed beliefs about 
the multinational energy and petrochemical company Shell’s scenario planning methods 
from the 1970s, and was a significant contributor to the technique’s contemporary 
legitimacy in the field of strategic management. In the competitive business environment 
of the late-twentieth century, one increasingly driven by the newest, most ‘innovative’ 
ideas, multinational corporations like Shell increasingly relied upon the “charismatic 
authority” in situations where the way forward was unknown. By identifying the 
importance of what historian of science Steven Shapin calls the “personal equation” in 
contemporary corporations facing “radically uncertain futures,” the chapter shows how 
corporate scenario planning exceeds conventional understandings in the history of 
postwar science of impersonal planners who sought to operationalize calculative 
rationality.106 However, as this chapter demonstrations, the “charismatic authority” of 
visionary “thought leader” scenario planners like Pierre Wack was produced and 
promoted by a financially-endowed business publishing industry that was invested in the 
selling the success of corporate scenario techniques even though a direct connection to 
Shell’s improved strategy or financial success was questionable.  
The conclusion “Learning from Corporate Scenario Planning,” examines how 
post-structural theories of biological and machinic organization from the mid-1980s, 
often taken up by critical science studies theorists, were also used by the California-based 
management consulting company Global Business Network as they, along with Shell, 
sought to theorize scenario planning efforts. Specifically, the conclusion utilizes the case 
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of scenario planning at a series of meetings called the Learning Conferences to trace the 
considerable shared intellectual resources among the leading edge of late-twentieth 
century corporate planners and critical biological theorists. The explanatory frameworks 
of symbiotic Gaia theories of James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, and the autopoietic 
organizational theories of Francisco Varela, for example, were welcomed by corporate 
scenario planners. This is more than a case of shared theoretical texts: many of these 
academics were enrolled as consultants to guide corporate strategists in nothing short of a 
reconceptualization of the nature and process of corporate strategy. In this, concepts like 
the Gaia hypothesis and autopoiesis, used as contemporary methods of challenging 
dominant modes of thinking in science and technology studies, and positioned as a 
struggle against capitalism, were also crucial metaphors in planning debates in late-
twentieth century corporate strategy. The conclusion uses these late-twentieth century 
entanglements as invitations to critically engage with critical theories of science studies, 
which includes their uncomfortable connections with corporations. The distance between 
corporate scenario planning techniques and counter-epistemologies in science studies are 









































In the early days at RAND most studies involved an attempt to 
find the “optimum” system, given some reasonably definite set of 
circumstances, objectives, and criteria. The emphasis was on 
comparing thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of different 
systems under idealized  
conditions; then the “best” one would be picked… Naturally the 
high-speed computer often played a central role in all this.  
  
Sometimes our researchers took a curious pride in the prowess of their  
high-speed computers. They would make such remarks as, “More than a  
million campaign calculations went into this analysis.” Or, “This is the first analysis  
done by man in which 10,000,000 multiplications were made.” Or even a more extreme 
boast, “These results came out of a complicated calculation performed by the most 
modern of high-speed computers using the most advanced mathematical techniques 
available. Do you want to argue with an electronic machine backed up by all the 
resources of modern science?”  
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The only possible answer to that question is, “Yes.”  
 




In a 1957 RAND Corporation survey of systems analysis techniques, part of a draft 
tentatively titled Military Planning in an Uncertain World, Herman Kahn and Irwin 
Mann asked defense analysts to distinguish between two very different types of 
uncertainty. “Statistical uncertainty” was not the problem for military strategists; it was 
amenable to quantitative calculations because it pertained “to fluctuations phenomena 
and random variables.”2 The larger barrier to enhancing military decision-making was 
the more problematic “real uncertainty.” Real uncertainty was the result of diverse 
“assumptions” and “objectives” that made probabilistic calculations impossible.3 Put a 
different way: statistical uncertainty is quantified by mathematical tools; real uncertainty 
falls outside the tools’ parameters and capabilities. Analysts, Kahn and Mann argued, 
needed to develop alternative approaches to deal explicitly with the inherent uncertainties 
in the ways people differently valued, for example, “categories of human lives, such as 
civilian and military, or friendly, neutral, and enemy.”4 This was, even to RAND 
analysts, incalculable. By the early-1960s, Kahn had moved from the RAND Corporation 
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to the think tank the Hudson Institute, and had developed what he argued was one of the 












Figure 2. “Real Uncertainty,” in 
Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, “Techniques of Systems Analysis”6  
 
 
Scenarios, according to Herman Kahn, were collections of “plausible” stories 
meant to “describe in more or less detail some hypothetical sequence of events.”7 They 
                                                
5 Kahn liberally used the concept of “muddling through” to describe the work he was doing: “I 
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been clearly formulated,” Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 575; Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-
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attempted to answer two questions: "1.) Precisely how might some hypothetical situation 
come about, step by step? [and] 2.) What alternatives exist, for each actor, at each step, 
for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process?”8 Starting in the late 1950s at the 
RAND Corporation, analysts introduced the production of scenarios as one way to 
generate “relatively plausible contexts” in the considerations of “future weapons” and 
“war-fighting strategies” that were overlooked by the prevailing quantitative 
methodologies of the period, including but not limited to game theory, Monte Carlo 
simulations, and probabilistic forecasts.9 Scenarios were not predictions, and there were 
not confined to “doomsday” worst-case scenarios.10 Rather, at their base, they were 
narrative articulations of “what if?” pushed to the furthest degree of plausibility.  
Herman Kahn made a name for himself at RAND with his audacious On 
Thermonuclear War, a 668-page argument detailing how thermonuclear war was not 
only possible, but also survivable. It became a bible for defense analysts in the early 
1960s, signaling a larger shift in military strategy from the authority of decorated 
generals to that of civilian “analysts” with an assortment of academic credentials in fields 
from mathematics, computer science, and sociology.11 Historian Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi 
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Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 6. 
9 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 77.   
 
10 Kahn’s chapter “Will the Survivors Envy the Dead?” in his 1960 On Thermonuclear War is the 
most cited example of “doomsday” scenarios. The history of Kahn’s apocalyptic worst-case 
scenarios has been well-examined. For a prime example of a more nuanced history, see Ghamari-
Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005).  
 
11 Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn.  
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has called Kahn a “visionary of the thermonuclear era.”12 As anthropologist Joseph 
Masco has argued, a key accomplishment of the American Cold War military complex 
were imaginaries of planetary destruction aimed at producing affective states.13 A special 
assistant to the Secretary of Defense once remarked: “we at the Department of Defense 
have been living off the intellectual capital accumulated by Herman Kahn.”14 It was no 
secret that both military generals and IBM executives went to Hudson Institute’s pricey 
lecture-seminars to see Herman Kahn’s charismatic scenario briefings on topics from 
geopolitical trends to changing values.15 New York Times journalist Richard Kostelanetz 
described Hudson Institute as a “one-man think tank.”16 And, Herman Kahn was called 
by the LA Times the “guru of his very own Hudson Institute.”17 
At RAND, Kahn’s flamboyant and ebullient presentations interwove “rationalist” 
methodologies made up of structural charts and pragmatic principles traditionally 
associated with interdisciplinary Cold War research centers with, as Sharon Ghamari-
Tabrizi has put it, a “self-consciously avant-garde sensibility.”18 It was at RAND that the 
energies of creative intellectuals like Herman Kahn gained traction in the face of the 
                                                
12 Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn, 1.   
 
13 Masco, The Theater of Operations.  
 
14 Arthur Herzog, “Report on a ‘Think Factory,’” New York Times Magazine (10 November 
1963): 12.  
 
15 William McWhirter, "I am one of the 10 most famous obscure Americans,” Life (6 December 
1968): 110. 
 
16 Richard Kostelanetz, “One-man think tank,” New York Times Sunday Magazine (1 December 
1968). 
 
17 James Real, “RAND vs. the Urban Crisis,” Los Angeles Times (30 June 1968): 20. 
 
18 Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn, 55.   
 
 47 
anxieties surrounding the unreal possibility of nuclear annihilation. Before the mid-
1960s, scenarios were used primarily for political-military speculation on war escalation 
closely associated with the RAND Corporation. This was the case when Kahn broke 
away from RAND in 1961, and started the Hudson Institute, along with defense analyst 
Max Singer and MIT mathematician Donald Brennan.  
Financed by contracts from the federal government and private industry 
donations, the think tank pitched their narrative-based approach to “thinking about the 
unthinkable” to audiences outside of the military establishment. The unknowable 
character of the future was a significant problem for postwar military strategists as well 
as business strategists. During the 1960s, Hudson Institute consulted with a diverse range 
of clients, from educational policy government agencies to the Department of Defense, 
NASA, and Stanford Research Institute; from US-based corporations like General 
Motors to multinational corporations like Shell.19 When the Hudson Institute started, they 
were one of numerous “think factories” that banked on the intellectual capital defense 
                                                
19 Douglas Martin, “Anthony J. Wiener, Forecaster of the Future, Is Dead at 81,” The New York 




analysts gained directly after WW2.20 These efforts were part of a larger tradition started 
by RAND of attempting to reframe war strategies for use by business executives.21  
In May of 1964, Hudson Institute inaugurated their Futures Program, widening 
their focus from defense studies to broader and more long-range economic, social and 
political contexts. For example, in one three-hour presentation to the managing directors 
of the construction company Bechtel Corporation, topics included changing values 
(including anti-institutionalism and the rise of humanism), technological crises that might 
hinder growth, the increasing influence of Japanese business, and the importance of the 
decentralized organizational structures of multi-national corporations.22 Hudson 
presented their scenarios as an important integrative context within which to consider 
corporate planning: a global view that considered a world economy in an interconnected 
                                                
20 In addition to futures work, Hudson also forayed into the world of economic development in 
Angola, Thailand, France, Columbia and New York. The Hudson Institute was also responsible 
for projects ranging from the more sinister “flying think tank” approach that was commissioned 
by Portuguese government to bolster colonialism to the more aspirational proposal to 
redevelopment New York’s “Welfare Island,” claiming to provide affordable apartments for all 
classes of people. In Columbia, they planned construction of an audacious ocean-to-ocean 
passage and power generating waterway between the Pacific and the Caribbean. Defense 
contracts continued in the face of Vietnam and the controversies over anti-ballistic (ABM). Paul 
Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 99; Neil Picket “A History of 
Hudson Institute,” (Croton-on-Hudson: Hudson Institute, 1992): 10-11; Bowen Northrup, “They 
Think for Pay,” Wall Street Journal (20 September 1967).  
 
21 Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi has argued that RAND’s 1950s advertisements in Fortune originally 
exposed businessmen to the merits of systems analysis. Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman 
Kahn, 56; Journalist John McDonald also wrote an optimistic 1951 article in Fortune “The war 
of wits.” McDonald saw in the first postwar think tank’s scientific analysis of war opportunities 
for business: “For any given sum of money and any particular division of this money, and for any 
particular choice of design characteristics of the weapon, an imaginary war is ‘fought’ and the 
damage to targets is computed according to the payoff chosen for the study.” John McDonald, 
“The war of wits,” Fortune (1 March 1951): 158, 152. On the more general topic of the mid-
century militarization of the social sciences, see Joy Rohde’s Armed with Expertise: The 
Militarization of American Social Science Research During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013).  
22 Letter from Ashton J. O’Donnell, Manager of Business Development for Bechtel Corporation 
to Herman Kahn, 26 April 1971. Hudson Institute Archive, National Defense University.  
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global society. For a fee between $5,000 and $25,000 corporations could join the Futures 
Program, gaining access to reports, newsletters and seminar courses dedicated to the 
exploration of the future through scenario methods.23 In the first year, clients included 
Corning Glass International, International Defense Analysis, International Business 
Machines Corporation, Lockheed, and Sprague Electronic.24  
This chapter articulates the early history of scenario techniques. 25 It tracks how 
the Hudson Institute modified scenarios from American thermonuclear defense strategy 
                                                
23 “Futures Program” brochure, Hudson Institute, 1964, Hudson Institute Archive, National 
Defense University.  
 
24 Memo from Felix Kaufmann, head of the Futures Program at Hudson Institute to James J. 
Ling, Ling-Temco-Vought, 21 May 1964, Hudson Institute Archive, National Defense 
University.  
 
25 Herman Kahn’s contribution to the field of scenario planning as a way to “think about the 
unthinkable” has been well-documented. See Roland Krupers and Angela Wilkinson, The 
Essence of Scenarios: Learning from the Shell Experience (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2014); Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself 
and Your Company (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996); Art Kleiner, The Age of Heretics: 
Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change (New York: Currency Doubleday, 
1996). This is most often limited to a sentence or two acknowledging Kahn. These superficial 
acknowledgements, however, overlook Kahn’s larger project and intellectual aspirations. These 
studies acknowledge Kahn’s military scenarios at RAND and neglect to mention Hudson 
Institute’s transition to business scenarios at the end of the 1960s, including the popular 
“Corporate Environment Study” that began in 1969.   
Many of the canonical scenarios from the 1970s from this dissertation, including Royal 
Dutch/Shell (Chapter 4) and Stanford Research Institute (Chapter 3), for example, were 
originally produced by Hudson Institute, including the famous “Belle Epoque,” a scenario for 
1975-1985 that was described as a world “duplicating in growth and spirit the decade before 
World War I which experienced such a rise in international communication, capital flow and 
world trade in an era of relative peace.” Herman Kahn and Leon Martel, “Corporate Environment 
Study” Research Memorandum #5 “Hudson Standard World #1, September 1974, 6, Hudson 
Institute Archive, National Defense University.  
Additionally, historians of science and technology have examined the postwar efforts to 
quantify complex social and political phenomena as simplified technical equations in fields such 
as operations research, linear programming, and game theory. Historians of science Lambert 
Williams and William Thomas have name this approach, one they identify as being misguided, as 
“technologist-as-“world controller.”” Yet, there has been no sustained inquiry into how the non-
calculative methods of producing scenarios developed and moved from war planning to corporate 
planning. See Lambert Williams and William Thomas, “The Epistemologies of Non-Forecasting 
Simulations, Part I: Industrial Dynamics and Management Pedagogy at MIT”, Science in Context 
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and presented them as advantageous to larger analyses of future economic, social and 
political phenomena for governments, and then, multinational corporations.26 Instead of 
using high-speed computers in forecasting or operations research, the Hudson Institute 
concentrated on producing collections of narrative scenarios: explicit synoptic 
frameworks of alternative future worlds from technocratic fantasies to post-apocalyptic 
nightmares, and worlds in-between. These scenarios came in the form of consistently 
modified sets of charts and fragmented, rapid-fire presentations. Though Kahn was 
explicit that he “made them up,” scenarios drew on unexpected sources, including the 
qualitative methodological considerations of sociologist of knowledge and science 
Robert K. Merton’s paradigm.27  
Starting with Kahn’s earlier methodological reservations about the limits of 
computing techniques to adequately formulate problems at RAND, this chapter argues 
that the objective of early scenarios was primarily methodological, rooted in military 
planning, and yet, substantiated by non-calculative sociological strategies and 
                                                
22, no. 02 (June 2009): 248. See also: Paul Erickson, The World that Game Theorists Made 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Paul Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and 
the Politics of Discourse in Cold War American (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Erickson et. al, 
How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality; Phillip 
Mirowski’s Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  
 
26 Peter Galison identifies three features of nuclear disaster scenarios: apocalyptic imaginaries; 
specific present references; and, caricatured sketches of reality to create “an extension of some 
elements of the world into its asymptomatic extreme.” Though there are many distinctions 
between the two kinds of scenarios, the third feature is the most prominent in Hudson Institute’s 
scenarios. See Peter Galison’s “The Future of Scenarios: State Science Fiction,” In The Subject of 
Rosi Braidotti: Politics and Concepts, by Bolette Blaagaard and Iris van der Tuin (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 40; also, Peter Galison, “The Half Life of Story,” In Hall of Half-
Life, by Tessa Giblin, (Graz: Steirischer Herbst, 2015).  
27 Kahn and Wiener,” The Year 2000, 8.  
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epistemological concerns shared by early work in the sociology of science.28 Hudson 
Institute’s scenarios differed from calculative forecasts and simulations; they were a kind 
of speculative sociological technique specific to the second half of the twentieth century. 
In this, scenario planning broadens the historiography of Cold War rationality.29 While 
scenario techniques emerged out of the ideological struggles of Cold War deterrence 
strategy in American defense-related think tanks, they were importantly animated by a 
critical awareness of the limitations of computing techniques to adequately calculate 
social and political conditions. The histories on Cold War rationality highlight the 
calculative or rule-based dimensions of rationality, ignoring the imaginative dimensions, 
like intuition and creativity.30 At the Hudson Institute, researchers certainly appealed to 
the rational rule-based processes of science. At the same time, however, their techniques, 
like scenario planning, attempted to self-consciously account for uncertainty, possibility, 
and unknowability. Kahn sought to develop scenarios as heuristic tools capable of 
flexibly modelling conceivable behaviour.31 This move was as much a reaction to the 
                                                
28Lemov, “Hypothetical Machines: The Science Fiction Dreams of Cold War Social Science,” 
Isis, 101, no. 2 (June 2010): 403, 405 
 
29 Erickson et. al, How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War 
Rationality. Here, I continue to build from historian of science William Thomas’ argument that 
postwar developments in systems analysis, operations research, and management science, what 
he calls the “sciences of policy” did not perceive the tools of science as the reigning intellectual 
authority, capable of overcoming cultural and political differences, or providing the ultimate 
solutions to complex problems. Thomas aims to upend what he sees as an assumption guiding the 
historiography of postwar science and technology: that acting rational was a product of naïve 
faith in the powers of science and technology, a project this dissertation continues. Thomas, 
Rational Action. 
 
30 Erickson et. al, How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War 
Rationality.  
 
31 This is similar to the discussion put forth by Lambert Williams and William Thomas regarding 
MIT Industrial Dynamics and Forrester. Williams and Thomas, “The Epistemologies of Non-
Forecasting Simulation.” 
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closed and mechanistic systems of forecasting tools as it was a response to the 
‘ideological’ anti-Establishment critiques from the New Left.32 Over the course of the 
late 1960s, Kahn and the Hudson Institute formalized and disseminated scenarios as an 
ideal approach for stretching and disciplining imaginative speculation in the growing 
field of corporate strategy.  
It is important to make clear the intellectual inspirations for Hudson Institute’s 
methodological approach for two reasons. The first reason is to connect this sociological 
methods to corporate strategy in order to further historian of science Orit Halpern’s 
argument that “capital has many guides”—rarely is it the “reason” or calculative 
“rationality” articulated by the historiography of postwar science. 33 The second reason is 
that the imaginative dimensions of corporate techniques are conjured through the day-to-
day techniques. 34 That is to say that the Hudson Institute’s production of scenarios was a 
creative act; the scenario technique treated future situations as an imagined world 
resulting from the aggregate of a multitude of forces and actors. This type of thinking 
enabled early sociologists of science to do their epistemological work, as it enabled 
military and business strategists to make war and business strategy after the postwar 
                                                
 
32 Media theorist Fred Turner distinguishes the New Left, the overtly political social movements 
that grew out of the civil rights and free speech movements in the 1960s, from the New 
Communalist, those who lived on communes or “saw the transformation of consciousness” as the 
route to American social transformation. Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart 
Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism, 31-32. 
 
33 Halpern, Beautiful Data: A History of Vision and Reason since 1945, 33.  
 
34 Here I follow Joseph Masco and Michelle Murphy’s work on the imaginative dimensions of 
Cold War military and public policy strategies. On the affective and imaginative dimensions of 
military strategy from the Cold war to the War on Terror, see Masco, The Theater of Operations: 
National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror; on the calculative techniques 
of population as an aggregate of intangible forms, see Murphy, The Economization of Life.  
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period. Following Kahn’s development of scenarios demonstrates how scenarios first 
became formalized and disseminated as an ideal heuristic approach for imaginative 
speculation that continues to circulate as a critical part of business school training and 
corporate strategy in the early twenty-first century. 
Speculative techniques aimed at what could be known and what could be 
prepared for rose to new prominence in the postwar period.35 Although engaging with the 
uncertainty of the future was not new, during the postwar period diverse fields attempting 
to improve complex decision-making by applying and expanding techniques from World 
War II surfaced—including operations research, systems analysis, and eventually, 
futurology.36 This rise can be partially attributed to an upsurge in government funds at 
unique, interdisciplinary research institutions, like the military think tank the RAND 
Corporation.  
Though the approaches and goals of these numerous advancements in military 
decision-making techniques differed, where they overlapped was in the debates 
concerning the proper role that the tools of science and technology could play in offering 
solutions to high-level problems. Operations research was one kind of military decision-
making strategy that emerged during the interwar years in Britain to differentiate 
laboratory-based research and development from attempts to integrate technologies into 
aerial combat.37 It was not until the mid-1950s that operations researchers “adopted” 
                                                
35 Andersson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World.”  
 
36 On think tanks, see Paul Dickson, Think Tanks. These are what historian William Thomas calls 
“the sciences of policy,” see Thomas, Rational Action.   
37 The history of operations research is covered well by Thomas, Rational Action, 81-174.  
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mathematically-based approaches to support their recommendations.38 Optimism 
accompanied the change in method, though many, including Charles Hitch, the head of 
the economics department at RAND Corporation between 1948-1961, asserted that 
operations research was at its best when applied to physical, “lower-level problems.”39 
During the postwar period, operations researcher mainly considered a set objective with 
specific criteria—for example, the optimal number of aircraft guns or ships necessary for 
an attack.   
Systems analysis importantly differed from operations research. It was broader 
and more speculative, offering a degree of flexibility to analysts. Instead of focusing on 
one particular attack, systems analysts considered how to increase the number of attacks, 
and kinds of weapons used, on enemy targets over a period of one month.40 Systems 
analysis became especially useful when there were no definite objectives or specific 
contexts or equipment, a situation common during the rapid technological advancements 
of World War II. With this broad scope and flexibility came more uncertainties, thus 
creating a considerable amount of scrutiny from strategists.41  
Scenarios developed in a fringe field of systems analysis that associated 
practitioners hesitantly called “futurology” during the mid-1950s in the United States and 
Europe. Futurology began its academic career as a discipline that applied the tools of 
                                                
38 William Thomas argues that the scope of operations research narrowed as it “adopted” 
mathematical methods in an attempt to gain legitimacy, see for example, Thomas, Rational 
Action, 33-40.  
 
39 Charles Hitch, “Letters to the Editor: Operations Research and National Planning—A Dissent,” 
Operations Research 5, no. 5 (1 October 1957): 718.  
 
40 Kahn and Mann, “Techniques of Systems Analysis,” 7.  
 
41 This criticism is well-known. See, for example, Thomas, Rational Action, 286.  
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systems analysis to problems of the distant future—often five, ten or even thirty years 
ahead. And, unlike the predominantly empirical emphasis of operations research and 
systems analysis, scenarios were principally qualitative and theoretical. Though in 
scenario analysts often positioned scientific credentials and empirical data as assets, 
scenarios were based on speculative, theoretical frameworks, particularly from sociology, 
as strategists attempted to self-consciously examine assumptions.  
 
 
Kahn as Human Computer  
 
It was Herman Kahn’s reaction to what he saw as the dangers associated with 
complicated mathematical abstractions that encouraged him to turn away from 
increasingly sophisticated calculative aids. First hired as a human “computer,” producing 
ballistic calculations manually, and then a leading expert in Monte Carlo simulations at 
RAND, Herman Kahn worked in a period marked by larger reservations toward 
automation in fields from operations research to systems analysis in the mid-1950s.   
In the early postwar period, military strategists at the RAND Corporation 
overwhelmingly used high speed computers to aid future prediction. Thus, most histories 
of forecasting focus on RAND’s statistical and calculative contributions to speculation.42 
                                                
42 The history of postwar computational forecasting will not be treated in depth here. Two 
histories that are drawn on in this dissertation are outlined in Jenny Andersson and Egle 
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For example, RAND strategists at first utilized human “computers” that calculated by 
hand on large worksheets. Later, the calculators used punched-cards and plugboards in 
order to calculate the optimal solutions to strategic warfare.43  
In 1947, when Herman Kahn was 25 years old, he was hired as a mathematical 
physicist at RAND. His specialty was Monte Carlo random sampling techniques, a 
“mainstay” in “analytic modeling” at the time.44 By 1953, Kahn had become an expert in 
Monte Carlo. Kahn often described Monte Carlo calculations through a simplified 
example:  
 
Suppose we have a simple game of solitaire and are interested in calculating the 
probability of winning the game. There are two ways to do this. The first is by 
exact combinatorial methods. We consider every possible shuffle as being equally 
likely, and simply count the number of different shuffles that will end in success. 
If we then divide this number of shuffles by the total number of possible shuffles, 
we have calculated the probability of winning. A solitaire game does not have to 
be very complicated before such a procedure would take more than a lifetime, 
even with high-speed computing machines. But there is a way to sidestep the 
combinatorial computation. It is not only easier, but it may be more pleasant also. 
We can simply play the game, say a thousand times…[or] trials could be 




Monte Carlo used random sampling and algorithmic simulation to probabilistically 
decide on an optimal solution to physical problems with a range of possibilities. 
Originally done manually, Kahn’s impressive accomplishment was to help to integrate 
RAND’s John von Neumann Numerical Integrator and Automatic Computer 
                                                
43 For an internal history of this at RAND, see Willis Ware, RAND and the Information 
Evolution: A History in Essays and Vignettes, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), 11-12. 
 
44 Ware, RAND And the Information Evolution: A History in Essays and Vignettes, 90.  
45 Kahn and Mann, “Techniques of Systems Analysis,” 48-49.  
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(JOHNNIAC) and Monte Carlo.46 JOHNNIAC was operational between 1953 and 
1966.47 Hudson Institute strategist B. Bruce-Briggs acclaims Kahn for bringing Monte 
Carlo from “Neumann and Ulam” to a larger field of applied mathematics by introducing 
a range of mathematical shortcuts, including assistance by the use of RAND’s A Million 
Random Digits with 100,000 Normal Deviates.48 Monte Carlo significantly shortened the 
time needed to conduct random sampling calculations.   
 For all the complicated computations, Kahn was all too aware that any misstep in 
assumptions of the foundational rules meant that the entire simulation would be 
misinformed. For decades, he was the expert on Monte Carlo, creating reams of paper 
calculating optimal situations according to probabilistic distribution. However, he was 
also attentive to how such calculations, while “simple in principle,” required a great deal 
of unaccounted-for assumptions. Kahn often expressed his hesitations with Monte Carlo: 
“In many cases it was necessary to idealize the problem so much to make it tractable to 
analysis that the resulting considered opinion was less valuable than almost any 
reasonable intuitive judgment which was based on an examination of the un-idealized 
problem.”49 More than this, Kahn became troubled by the hegemony of calculative 
simulation: “It is to be feared that it [calculative models] may have become too popular. 
Many people got so excited about the possibilities that they went overboard and claimed 
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entirely too much for the technique.”50 While at first Kahn embraced the calculative 
prowess of early machines, he began to consider Monte Carlo “tedious” and unfit for the 
task of policy analysis.51 R. John Williams contends that this reaction was against 
complicated mechanical calculation—and not the computer per se; Monte Carlo 
simulations were only capable of pinpointing a singular solution.52  
  Kahn and Mann captured these hesitations in a section of the 1957 RAND report 
Military Planning in an Uncertain World entitled “Ten Common Pitfalls.” Modelism—
the overreliance on idealized models—was their primary concern.53 It was not that Kahn 
and Mann entirely disapproved of technical tools. Instead, they were wary of analysts 
becoming overly “enamored of intellectual and mechanical gadgets, particularly more 
modern ones, such as high-speed computers, war gaming, information theory, linear and 
dynamic programming, differential analyzers, game theory, Monte Carlo, etc.”54  To 
focus too much on technical tools, instead of “real problems” in the world with its 
“mathematically untidy questions,” meant that policy would be guided astray.55  
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 It was not only Kahn and Mann that held these opinions. In a 1956 address to the 
Annual Meeting of the Operations Research Society of America, Columbia University 
professor B. O. Koopman cautioned researchers that there were limits to operations 
research.56  In his comments to the address, Charles Hitch echoed Koopman, suggesting 
“mechantitis” and “authorititis,” which stemmed from policymakers’ overreliance on 
high-speed computers to set the parameters on social and political problems, were a real 
concern.57 Even operations researchers were well-aware that many complex problems 





In the Absence of Relevant Knowledge   
 
During the 1960s, Hudson Institute analysts were intent on differentiating 
themselves from earlier policy techniques based arbitrarily on the experience of military 
generals, or worse, on the assumptions grounded in the kinds of unfounded calculative 
proficiency discussed above. As early as 1963, Hudson Institute asserted that scenario 
methods would be able to capture the assumptions accepted and unaccounted for by other 
methods:  
 
                                                
56 B. O. Koopman, “Fallacies in Operations Research,” Operations Research 4, no. 4 (1 August 
1956): 423.  
 
57 Charles Hitch, “Comments by Charles Hitch” Operations Research 4, (1956): 426-430; 
Thomas, Rational Action, 270. 
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The kind of policy research we are concerned with here, then, emphasizes 
attempts to derive substitutes for relevant knowledge, experiment, judgment, 
perception, insight and intuition. It tends to rely heavily on such things as.. 





It was not simply that scenarios generated intuition or creativity that guided the work of 
Hudson Institute. Scenarios served the dual task of expanding the imagination to capture, 
for example, all possible war measures and countermeasures, while aspiring towards an 
approach amenable to rational, structural stipulation. This is what the scenario approach 
offered: a capacity to develop general frameworks that could be continually revised in 
the absence of, in Kahn’s words, “relevant knowledge, experience, perception, judgment, 
insight, and intuition.”59 Kahn imagined that scenarios techniques would enable analysts 
to bring imagination to bear systematically on "the interaction of complex and/or 
uncertain factors."60  
 Kahn believed scenarios were best suited to reducing “carry-over thinking” that 
inevitably haunted research even “when it is clear to all the 1975 cannot be the same as 
1945 or even 1960.”61 Thus, “scenarios are one way to force oneself and others to plunge 
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into the unfamiliar and rapidly changing world of the present and of the future by 
dramatizing and illustrating the possibilities they focus on.”62 Scenarios also, “force the 
analyst to deal with details and dynamics which he might easily avoid treating if he 
restricted himself to abstract consideration.”63 In other words, scenarios were an 
“antidote for concentrating exclusively on the forest and ignoring the trees: analysts who 
limit themselves to abstract generalizations may easily overlook crucial details and 
dynamics.”64 At the same time, Kahn was aware of the dangers of thinking that scenarios 
were sufficient to understand “reality.” On this, Kahn warns: “a specific estimate, 
conjecture, or context, even if it is later shown to have serious defects, is often better than 
a deliberate blank which tends to stop thoughts and research.”65  
In 1966, Hudson Institute’s lecture-seminars began to feature a set of scenario 
charts mapping the possibilities for the next thirty-three years. One scenario, what Kahn 
called the “Standard World,” has gained the majority of the attention from scholars. 
Business journalist Art Kleiner has labelled this world as one of “worldwide peace and 
financial boom.”66 The “Standard World” has been described by critical scholars as a 
delusion created out of technological optimism. The belief that technology could drive 
economic progress—and thus lead to worldwide prosperity— has been subjected to 
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66 Art Kleiner, Age of Heretics: Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change, 
(New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996), 130.  
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critiques of technological determinism since at least Thorstein Veblen. That is to say, the 
critiques of the pro-growth position of the “Standard World” connect to a much longer 
history of critical theories of technology.67   
The “Standard World” was based upon what the Hudson Institute identified as the 
important thirteen trends. These trends included, for example, the spread of secular 
humanism, rising technological and scientific innovations that could be integrated into 
institutional environments, and population growth. In this world, the scarcities of 
resources and poverty would be solved by technological ingenuity. In Kahn and Wiener’s 
dramatic articulation of the “Standard World” there are no mass crises: "The more 
desperate and seemingly eternal problems of human poverty will be solved" and "most 
misery will derive from the anxieties and ambiguities of wealth and luxury, not from 
physical suffering due to scarcities."68  
 
 
                                                
67 For the quintessential example of this history and critique, see Merrit Roe Smith and Leo 
Marx, Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
 








The assumptions of the “Standard World” model examined in isolation provide 
grounds for critique. Social philosopher William Irwin Thompson best captures the thrust 
of the arguments against this world in his At the Edge of History, contending that Kahn’s 
projections were invested in the growth of the corporation and machine—with their 
                                                
69 Herzog, “Report on a “Think Factory.”” Hudson Institute Archive, National Defense 
University.  
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industrial metaphors—at the expense of the individual, society and the environment.70 
Elsewhere, Thompson claimed that Kahn and Hudson Institute, as members of a Western 
liberal humanist elite, were training world leaders at places like Harvard Business School 
to think that this version of increased enterprise —what Thompson calls an “irrational” 
investment in the “mythical claim”—was the only means of measuring progress.71  
Generally speaking, I believe Thompson’s characterization to be true. When 
focusing solely on this “Standard World,” the critique that it secures the expansive 
futures of global capitalism and the unregulated expansion of technology by a selected 
group of business and intellectual leaders is not unfounded.72 The “Standard World” is 
one where capitalism triumphs over limitations of resources and overall increase in Gross 
National Product of major powers becomes a marker for prosperity. Taken at face 
value—and under the assumption that such a technique will lead to the emergence of this 
world—the framework of the “Standard World” is grounds enough for such criticism.  
Much more interesting, I think, are the often-unacknowledged sets of alternative 
worlds presented by Hudson Institute. Hudson Institute’s “Standard World” was always 
accompanied by a series of “Canonical Variations.” These original alternative worlds 
were adjustments based upon three criteria: “more integrated,” more “inward-looking,” 
                                                
70 William Irwin Thompson, At the Edge of History and Passages about Earth: A Double Book 
(New York: Steiner Books, 1990), 142-151.   
 
71 World Opinion Forum. Margaret Mead, Herman Kahn, William Irwin Thompson -  Nuclear 
Power. The Next Century. Accessed 1 October 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-
QwGBDbd3M. 
 
72 See, for example, Susie O’Brien, ‘“We Thought the World Was Makeable”: Scenario Planning 
and Postcolonial Fiction,” Globalizations 13, no. 3 (3 May 2016).  
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or in greater “disarray.”73 What if, for example, the world became politically and 
economically coordinated, but excluded the third world from having influence? What if 
the world became more progressive and pragmatic, and developed welfare programs? 
And, finally, what if NATO collapsed? Although they were assumed to be less likely, 
they were postulated with the stipulation that there were no factual bases for the future. 
“The most salient of the projects we can make is one that is “surprise-free,” Kahn admits, 
“nevertheless it would be very surprising if any thirty-three year period the real world did 
not produce many political and technological surprises.”74 Kahn’s supposed faith in 
“rational science” is tempered by the acknowledgement that there is no relevant 
knowledge about how things will be, and thus, the “future worlds” are to be taken 
“mostly as heuristics” to “further discussion” and attempt to identify and make sense of 
heterogeneous “assumptions.”75  
For Kahn, scenarios were the central weapons in his assault on the “clumsiness of 
passionate thinking” that encouraged only optimism or pessimism from corporate policy 
to war-fighting strategies. Kahn positioned himself in contradistinction to “sloppy, 
emotional thinking,” claiming that he was against “ignorance,” and “against the whole 
cliché at the moment.”76 As historian of science Elena Aronova pointed out, it was Bell’s 
“end of ideology” discussions that turned the social-economic and political studies of 
                                                
73 Kahn and Wiener, “The Next Thirty-Three Years: A Framework for Speculation,” 727-28.  
 
74 Kahn and Wiener, The Year 2000, 8. 
 
75 Kahn and Wiener, The Year 2000, 8. 
 
76 Joseph B. Treaster, “Herman Kahn Dies; Futurist and Thinker on Nuclear Strategy,” The New 
York Times, 8 July 1983, Obituaries. http://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/08/obituaries/herman-
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science into a central topic of concern in cold war America, providing a pre-history of the 
discipline of science studies.77 Kahn believed his future worlds—from “Standard World” 
and “Canonical Variations” – resisted simplistic views of socio-technical realms, 
including the inherent tensions and contradictions. Interestingly, sociologist Robert 
Merton’s paradigm provided just such the inspiration.  
 Kahn built on Merton’s “paradigm” while producing scenarios: he saw Merton’s 
paradigms as “more elaborate than a metaphor made explicit,” yet “less formal than an 
analytical model.”78 Merton’s efforts to systemize qualitative sociological analysis 
through codification of ideas meant that strategists could potentially evaluate a range of 
assumptions simultaneously. Kahn used Mertonian paradigms as the building blocks of 
scenarios. By following the intellectual inspirations that guided the creation of scenarios 
instead of the specific scenarios themselves, I trace one connection between early 
aspirational methods from the sociology of science, one strand of science studies, and 






                                                
77 Aronova, “The Conquest for Cultural Freedom, Minerva, and the Quest for Instituting “Science 
Studies” in the Age of the Cold War.” The “end of ideology” was, in Aronova’s words, “a 
normative position” used to reconcile the “free market (a cherished capitalist system) and 
centralized planning (firmly associated with Soviet economic system), in the political economy 
of the post-WWII world shaped by dramatically increased role of science and technology.” (309).  
 
78 Kahn and Wiener, The Year 2000, 403.  
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Paradigm for the Sociology of Strategy   
 
Hudson Institute first referenced Robert K. Merton’s term “paradigm” in a 1963 report 
on war strategies for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Project Agency 
(ARPA). Starting in the 1940s, Merton began using the term “paradigm,” to describe a 
technique that could systemize qualitative sociological analysis for cross comparison and 
provide theoretical rigour to social anthropologists. Robert K. Merton was a product of 
the sociological school of structural-functionalism that emerged from Harvard 
University’s Sociology Department in the 1930s, a field most closely associated with the 
Talcott Parsons. Parson’s functionalism—especially his focus on introducing theoretical 
meticulousness to sociology – inspired Merton even as he sought to differentiate himself 
from Parson’s universalist social systems, instead opting for theories of “middle range.”79  
Merton aimed to show how social and cultural factors (he called them “existential”) 
shaped mental products in the articulation of ideal types. However, Merton differed from 
Parsons’ stable systems of social order and dysfunction even as he sought to establish 
sociology as a proper science. In Merton’s words: “the analytical paradigm identifies the 
basic assumptions, problems, concepts, and hypotheses incorporated in the sociological 
idea in order to generate researchable questions and to provide for continuities of 
                                                
79 For the most generous reading of Merton, see Steven Shapin, “Understanding the Merton 
Thesis,” Isis 79, no. 4 (1988): 594–605; For a discussion of the mid-century emergence of 
Harvard University as an “interstitial academic space” made up of informal “clubs, discussion 
groups, societies, pedagogical programs, seminars, and marginal departments and schools,” see 
Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 60-62; on 
professional and epistemic norms of Harvard’s sociology department, see Jamie Cohen-Cole, 
“Chapter 3: Interdisciplinarity as a Virtue,” In The Open Mind: Cold War Politics and the 
Sciences of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).  
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theoretical and empirical inquiry.”80 The Mertonian paradigm offered Kahn a “systematic 
and precise” approach to war strategy that highlighted methodological considerations 
over tacit assumptions.81 The problem for Kahn was that there were assumptions 
embedded within each disciplinary community of war strategists that were never 
explicitly stated. For Kahn, “paradigms” would enable war strategists to process large 
amounts of interconnected information streams from the different communities, adding 
scientific rigour and promoting abilities for systematic analysis. One of the major 
objectives of the original DARPA report was to “to create propaedeutic and heuristic 
methodologies.”82 This is something he derived directly from Merton’s 1949 sociological 
volume on Social Theory and Social Structure.83 
                                                
80 Robert K. Merton, “A Life of Learning,” In On Social Structure and Science (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 357.  
 
81 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 1; an attention to tacit knowledge, the 
unarticulated skills and embodied practices of scientific knowledge, was also important to the 
early history of science studies. See, for example, Harry Collins, “The TEA Set: Tacit 
Knowledge and Scientific Networks,” Science Studies 4 (1974): 165-86.     
 
82 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 61; the complete list of objectives includes: 1. 
To stimulate and stretch the imagination and improve the perspective; 2.To clarify, define, name, 
expound and argue major issues; 3.To design and study alternative policy "packages" and 
contexts; 4. To create propaedeutic and heuristic expositions, methodologies, paradigms, and 
frameworks;  5. To improve intellectual communication and cooperation, particularly by use of 
historical analogies, scenarios, metaphors, analytic models, precise concepts, and suitable 
language; 6. To increase the ability to identify new patterns and crises and to understand their 
character and significance; 7. To furnish specific knowledge and to generate and document 
conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions; 8. To clarify current realistic policy choices, 
with emphasis on those that retain efficiency and flexibility over a broad range of contingencies; 
9. To improve the "administrative" ability of decision-makers and their staffs to react 
appropriately to the new and unfamiliar.” This list of objectives shaped Hudson Institute’s work 
for over a decade, and it changed little across reports funded by different agencies.  
 
83 It is unclear exactly how Kahn became attuned to Merton’s sociological work. However, 
Merton shared a department with sociologist and Hudson Institute interlocutor Daniel Bell, and 
Merton pursued research supported by mid-century corporate and foundation benefactors at the 




“Paradigms” also played an important role in the emergence of science studies. 
Although the term is most closely associated with the 1962 publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it was originally used by Merton.84 At its 
most basic, the Mertonian paradigm enabled the examination of normative science and 
thus emphasized the cognitive limitations (or assets) that impinged upon scientific 
knowledge.85 Different from the Kuhnian paradigm, the Mertonian paradigm was less 
expansive,  focusing on the “analytical observer” as opposed to the community being 
observed.86 Historian of science Steven Shapin puts Merton’s claim this way: “the social 
dimension” of different communities of sociologists needed attention; it was the 
“legitimacy of individualist frameworks for interpreting scientific knowledge” that was 
Merton’s aim, rather than the “legitimacy of scientific knowledge.”87 These paradigms 
                                                
84 There have been numerous interpretations of the Kuhnian and Mertonian paradigms, and this 
reflects divisions in the fields of the science studies and the history of science. For one 
interpretation, see Lorraine Daston, “History of Science and Science Studies,” Critical Inquiry 
35, no. 4 (2009). 
 
85 Merton’s theories have received much criticism from sciences studies. These critiques are not 
unfounded, and they deserve attention: First, Merton was primarily interested in “externalist” 
accounts of science that defined the early sociology of science. He granted special status to 
scientific practices and scientific knowledge, leaving them “black boxed.” Instead, he was 
invested in examining the cognitive and social/cultural factors—the environment— that 
influenced the progress of science. Second, Merton was a functionalist, meaning that he was 
invested in “normal” science. “Normal” science was about the progress of science, and thus, 
focused on the things that potentially impinged upon it; Merton was not interested in challenging 
scientific knowledge. For a good summary of the critiques, see Karin Knorr-Cetina, “Review: 
Merton’s Sociology of Science: The First and the Last Sociology of Science?” Contemporary 
Sociology 20, no. 4 (1991): 522–26.      
 
86 Robert Merton, “Paradigms: The Codification of Social Theory,” In Robert K. Merton and 
Piotr Sztompka, On Social Structure and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
61. 
 
87 Steven Shapin, “Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 21, no. 1 (August 1995), 300.  
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came in the form of ideal types for particular communities—a prime example is the 
Mertonian ethos of normative science.88  
In one 1963 Hudson Institute report to ARPA, partially a lengthy justification as 
to why analysts needed abstract, theoretical guidance, Kahn quotes Merton at length. 
Articulating future scenarios as paradigms happened before Hudson Institute’s 
transitioned from defense-related scenarios to business and social policy analysis. One of 
the “main objectives” in thinking about future wars was to create “a structured set of 
explicit assumptions, definitions, typologies, conjectures, analyses, and questions.”89 
Kahn looked to Robert Merton as a guide, quoting his Social Theory and Social Structure 
at length. Kahn cited Merton’s outline of paradigms verbatim not only in his Hudson 
Institute research report “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” but also in his book 
written along with fellow Hudson Institute analyst Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000.90   
In these pages, Merton argued that paradigms had five “interrelated functions”: 
1.) Paradigms were notational. In this, they enabled sociologists to simultaneously 
inspect their analyses and understandings, a task made difficult when concepts and 
assumptions were implicit. 2.)  Paradigms made assumptions explicit. Each assumption 
was to be stated explicitly within the paradigms. 3.) Paradigms furthered knowledge. 
                                                
88 In Merton’s words: “Four sets of institutional imperatives—universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, organized skepticism—are taken to compromise the ethos of modern science,” 
Robert Merton, “The Normative Structure of Science,” In The Sociology of Science: Theoretical 
and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).  
 
89 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 68; Repeated verbatim in Kahn and Wiener, 
The Year 2000, 403.  
 
90 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 12-16; In Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 
Debate,” 68-70; Repeated almost verbatim in Kahn and Wiener, The Year 2000, 404-405. 
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Merton believed that sociologists could build off each other’s theoretical understandings 
if they were made explicit, an idea that Kahn wanted to extend to analysts. 4.) Paradigms 
aided critical examination. Merton urged that by explicitly outlining theories, “empirical 
and theoretical”91 problems would be more easily identified.  And, 5.) Paradigms brought 
the rigour of quantitative procedures to qualitative analysis. Merton claimed paradigms 
would bring forward the implicit analytical concepts of qualitative analysis that were 
thought “reside in a private world inhabited exclusively by penetrating but unfathomable 






Figure 4. The Interrelated Functions of Robert Merton’s Paradigms  
in Herman Kahn’s “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate.”93  
                                                
91 Merton quoted in Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 70.   
 
92 Merton quoted in Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 70.  
 




Here were the goals of scenarios, quoted directly from Merton, as Kahn saw them in 
1967. These were goals that Kahn and associated repeated verbatim in other reports. For 
social scientists, policy analysts and corporate executives, Merton’s paradigms served as 
a sociological and scientific technique that proved flexible enough to transcend 
ideological constraints—it was both ‘rational’ and ‘dispassionate’. Kahn suggested that 
Merton’s “paradigms” were ideal as they were “more than a metaphor in attempting to be 
relevant and rigorous” and “less than a model in its definiteness, preciseness and 
analyzability.”94  Merton’s paradigm provided Herman Kahn with a generalizable 
sociological framework with which to build scenarios.  
 
 
The Paradigmatic Scenario  
 
To grasp the crucial features of scenarios, one cannot look only to Kahn’s many 
publications or the content of any one scenario. His lectures were performative, a jumble 
of jokes, storytelling and ‘rational analysis’ complete with provocative statements, 
sprawling charts, odd puns, and catch phrases.95 During his lectures, Kahn armed himself 
with nothing more than two remote controlled Kodak carrousel projectors, two 
presentation screens, and hundreds of slides filled with charts of future plausibilities. 
Historian Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests that Herman Kahn gained “epistemic 
                                                
94 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” i.  
 




authority” through his aesthetic and avant-garde style, a feature of RAND Corporation in 
the postwar period.96 It was through the free form, “open form” style of the presentations 
and the “zig-zaggery of fragmentary alternatives” in the graphs and columns that the 
inherent uncertainties, and the “absence of consensus” regarding the future, could come 
to light.97 
Kahn’s presentations, and the books and reports that accompany them, evade 
simple categorization. One Hudson Institute report entitled "Notes on the US 
Political/Values/Morale Milieu in the 1970s" begins with a self-conscious note of 
warning: "Readers are cautioned that items on the charts reproduced here may be 
unintelligible or directly misleading if they are interpreted outside the context of the talk 
they are designed to accompany. (Some have been included ironically, in order to raise 
questions, and in order to be controverted by the speaker…)."98 Kahn’s ideas, however 
inchoate in his scenario routines, became cemented in the transcripts that were 
transformed by Kahn’s secretarial staff into the fodder for Kahn’s published texts. He did 
not like to write. Kahn had no reservations about reusing materials and slides over and 
over: these “routines,” as Kostelanetz called them, were often verbatim anecdotes, 
arguments and frameworks from previous work, scenarios included.99  
                                                
96 Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Chapter 2: The Cold War Avant-Garde at RAND,” The Worlds of Herman 
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97 Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Chapter 5: How to Build a World with Artful Intuition,” The Worlds of 
Herman Kahn, 129-130.  
 
98 Herman Kahn, “Notes on the US Political/Values/Morale Milieu in the 1970s,” Hudson 
Institute Archives, National Defense University.   
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Most historical accounts of Kahn’s lectures reference to his overwhelming 
stature, his intellectual prowess, his at times incoherent and contradictory methods of 
communications, and his sweatiness.100 He moved deftly from technological innovations 
he thought likely by the twenty-first century—these included artificial moons lighting 
large areas, weather control, automatic grocery stores, superconnectivity, and 
programmed dreams—to jokes about accessing inner space through mystic or drug-
induced experimentation.101 Whether loved or hated, no one could disagree that he was 
captivating, even if he could be overly pugnacious.  
In 1963, Hudson Institute first suggested that conjuring “alternative future 
worlds” was a viable war strategy in a report for Advanced Research Project Agency for 
the Department of Defense: “By constructing a series of named worlds and more or less 
consistently treating the factors involved in a comparable fashion, we may both be able 
to understand each one separately better, and by making arguments clearer lead to more 
emphasis on the more important cases and situations.”102 It was neither a particular future 
situation they were interested in, nor a set of predicted futures that they sought. The 
Hudson Institute focused on the methodological considerations involved in conjuring 
alternative worlds. The instructions were to categorize important themes, such as 
                                                
100 See, for example, Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn, 203-204.    
 
101 Kahn and Wiener, “One hundred technical innovations very likely in the last third of the 
twentieth century,” The Year 2000, 51-55; Kahn did not have empathetic feelings towards the 
mystical and spiritual exploration of “inner space.” These movements make me “totally cold,” he 




102 ARPA (later renamed to DARPA) was established in 1958 with a mission to advance the 
American military’s technical prowess. Hudson Institute was awarded a contract to study “the 
changing international security environment” in 1962; it was renewed annually until 1972. Picket 
“A History of Hudson Institute,” 8; Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 81.  
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political factors and military factors, and then create related lists of hypothetical variables 
within each theme. For example, possible political factors of the 1970s might include: 
“population explosion; nuclear stalemates; small world; frustrated expectations; envy, 
racism, nationalism; ban-the-bomb movements; West has Ancien Régime morale; social 
order vs. social justice.”103  
The report states directly the appeal of this speculative approach and the 
methodological objective for these speculative future environments: “Imagination has 
always been one of the principle means for dealing in various ways with the future, and 
the scenario is simply one of many devices useful in stimulating and disciplining the 
imagination.”104 By conjuring alternative futures, Hudson Institute pulled together the 
seemingly contradictory techniques of intuition and rationality. In his widely popular 
1969 study “Technological Forecasting and Long-Range Planning,” Hudson Institute 
contractor Robert Ayres positioned scenarios as a more evolved evaluation method of 
future environments: “although intuition is an undisciplined and unreliable form of 
cognition, it is not—as some would have it—the antithesis of rational analysis, nor 
should we imagine that intuition cannot be improved by the application of system and 
order.”105  
The report instructs analysts how to craft the worlds with the help of their 
imagination, while admitting that the distinctions between the approaches were parsed 
                                                
103 Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 85.  
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105 Ayres, “Technological Forecasting and Long-Range Planning, 143.  
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“arbitrarily.”106 The alternative futures conjured in response to “What if?” could be 
extrapolated through a variety of methods. One commonplace method was the use of 
“simple extrapolation” whereby the “underlying supposition” is that the future 
environment does not change from current trends.107 For example, one way to construct 
scenarios was by identifying potential future problems, like overpopulation and mass 
starvation, by projecting population and food production estimates. Other approaches 
included synthetic (start with actors and situations, looks for environment); 
morphological (begin with environment, look for actors and situations)…syncretic (start 
with desired future, work backwards); intuitive-empirical (like extrapolative technique, 
“only more concrete”); and abstract-analytic (make abstract model, then use variables to 
change model).108 Kahn generally opposed the extrapolation approach, as the “if” in the 
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To put it a different way, making scenarios was an attempt to generate and 
systematically order a complicated array of factors—be they social, technological, 
economic and political— whose discontinuous change might affect the future.111 The 
inventive move in Hudson’s scenario approach to planning was to suggest that future 
plausibility could be broken down into an array of variables, especially political and 
social forces, that could then be inverted, manipulated, extrapolated or combined 
imaginatively. It was not a technical revolution: there was neither an optimal future 
equation nor a refined calculative prediction. Following a trend emerging in sociological 
                                                
110 Kahn. “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 82. Hudson Institute Archive, National 
Defense University.  
 
111 Original alternative futures were differentiated by Greek letters as opposed to names. Each 
world denoted a variation on a particular theme, for example: Apha-1; Alpha 1-6 would be 
variations on “Mostly Peaceful and Prosperous” while Beta 1-5 were variations on “Many 
Structural Stresses.”  Kahn, “A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Debate,” 89. 
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thought best captured by Daniel Bell’s “end of ideology,” the Hudson Institute sought to 
rise above the ideological fray by rejecting any “ideology of romantic protest against 
contemporary life.”112 It was a conceptual shift in strategy, one focused primarily on 
systematic speculation that took seriously the tensions and contradictions between groups 
of individuals in the world. “I am not here to discuss substantive problems,” once Kahn 
told seminar participants, “but to stimulate your minds. I want to be able to shock 
(you).”113   
The second crucial methodological aspect of Hudson Institute’s scenarios was the 
environment within which Kahn and associates articulated them. Hudson Institute was 
established during the financial and intellectual heyday for postwar experts on a scenic 
campus in Croton-on-Hudson; located on the site of a former mental institution, it was 
intentionally isolated from Washington and New York business as dispassion was one of 
Hudson’s many self-proclaimed qualities. An additional component of the technique was 
Hudson Institute’s lecture-seminars on an annual theme, a common executive training 
technique that rose during the postwar period. As the attendance expanded from military 
generals to corporate leaders, so too did the ambition of the Hudson Institute. The 1965 
theme was a modest look at “The Decade Ahead”; by 1968, Hudson Institute was 
speculating on “The Next Thirty-Three Years.” Most of the lecture-seminars happened 
either at the Hudson Institute, or the Sterling Forest Onchiota Conference Center in 
upstate New York. The lecture-seminar was a business retreat, one where top executives 
and military generals could be sequestered to listen to Kahn for days at a time. 
                                                
112 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 38. The “end of ideology”  
 
113 “Strategie: Duell im Dunkel,” 1967, Der Spiegel. 
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Conversations overflowed from the seminars into the hikes and the elaborate meals 
supplied with copious amounts of alcohol.114 The Hudson brochure described the 








While Herman Kahn was already well-known for his thinking on thermonuclear war in 
the early 1960s—it was not until the publication of The Year 2000: A Framework for 
Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years with Anthony Wiener that “alternative 
worlds” became an important point of consideration for multinational corporations. It 
began when, in 1965, Herman Kahn was invited by the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences to join the Commission on the Year 2000. Headed by sociologist Daniel Bell –
whose anti-ideological pluralism gained him both praise and criticism—  the 
commission, made up mostly of academics, sought to think “consciously” and 
“rationally” about the future simultaneously.116 In the memorandum to the Commission, 
                                                
114 Note the similarity here to the virtues of 1960s academic conferences described by Cohen-
Cole, Chapter 4: “The Academy as Model America,” The Open Mind.    
 
115 This is to say that as much as the scenario process became the focus, so too did charisma and 
exuberance become a part of Hudson’s scenarios. “Charismatic authority has recently gained 
attention in science studies, most notably in historian of science Steven Shapin’s The Scientific 
Life: A Moral History of A Late Modern Vocation. Shapin works to contextualize and legitimate 
the “charismatic authority” needed in these future shaping “risk taker[s],” of the late modern 
period (267, 210). He argues that “trust, familiarity, and personal virtue” are essential to analysts 
looking towards the future (3). These virtues mobilize from the “radical normative uncertainties” 
of late modern technoscience that plague the “people who speak on behalf of nature, technology, 
and the future” (312). Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of A Late Modern Vocation. 
For more on charisma in the rise of corporate scenarios methodologies, see Chapter 4.  
 
116 Bell, The End of Ideology.  
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Bell identifies the motivation for convening: it was an awareness that there were “no 
adequate mechanisms to anticipate, plan for, guide, or “invent” the future” combined 
with the overwhelming nature of the “fractious problems (Negro rights, poverty, 
pollution, urban sprawl…)” that have been dealt with in a “piecemeal fashion.”117  
 Joining the Commission on the Year 2000 was a large break for the Hudson 
Institute. As early as 1965, Hudson Institute annual reports suggested that they were 
looking for an appropriate venue to expand their analysis from defense strategy to large 
questions related to economic, political and social transformations.118 The commission’s 
initial publication, a 1967 issue of Daedalus, entitled “Toward the Year 2000: Work in 
Progress,” was one of the first of its kind to bring together academics to think about the 
longer-term future. Questions of value changes and scale changes guided the sociological 
postulates of the commission.119 These included: 1. The idea that a “post-industrial 
society” was emerging that changed the form of economic exchange from industrial era 
goods-production to services sectors that relied heavily upon imaginaries regarding the 
rising abilities of technology and information and its relationship to knowledge 
production; 2. A change in the “character of technology” from a mechanical process to 
an intellectual process that accompanied the rise in software and programming; and, 3. 
                                                
117 Preliminary Memorandum to the Members of the Commission on the Year 2000, in Bell, 
Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, 17.  
 
118 Hudson Institute, “Annual report to members, 1965.” Hudson Institute Archive, National 
Defense University.  
 
119 Daniel Bell’s introduction to the Commission’s publication, Toward the Year 2000, began 
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number of factious problems like “negro rights, poverty, pollution, urban sprawl, and so on…” 
Daniel Bell, Stephen Richards Graubard, and American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
Commission on the Year 2000, Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1969), 17.  
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Social and philosophical changes that characterized the 1960s.120 The work of the 
commission coincided with many other organizations exploring the future at the same 
moment. Two of the most notable were the Futuribles project on French public policy in 
Paris that was funded by the Ford Foundation and headed by Bertrand De Jouvenel 
beginning in 1960, and the former RAND Corporation mathematician Olaf Helmer’s 
Institute for the Future established in 1968 in Connecticut.121 Daniel Bell began his foray 
into studying the future after he attended the 1963 Futuribles conference in Paris where 
he produced his popular paper, “Twelve Modes of Prediction—a Preliminary Sorting of 
Approaches in the Social Sciences” on the problems with prediction in the social 
sciences.122 
After the issue of Daedalus, the Commission funded Hudson Institute to produce 
scenarios that were hastily put together and published as The Year 2000. It became an 
unintentional bestseller, officially inaugurating long-term thinking as a viable business 
strategy. This is how the “Standard World” and “Canonical Variations” scenarios gained 
traction in the business world. Kahn and the Hudson Institute made a list of thirteen 
trends that they believed had been continuing for decades, in the model of the Mertonian 
                                                
120 Bell et al., Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, xiv-xv.  
 
121 Andersson, “The great future debate and the struggle for the world,” 1417-1419. On the 
“Futuribles” project and Bertrand de Jouvenel, see Robert Colquhoun, “The art of social 
conjecture: remembering Bertrand de Jouvenel”; On Olaf Helmer and the Institute for the Future, 
see  
 
122  Robert Colquhoun, “The Art of Social Conjecture: Remembering Bertrand de Jouvenel,” 28; 
Daniel Bell, “Twelve Modes of Prediction – a Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social 
Sciences,” Daedalus 93: 845-80.  
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paradigm. It was the methodological considerations of the “Standard World” and 
“Canonical Variation” that Hudson Institute offered in their lecture-seminars.  
Kahn and Wiener suggested that next thirty-three years would likely see increases 
in standards of living worldwide and economic growth, essentially. Poverty, pollution 
and famine would end, and dwindling resources would be turned around due to new 
knowledge in science and technology. They produced hundreds in-line with this 
"surprise-free" future, outlining the optimistic scenarios of worldwide economic growth 
and technological expansion.123 Corporations were intrigued, and were quick to invest in 
Kahn’s scenario process: it promised ways to cope with the technological and economic 
changes of post-industrial society that was different from the suggestions coming from 
the Club of Rome.124 
Kahn and Wiener positioned The Year 2000 scenarios in contradistinction to less 
optimistic future-oriented projects, like the Club of Rome’s. The Club of Rome emerged 
after a meeting of bureaucrats, primarily from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Committee for Science Policy, at the Agnelli 
Foundation at the Accademia dei Lincei in Rome in 1968.125 The Club of Rome, made up 
of a diverse group of intellectuals, commissioned a report on the future problems of 
                                                
123 This is not to say that there was not considerable skepticism regarding the usefulness of the 
future-oriented approach. In 1967, seven of the eleven contracts for the Office of Civil Defense 
undertaken by Hudson Institute produced findings and reports that were deemed "less useful than 
had been expected, or required major revisions," McWhirter, "I am one of the 10 most famous 
obscure Americans,” 113. 
 
124 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 251. See Chapter 3 for a more on the Club of Rome.  
 
125 Matthias Schmelzer has recently made clear that the OECD has been crucial, and largely 
neglected, in the history of the Club of Rome. For more on this debate, see Chapter 3. Matthias 
Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth 
Paradigm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
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mankind. Italian industrialist, former Fiat executive, and anti-fascist Aurelio Peccei, the 
founder of the group, was concerned that the future was threatened by problems of 
pollution, scarcity of resources, and population growth, on a scale and complexity too 
large for an individual to manage.126 It was the crisis of crises, the problem of mankind, 
"le problématique". The data from the report came from MIT systems scientist Jay 
Forrester's world dynamics computer model, an outcome of his Systems Dynamics 
approach from the 1950s and 60s.127 The Club of Rome commissioned Forrester to 
develop five world systems simulations. According to The Limits to Growth, the 1972 
report on the simulation outcomes, there was a fundamental incompatibility between 
growth of the population and production and the limits of natural resources and the 
absorption of pollution in the atmosphere.128 It was not so much that Kahn and Wiener 
believed the Club or Rome reports to be wrong, or that the idea of limits was entirely 
misguided. Instead, what bothered them was the “crash and burn” computer model 
provided by Forrester, did not account for “potentials for innovation,” and the lack of 
optimism might mean a loss of aspirations.129  
                                                
126 Elodie Blanchard, “Technoscientific Cornucopian Futures versus Doomsday Futures: The 
World Models and The Limits to Growth,” In The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational 
Science and Politics: Forging the Future (New York: Routledge, 2015): 94; See also Peter Moll, 
From Scarcity to Sustainability. Futures Studies and the Environment: The Role of the Club of 
Rome (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1991). 
 
127. Thomas and Williams, “The epistemologies of non-forecasting simulations, part I: industrial 
dynamics and management pedagogy at MIT”; Edwards, The Closed World. 
 
128 Blanchard, “Technoscientific Cornucopian Futures versus Doomsday Futures,” 92.   
 
129 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 250.  
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At the turn of the 1970s, Hudson Institute expanded their scope, building on the 
unexpected popularity of The Year 2000 in the business world. The scenario 
methodology was well-received by corporate leaders, anxious about the major social 
transformations and technological disruptions.130 After the establishment of the 
Corporate Environment Program (CEP) in 1970, Hudson Institute produced essays, 
papers, chartbooks, and organized meetings and seminars in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan on scenario methodologies.131 Executives from IBM, Coca-Cola, General 
Motors, and Royal/Dutch Shell paid heavily to be briefed by Kahn on his optimism for 
economic growth and prosperity, with caveats.  
 
 
Figure 6. “Corporate Strategy in the Seventies,”  
with Herman Kahn, Daniel Bell, and Anthony Wiener.132  
                                                
130 Picket “A History of Hudson Institute,” 15.  
 
131 Picket “A History of Hudson Institute,” 16. 
 
132 Undated. Source: Hudson Institute Archive, National Defense University. 
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It was at the Hudson Institute lecture-seminars that Shell planners, like Ted Newland and 
Pierre Wack, first encountered scenario planning.133 Kahn’s economic optimism and 
epistemological concerns were a good match for businessmen from multinational 
corporations like Newland: themes of economic growth and technological innovation 
guided the “Standard World” and, as Art Kleiner has pointed out, “corporate 
imaginaries.”134 Financed by 100 corporations, including General Electric, Mitsubishi, 
Royal Dutch/Shell, Time, Volvo and Xerox, the scenarios from the CEP ironically began 
to postulate more straight-line economic growth and prosperity, and less of the Faustian 
nuance of the earlier Year 2000 reports.135 At the height of Hudson’s prominence in the 
field of futurology in the 1970s, there were offices in Tokyo, Paris, and Montreal.136  
Hudson Institute’s scenario techniques emerged from a sense that the future 
corporate environment, a complex dynamic of social, political, and technological forces, 
was incalculable; this understanding challenges conventional assumptions in the history 
of science that pivot on the importance of calculative strategies and technical capacities 
in uncertain conditions. The histories have examined the postwar efforts to quantify 
complex social and political phenomena as simplified equations in fields such as 
operations research. Although systems analysis and computer modeling played important 
                                                
 
133 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 131; On Shell Group Planning’s development of scenario 
planning, see Chapter 4.  
 
134 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 251. 
 
135 See, for example, Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come: Thinking about the 
Seventies and Eighties (London: McMillan, 1972).  
 
136 Picket “A History of Hudson Institute,” 17.  
 86 
roles in developing corporate strategies, the critiques and limits of such models, also 
existed.  
Hudson Institute’s scenario methods, I suggest, were a kind of speculative 
technique that brought together the virtues of the imaginative and rational to bear on the 
unknowable character of the future. Hudson Institute’s scenarios were multiple narrative 
articulation of “what if?” that took shape through Kahn’s lengthy, free form presentations 
in isolated executive retreats common to intellectual discussion in the postwar period. 
Specific to the latter half of the twentieth century, Hudson Institute’s scenario methods 
expanded from problems of national defense to larger concern about future economic, 
social, political, and technological changes beginning in the mid-1960s through the 
Hudson Institute’s The Year 2000, and eventually, the Corporate Environment Program. 
Secondarily, I campaign for a more complex portrait of Cold War rationality by tracing 
the way that sociologist of science Robert Merton’s paradigm guided the creation of 
scenario methods. Hudson Institute’s dissemination of scenario methodologies from 
military strategy marked a significant moment in the transformation of corporate 
planning efforts in the 1970s. After Hudson Institute’s Corporate Environment Program, 
other consulting firms and corporations began developing their own interpretation of the 
scenario methodology. One alternative development of corporate scenario methods was 














Changing our values and premises is not just a good thing—it is a necessity. 
-Willis W. Harman1 
 
 
The various aspects of the world macro-problem are appearing more and more like 
surface manifestations of a pathogenic condition lying beneath the surface.  





A New Copernican Revolution?  
 
 
In a 1969 article for Stanford Today entitled “The New Copernican Revolution,” 
electrical engineering professor turned policy analyst Willis Harman boldly claimed that 
mounting scientific evidence supported the coming of a “New Transcendentalism.” 
Much like its nineteenth-century predecessor, Harman’s transcendentalism was a 
spiritual rebellion; this time, the visionary idealism aimed at a misguided “mechanistic 
and economic image of man” and “technocratic image” of American society.3 Evidence 
                                                
1 Willis Harman, "Alternative Futures and Educational Policy," Educational Policy Research 
Center (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1970), 10. 
 
2 Harman, “Alternative Futures and Education Policy,” 8.   
 
3 Harman’s transcendentalism referenced a diverse collection of nineteenth century American 
thinkers that originally emerged as a rebellion against rationalism within the Unitarian Church. 
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on altered states of consciousness from psychedelic researchers to clinical psychologists 
pushed Harman to search for an image of man capable of apprehending the mystical 
dimensions of the universe; Harman argued that once institutions accepted the 
transcendental image, they could shift to encourage personal growth, and enrich the 
American nation.4 At the core of Harman’s alternative futures research at Stanford 
Research Institute (known as SRI International in 1977) was a quest to develop business 
and policy planning tools to enable such a transformation; this was the case when he 
started the SRI-based U.S Office of Health, Education and Welfare funded Educational 
Policy Research Center (EPRC) in 1967, and it continued in the Charles F. Kettering 
Foundation funded studies at SRI’s Center for the Study of Social Policy in 1972.5 
                                                
Inspired by German romanticism, transcendentalists sought a more personal and lively 
experience of Christianity. It was more than the natural philosophies of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau, and their pursuit of individual meaning, as popular imagination would 
have it. Between 1830 and 1850, the transcendentalists were an influential intellectual group 
pushing education reform, working to abolish slavery, and demanding emancipation for 
subjugated groups, including women, labourers, and the poor. Historian Philip Gura describes the 
transcendentalism as primarily as “a way of perceiving the world” centered on “individual 
consciousness” as opposed to “external fact” (8). However, much like Harman, there was 
considerable disagreements as to what this kind of thinking would mean, as to what the proper 
balance was between individualism and community, and as to exactly what universalist principles 
were in fact universal. Philip F. Gura, American Transcendentalism: A History (London, 
Macmillan, 2007); Also, Chris Jennings, Paradise Now: The Story of American Utopianism 
(New York, Random House, 2016), 189-202; Willis Harman, “The New Copernican 
Revolution,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 9, no. 2 (1969): 132. 
 
4 Willis W. Harman, “The Great Legitimacy Challenge—A Note on Interpreting the Present and 
Assessing the Future,” (speech delivered in Texas in October 1975): 29. 
 
5 There were two Educational Policy Research Center launched in 1967. In addition to the one at 
SRI, there was another at Syracuse University. Interestingly, the Syracuse University center 
contracted to Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute and the Institute for the Future, although the 
Hudson Institute was turned down for the original contract. Oliver W. Markley and Willis W. 
Harman (editors), Changing Images of Man (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982): xvii; See also, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Alternative Educational Futures in 
the United States and Europe: Methods, Issues and Policy Relevance (Paris: OECD, 1970): 61-
66, 71-74; Donald L. Nielson, A Heritage of Innovation: SRI’s First Half Century (Menlo Park: 
SRI International, 2004).    
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Although not originally a corporate planning project, the SRI’s alternative futures had a 
significant impact on corporate planning as corporations adopted SRI scenario methods.  
This chapter examines the development of alternative futures by Willis Harman 
and associates at Stanford Research Institute starting in 1967. Specifically, it looks at the 
way that corporate scenario planning at SRI emerged from Harman’s alternative futures 
research, which drew diverse countercultural mystical and psychedelic epistemologies 
together with rationalist mathematical engineering and military contingency methods 
typically associated with corporate planning. In doing so, the chapter puts forward two 
arguments, one central to the development of the larger dissertation on the history of 
corporate scenario planning, the other a modest disciplinary claim in conversation with 
the field of science studies. First, the chapter contends that corporate scenario planning 
constitutes a more extensive gathering of genealogies, including LSD experimentation, 
Gestalt holism, and “Eastern” philosophy, than are typically associated with mid-to-late 
twentieth century corporate techniques.6 In this, SRI’s scenario techniques provides an 
example of the way the rationalities of mid-to-late twentieth century corporate strategies 
were created through diverse and contradictory genealogies that exceed the conventional 
understanding of Cold War rationality in the history of science. Secondarily, corporate 
                                                
6 I aim to add to the arguments from historians of psychology, like Nadine Weidman, regarding 
the importance of humanistic psychology’s theories of human nature that appealed to 
countercultures and ‘the Establishment.’ Though the aims of countercultures and corporations 
were different, both were drawn to the legitimacy of the study of values and subjective 
experience. Nadine Weidman, “Between the Counterculture and the Corporation: Abraham 
Maslow and Humanistic Psychology in the 1960s,” In Groovy Science: The Counter-Cultures 
and Scientific Life, 1955-1975, ed. David Kaiser and W. Patrick McCray (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), 109-134.  Additionally, I build from critical scholar R. John Williams’ 
contention that “cybernetic zen” is a powerful twentieth century corporate epistemology that 
joins together technological innovation and organic thinking of “Eastern” philosophy, promising 
enlightenment. R. John Williams, “Technê-Zen and the Spiritual Quality of Global Capitalism,” 
Critical Inquiry 37, no. 1 (Autumn 2011): 17-70.  
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scenario planning developed in conversations with postwar critiques of science and 
technology, epistemologies that animated the early history of science studies as well as 
business strategy. That is, business leaders and bureaucrats engaged with critiques of 
technoscience as they were grappling with the unintended consequences of 
industrialization beginning in the late 1960s. In making this claim, the chapter suggests a 
more entangled and complex portrait of the legacies of the science studies discipline.7 
 The conceptual foundation of SRI’s alternative future research emphasized the 
importance of changes in traditional values, echoing many strands of 1960s 
countercultures’ self-expression and quest of personal growth and the New Left’s 
critiques of bureaucracy and technocracy.8 SRI was indebted to Hudson Institute’s 
synoptic alternative futures methodology and provocative narration of alternatives 
described in the last chapter. However, SRI disagreed with the conceptual foundations of 
Hudson Institute’s alternative futures. Harman’s critique centered on Hudson Institute’s 
“Standard World” scenario, which proposed technological ingenuity could alleviate 
resource scarcity and inequalities. For Harman, the successful realization of the 
                                                
7 I follow historians of science Elena Aronova and Simone Turchetti argument that there is a gap 
in our knowledge about the origins and development of the field of science studies, and its 
relationship to Cold War politics and expertise, a conception they seek to complicate. Elena 
Aronova and Simone Turchetti, eds., Science Studies during the Cold War and Beyond (Palgrave 
Studies in the History of Science and Technology, 2016).   
 
8It is important to note the large body of literature dedicated to the distinctions and relationship 
between the New Left and countercultural movements. In simple terms, the New Left grew out of 
civil rights and Free Speech Movement, whereas the countercultural movements turned inward in 
contrast to the outward political focus of the New Left. See Rossinow, "The New Left in the 
Counterculture: Hypotheses and Evidence," Radical History Review 1997, no. 67 (1997): 79-120. 
Historian Fred Turner writes what distinguished the youth of the 1960s in the United States in 
distinct social movements. While the New Left grew out of civil rights and Free Speech 
Movement, the second was more internally than politically focussed. Fred Turner, From 
Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 31-32. 
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“Standard World” scenario was bound to unintended consequences of “uncontrolled 
technology application and industrial development,” including pollution, environmental 
degradation, and ecological imbalance.9 Harman stressed that the question analysts must 
have when crafting alternative futures was not how to devise planning tools to properly 
harness technology, but rather to decide “whether the operative values which served so 
well in the development of modern technology are basically capable of handling its 
humane application.”10 That is, Harman did not trust that new technologies would enact 
effective revolutionary changes in society. This concern, which Harman aggressively 
reiterated in his SRI policy reports, critiqued existing methods more than offered 
solutions: “If such a revolutionary societal transformation were in process” he wrote, 
“would our methods of futures research discern this fact? Or…does most of our 
methodology subtly include prejudices that would be unable to acknowledge indications 
of change?”11  
Harman recognized that the United States faced numerous problems at the end the 
1960s that technological innovations would not solve. As Cyrus Mody, Matthew 
Wisnioski, and other historians of science and technology have acknowledged, critiques 
of technology— that argued American technology was technocratic, elitist, and in the 
service of the military— proliferated in American institutions in the late 1960s.12 Student 
                                                
9 Willis Harman, “Context for Education in the Seventies,” Education Policy Research Center 
(Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1970), 2.  
 
10 Harman, “Context for Education in the Seventies,” 2.  
 
11 Harman, “The Great Legitimacy Challenge—A Note on Interpreting the Present and Assessing 
the Future,” 23  
 
12 Matthew Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s 
America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012); Cyrus CM Mody, "Santa Barbara Physicists in the 
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activists, as well as scientists housed in prestigious engineering and physical science 
departments, questioned the proper application of science in society.13 Thus, Harman was 
as much an instigator as he was a part of the wider cultural and scientific shifts in the 
mid-to-late 1960s, including postwar critiques of science and technology from public 
intellectuals like Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford, student protests against the Vietnam 
War, and the institutional and economic realities of physical science and engineering 
departments that sought funding sources after they lost their massive federal defense 
contracts.14  
Bureaucratic solutions, Harman argued, would also be unable to resolve these 
contemporary troubles:  “The nation is beset by numerous social problems which we 
point to with the terms of poverty, crime, racial discrimination, civil disorder, 
unemployment, pollution, and the like”; however, dealing with these problems 
“straightforwardly” through civil-rights legislation, minimum wage laws and welfare 
payments, urban-renewal problems, and protest, would fail, as they were “piecemeal” 
                                                
Vietnam Era," in Groovy Science: The Counter-Cultures and Scientific Life, 1955-1975, ed. 
Cyrus CM Mody, David Kaiser, and W. Patrick McCray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2016), 70-107. 
 
13 Matthew Wisnioski, “Inside ‘the System’: Engineers, Scientists, and the Boundaries of Social 
Protest in the Long 1960s, “History and Technology 19 (2003): 313-33; Cyrus CM Mody, "How 
I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, the nuclear reactor, the computer, ham radio, and 
recombinant DNA," Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38, no. 3 (2008): 460. 
 
14 Cyrus Mody argues that it was the economic realities of the Vietnam War that forced physics 
departments, like the one at UC Santa Barbara, to diversify their options, pursue interdisciplinary 
ventures, and develop civilian environmental applications and parapsychology. Mody, “Santa 
Barbara Physicists in the Vietnam Era." Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970); Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 
1964). For the impact these developments had on the behavioral sciences and their social 
technologies in consumer culture and counterculture, see Alexandra Rutherford, “B.F. Skinner’s 
Technology of Behavior in American life: From Consumer Culture to Counterculture,” The 
History of the Behavioral Sciences Volume 39, Issue 1 (Winter 2003): 1-23.  
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approaches.15 These piecemeal solutions did not address what Harman saw as the 
underlying causes of national breakdown: misguided beliefs, values, and attitudes.16 
Thus, “second level” planning solutions aimed at changing institutional structures 
bothered Harman; Harman instead targeted “third level” cultural assumptions and values 
that risked sabotaging institutional changes.17 For example, as Harman put it in 1968: 
“Combatting pollution of the environment is seen less as a matter of devising more 
perfect regulatory measures and more as a task of fostering wholesome relationships 
between man and nature.”18  
The problems associated with modernization—what bureaucrats and academics 
began referring to as the “problems of modern society” in the late 1960s—preoccupied 
the SRI group’s alternative futures research.19 Although criticisms of modernization have 
a much longer history, the specific idea of “the problem of modern society” developed 
within an informal group of elite, all-male scientists, industrialists and bureaucrats 
                                                
15 Willis Harman, “Education Policy Research—Toward a Unifying Focus,” Educational Policy 
Research Center (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1968): 3.  
 
16 Harman, “The New Copernican Revolution,” 5; historian of psychology Ellen Herman argued 
that by 1970, psychological expertise had transformed understanding of social problems, and 
their solutions, in the psychological terms of beliefs and attitudes. In her words, “The core 
imperatives of humanistic theory— to grow, to become, and to realize full human potential—
were nothing less than democratic blueprints grafted onto the map of human subjectivity,” Ellen 
Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 265.  
 
17 Harman, “Education Policy Research—Toward a Unifying Focus,” 3-4. 
 
18 Harman, ““Education Policy Research—Toward a Unifying Focus,” 4. 
 
19 For a discussion of “the problems of modern society” at OECD, see Matthias Schmelzer, The 
Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth Paradigm, 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, 239-244. Where I depart from Schmelzer is in the way that he 
deploys the Kuhnian paradigm as theoretical support for his argument. Differently, this chapter 
treats Kuhn’s work as a primary source.  
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connected to the OECD Committee on Science and Technology Policy, and specifically 
to its director Alexander King.20 As historian of economics Matthais Schmelzer has 
shown, the OECD, and the lively debates concerning the negative effects of 
modernization, was the “cradle” of the Club of Rome.21 These debates emerged as 
business leaders and bureaucrats struggled to account for the unintended consequences of 
industrialization and modernization.  
Although there is extensive scholarly inquiry on the Club of Rome, most of the 
research focuses on the widely popular 1972 report Limits to Growth and the Industrial 
Dynamics computer simulations of MIT systems scientist Jay W. Forrester.22 However, 
historians have largely neglected the fact that the debates about environmental limits 
preceded the computer simulations, and began within business and bureaucratic 
intellectual circles. Though not the predominating narrative inside bureaucratic 
institutions, debates about the negative ecological impacts of economic growth 
nonetheless rose in the 1960s, only to fall out of fashion by the stagflation and economic 
                                                
20 Matthias Schmelzer, "The crisis before the crisis: the ‘problems of modern society’and the 
OECD, 1968–74," European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire 19, no. 6 (2012): 
1005.  
 
21 Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth 
Paradigm, 246. For more on the Club of Rome, see Chapter 2.  
 
22 See, for example, Paul N. Edwards “Global Comprehensive Models in Politics and 
Policymaking.” Climatic Change 32 (1996):149–161; Paul N. Edwards, “The World in a 
Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early Computerized Global Systems Models,” In Systems, 
Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach to Management and Engineering, World War II 
and After, edited by Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000): 
221–253; Elodie Blanchard, “Technoscientific cornucopian futures,” In Andersson, Jenny and 
Egle Rindzevičiūtė (Editors), The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and 
Politics: Forging the Future (New York: Routledge, 2015): 92-111.   
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turmoil of the 1970s.23 For example, King’s OECD Committee on Science and 
Technology Policy, of which Harman was involved, debated the merits of economic 
growth as a marker for progress because this growth depended on limited natural 
resources with significant ecological costs.24  
Harman built from the OECD’s work, appropriating Italian industrialist, and 
future Club of Rome president, Aurelio Peccei’s phrase “the world macroproblem,” in 
his policy documents.25 Though Peccei diffusely defined the world macroproblem, the 
expression generally referenced the interconnected issues of technological misuse and 
threats, poverty, overpopulation, and environmental degradation.26 Through the 
framework of “the world macroproblem,” SRI’s scenarios consolidated the dispersed 
problems of planetary limits, the increasing discontents about rising economic disparities 
and other inequalities, and the disruptive capabilities of ‘non-industrialized’ nations. 
                                                
23 Schmelzer, "The crisis before the crisis: the ‘problems of modern society’and the OECD, 
1968–74," 1000; Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the 
Economic Growth Paradigm. On economic turmoil’s impact on 1970s scenarios, see chapter 5.  
 
24 Schmelzer, "The crisis before the crisis: the ‘problems of modern society’ and the OECD, 
1968–74," 1002. 
 
25 Aurelio Peccei’s The Chasm Ahead (1969) is a bizarre text on the growing technological 
disparities between North America and Europe. Peccei defines this gap as “between the GM age 
and the IBM age” (64). Peccei also proposes a multi-national sponsored study on systematic, 
long-term planning called “Project 1969” that would integrate both ‘mankind’ and ‘his 
environment’; See also, Aurelio Peccei, One Hundred Pages for the Future: Reflections of the 
President of the Club of Rome (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
 
26 In one EPRC report, Harman put it this way: The macro-problem “is the composite of all the 
problems that have been brought about by a combination of rampant technological application 
and industrial development, together with high population levels.” Indirectly aiming at the 
Hudson Institute, Harman was weary that “even among the informed” there would be a tendency 
to trust that “new technological breakthroughs will be achieved that will enable us to control 
pollution” and “technological breakthroughs in contraception will take care of the population 
explosion” and, even more relevant, that “the right programs for urban problems will begin to 
reduce the severity of the problems of racism in the nation,” Harman, “Alternative Futures and 
Educational Policy,” 6-7.  
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Harman, borrowing from familiar technological critiques of the era, and in a 1972 
address to the White House, declared: “the industrial era, which can be thought of as (in 
historical terms) a gigantic unprecedented step toward new possibilities for man, has 
been based in a paradigm which, however well suited to that step, seems now 
fundamentally inappropriate to the task of constructing a humane world on the base of 
those technological accomplishments.”27 
By 1970, the optimistic alternative futures of the Hudson Institute—and the 
economic growth and technological innovations they assumed could absolve limits—
became a point of contention in long range planning discussions.28 The shortcomings of 
industrial-era metaphors that brought about growth-and-consumption ethics, “predict-
and-control oriented” values, and limited models of economically-motivated people, 
interested not only Harman and his SRI associates, especially Oliver M. Markley and 
Duane Elign; they also commanded attention from United States government and 
multinational corporations trying to understand the implication for the future in a period 
marked by limits.29 While Hudson Institute’s Standard World scenarios have received 
considerable historical recognition, SRI’s alternative future trees have been lost from the 
                                                
27 Willis Harman, “Planning Amid Forces for Institutional Change,” Educational Policy 
Research Center, (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1971), 9.   
 
28 The three best-selling books that framed the limits debate were The Club of Rome’s The Limits 
to Growth (1972), Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968), and Barry Commoner’s The 
Closing Circle (1971). Later counterarguments included Herman Kahn’s and Julian Simon’s The 
Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000 (1984). Popular journal articles on the topic were 
also formative. See, for example, Edward Jay Epstein, “Good News from Mr. Bad News,” New 
York Magazine, 9 August 1976, 35-42.  
 
29 See, for example, White House Conference on the Industrial World Ahead, “A Look at 
Business in 1990,” Washington, D.C., February 7-9, 1972 (November 1972); Willis Harman, An 
Incomplete Guide to the Future, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976, 32; OECD, 
Science, Growth and Society, Report on the Secretary-General’s Ad Hoc Group on New 
Concepts of Science Policy (Paris: OECD, 1971).  
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historical record. Revisiting these lost alternative future trees reveals a more 
heterogeneous array of genealogies gathered in scenario planning methodologies.  
The construction of multiple “alternative future histories” pioneered by the 
Hudson Institute became the basis for Harman’s research at Stanford Research Institute.30 
Different from Hudson Institute’s optimism about the ability of technology to surpass 
limits, the SRI group saw adhering to those limits as the predominant concern of the 
long-term future. However, both sought alternative futures because they believed the 
future to be generally uncertain; both shared a diagnosis that the current planning 
systems, like technological forecasting, were based upon naively assumed values and 
premises that demanded reexamination. Both believed that future environments could be 
imagined by parsing and manipulating an array of variables, certain and uncertain. The 
SRI group developed its own approach for generating those variables and for relating 
different alternative futures based upon limits and contingencies, reconstituting the 
boundaries of plausible alternative futures left out by Hudson Institute.31    
Other bureaucrats and academics that were interested in the world macroproblem, 
like the Club of Rome, eventually looked to systems-based computer analyses and global 
modelling to generate debate.32 In contrast, and like the Hudson Institute, the SRI group 
                                                
30 By 1970, it was common knowledge that “it is impossible to predict a single most probable 
course of evolution for the world or for any significant part of its human component.” Like 
Hudson Institute, Harman sought “a useful set of bracketing descriptions of what may come to be 
must be schematically commensurate with what actually will emerge. That is, each projected 
alternative must be (insofar as imagination and skill can make it so) an internally consistent 
whole.” Harman, “Alternative Futures and Education Policy,” 1.  
 
31 See, for example, the Lewinian-inspired field sector map, Figure 6. “Lewinian Social Field 
Map” from this chapter.  
 
32 The history of the Club of Rome is covered in Peter Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability: 
Futures Studies and the Environment: The Role of the Club of Rome (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
1991), especially Chapter 1-2; William Thomas and Lambert Williams have argued that 
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used the narrative-based technique that schematized multiple futures. Yet, distinct from 
the Hudson Institute, the SRI group focused heavily on changing humanistic values. This 
chapter examines how the imaginative thinking of the SRI team combined intellectual 
resources including the social field theory of Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin, 
contingency analysis from RAND, and “relaxation techniques” from mathematical 
engineering to build their scenario techniques imagining the outcomes of a large-scale 
paradigm shifts in values and beliefs.  
Beginning with Harman’s background in psychedelic research and humanistic 
psychology while an engineering professor at Stanford University, this chapter shows 
how the scenario techniques at SRI drew together countercultural mystical and 
psychedelic epistemologies with rationalist engineering approaches more commonly 
associated with corporate planning. Just as the transcendental scenarios of Harman’s 
team gain popularity, however, changing goals at SRI, and the recessions and stagflation 
leading to the redirection of long-term planning efforts at SRI, halted Harman’s 
alternative futures research. To conclude, the chapter describes how the transcendental 
scenarios were nonetheless methodologically connected to epistemologies central to the 
origins of science studies, as well as larger efforts to develop alternative expertise on 
ways to analyze values in the external business environment. A diluted version of this 
approach would then go on to influence marketing and consulting efforts at SRI and 
                                                
computer simulations, like Forrester’s Industrial Dynamics simulations, were actually meant to 
be heuristics. They argue that science studies scholars have generally misunderstood the 
Industrial Dynamics as a command-and-control technology to manage complicated urban 
development and economic growth. Lambert Williams and William Thomas, “The 
Epistemologies of Non-Forecasting Simulations, Part I: Industrial Dynamics and Management 
Pedagogy at MIT”, Science in Context 22, no. 02 (June 2009): 248. 
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subsequent corporate scenario planning efforts in the mid-1970s to different effects, as 
the next chapter will show.  
 
 
Willis Harman and the Changing Times at Stanford  
 
 Willis W. Harman began his career as an electrical engineering professor at 
Stanford University in 1952, following the completion of his PhD on radio vacuum 
tubes. Like some other engineering professors disaffected by technology during this 
period in Silicon Valley, he became involved in the Sequoia Seminars, originally a 
Christian gospel group that evolved into a mystical movement.33 The Sequoia Seminars, 
started by mechanical engineer and Stanford University law professor Harry Rathbun and 
his wife Emilia in 1946, blended the Rathbun’s passion for studying the Christian 
gospels with the psychological teachings of Carl Jung and the evolutionary philosophies 
of British philosopher and parapsychologist Gerald Heard.34 During the seminars, 
participants studied mysticism, psychic phenomenon, meditation and self-understanding, 
and grappled with critiques of the secular “mechanistic worldviews” provided by 
                                                
33 For the experience of AMPEX engineer and psychedelics researcher Myron Stollaroff and his 
relationship to the Sequoia Group, see Peter Sachs Collopy, “The Revolution Will Not Be 
Videotaped: Making a Technology of Consciousness in the Long 1960s” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 103-119.  
 
34 Steven M. Gelber, “Sequoia Seminar: The Sources of Religious Sectarianism,” California 
History 69, no. 1 (1990): 40. On the Sequoia Seminars, see Steven M. Gelber, “Sequoia Seminar: 
The Sources of Religious Sectarianism”; Steven M. Gelber and Martin L. Cook, Saving the 
Earth: The History of a Middle-Class Millenarian Movement (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 84-87; Myron Stolaroff, Thanatos to Eros: Thirty-Five Years of Psychedelic 
Exploration, (Thaneros Press, 1994): 24–25; John Markoff, What the Dormouse Said: How the 
Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer Industry (New York: Penguin, 2005).   
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engineering as well as Freud’s psychoanalysis and Watson’s behaviourism.35 The 
Sequoia Seminars followed a longer mystical and spiritual tradition that accompanied the 
physical sciences since at least the nineteenth century.36  
Before the Sequoia Seminars, Harman identified as a ‘rationally-minded’ 
engineering professor. He fought in WW2 and built his family in the culture of 
Californian postwar engineering. Harman’s personal transformation in consciousness 
began with his first experience with LSD at the Sequoia Seminars in 1956. 37 It changed 
the course of his career at Stanford University and circuitously led him to alternative 
futures research at Stanford Research Institute. Starting in 1961, he became an affiliated 
researcher at the psychedelics research agency the International Foundation for 
Advanced Study (IFAS) founded by fellow Sequoia Seminar participant Myron 
                                                
35 The seminar techniques were experiential in aim, and would later be recognized as EST.  Many 
of the original Sequoia Seminar members would take leading roles in the humanistic psychology 
movement, including Willis Harman, Gelber and Cook, Saving the Earth: The History of a 
Middle-Class Millenarian Movement, 82-84. This critique—a quest toward the philosophical and 
theological in the face of increasing positivism – is also central to the beginnings of humanistic 
psychology. On humanistic psychology, see Jessica Grogan, Encountering America: Humanistic 
Psychology, Sixties Culture and the Shaping of the Modern Self (New York: Harpers Perennial, 
2013) and Roy Jose DeCarvalho, The Founders of Humanistic Psychology (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 1991).  
 
36 See, for example, John Tresch, The Romantic Machine: Utopian Science and Technology after 
Napolean (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).  
 
37 His first trip happened within a smaller group of Sequoia Seminar participants made up of 
engineers and their wives. The drug came into the seminar by AMPEX engineer Myron 
Stolaroff—who had connected with Al Hubbard’s Vancouver clinic, The Commission for the 
Study of Creative Imagination. Members included the Saskatchewan researchers, as well as 
Aldous Huxley and Gerald Heard. Al Hubbard started his clinic after visiting the Weyburn 
Saskatchewan clinic. Erika Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry: LSD from Clinic to Campus 
(Baltimore: JHU Press, 2010), 97. The format of the LSD sessions was formal: “One Monday 
night a member of the group would take LSD,” “and the rest of us would support him or her. The 
following Monday night the subject would share in detail his/her experience, and the following 
week we would proceed to the next member.” Harman, Personal Note, undated. On the LSD 
group at the Sequoia Seminars, see Sachs Collopy, “The Revolution Will Not be Videotaped,” 
118. 
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Stolaroff.38 By 1962, Harman had developed a cult following at Stanford University due 
to his elective course on human potential in the engineering department.39 It introduced 
students to what at the time were completely radical ideas about the expansive nature of 
reality through the discussion of scientific studies in quantum mechanics, ESP, and 
psychokinesis. Harman’s scientific credentials gave his non-traditional research and 
intellectual experimentation credibility, and his course inspired a generation of business 
and engineering students, as well as psychology majors.40  
During Harman’s tenure at IFAS, he came to believe that the “mind-expanding” 
potentials of consciousness, aided by tools like psychedelic agents, could help solve the 
                                                
38 Before being outlawed by the United States Food and Drug Administration in 1966, 
psychedelic researchers sought to explore the use of psychedelic agents, like LSD, to aid 
addiction treatment and psychotherapy, mimic psychosis, and enhance creativity and spiritual 
growth. Historian of psychology Erika Dyck has traced the history of medical LSD research of 
psychiatrists Humphry Osmond and Abram Hoffer in Weyburn, Saskatchewan starting in the 
1950s. She offers an account that differs from the drug’s history as a tool for military 
interrogation or cultural rebellion. She stresses that the experiments were not “marginal, 
unethical, or unprofessional, even by contemporary standards.” Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry, 2.    
Continuing in this tradition, fellow Sequoia Seminar participant Myron Stolaroff, opened IFAS in 
Menlo Park. Harman was a member of the research term organized under medical direction of 
psychiatrist Dr. Charles Savage from the National Institute of Mental Health. At IFAS, they 
worked with the research protocols from the reputable Saskatchewan clinic and reported their use 
to the government agencies they were working with regularly. They sought to use LSD as a tool 
for harnessing creativity and solving complex problems. They focused specifically on studying 
the use of LSD in scientific-and-engineering minded people to examine its effects on their 
creative problem solving and perspectives on the nature of reality. It was at a moment that a 
larger network of researchers sought legitimacy for psychedelic studies, and there was an influx 
of governmental and medical funding for the studies, that would quickly evaporate in 1966 with 
increasing psychedelic drug abuse. Their publications were numerous, including: Sherwood et. 
al, “The Psychedelic Experience—A New Concept in Psychotherapy,” 1962; On the 
Saskatchewan clinic, see Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry.  
 
39 In 1962, Harman was one of the only professors at Stanford University connected to the rising 
humanistic psychology movement. Fran and David Korten, personal communication.    
 
40 At the end of the seminar, where they studied Eastern philosophy and metaphysics, Harman 
offered students the chance to take LSD with IFAS for the cost of 500 dollars. Korten, personal 
communication.  
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complex problems facing the United States.41 The peer-reviewed IFAS studies reveal the 
expansiveness of his visions. IFAS’s first publication “The Psychedelic Experience—A 
New Concept in Psychotherapy” from 1962 for example, includes an appendix, entitled 
“The Seeming Universality of Perception in the Psychedelic Experience,” in which 
Harman discusses how changes in perception produced by psychedelics could be 
explained through the holism of the perennial philosophy articulated by British writer 
and philosopher Aldous Huxley in the bestseller The Perennial Philosophy (1945).42 
Mistakenly attributed by Huxley to the philosopher and polymath Gottfried Leibniz, the 
perennial philosophy (philosophia perrrenis)  referred to a “metaphysic that recognizes a 
divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds.” 43 In other words, 
                                                
41 IFAS frames the psychedelic experience in the terms of British writer and philosopher Aldous 
Huxley’s first, well-publicized, trip on mescaline. For Huxley, taking the drug “allowed him to 
reflect on both simple and complex matters from a clear perspective so that he was abler to 
contemplate the deeper and subjective meaning of life.” Huxley frames hallucinogens as a way to 
open the mind’s “reductive valve”: thus, allowing one to experience the world unfiltered and 
uninhibited. As Huxley writes, “Most people, most of the time, know only what comes through 
the reducing valve and is consecrated as genuinely real by the local language. Certain persons, 
however, seem to be born with a kind of by-pass that circumvents the reducing valve. In others 
temporary bypasses may be acquired either spontaneously, or as the result of deliberate "spiritual 
exercises,” … or by means of drugs.” Aldous Huxley, Doors of Perception (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1954): 22. Huxley describes how mescaline shook him “out of the ruts of ordinary 
perception” to see the relationship of his inner and outer worlds: as they are apprehended, 
directly and unconditionally.” Huxley, Doors of Perception, 22. 
 
42 The researchers provided a massive 100-200 mg dose of LSD with an additional 200 to 400 mg 
of mescaline to produce a personal transformation—i.e. to have the subject discover the 
infiniteness of his own being, something like the peak experiences studied by Maslow. Following 
the guideline on the “set and setting” from medical research protocols from Weyburn, 
Saskatchewan the sessions were held after preparatory therapy session and in a, “tastefully 
furnished room” with a tape recorder, record player, and “various carefully chosen works of art.” 
Sherwood et. al, “The Psychedelic Experience—A New Concept in Psychotherapy,” Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry 4 (1962): 73. 
 
43 Jeffrey Kripal notes that “perennial philosophy” probably came from Renaissance philosopher 
Marsilio Ficino. Jeffrey Kripal, Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007): 481. From Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New 
York: Harpers & Brothers, 1945):12.  
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there was an evolved absolute reality that only few could access. In Harman’s terms, and 
the way it was taken up by psychedelic researchers and the Americans humanistic 
psychologists, it was a way of conceptualizing “an image of man as part of a Whole, 




Figure 7. Willis W. Harman.45  
 
 
                                                
44 Willis Harman, “Policies for National Reunification,” The Journal of Creative Behavior 4, no. 
4 (1970): 287-88.  
 
45 Special Collections, Stanford University.  
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Harman recognized that uniting under the goals and principles of perennial 
philosophy would enable a view of “man” as “part of Nature,” an obligatory requirement 
for “resolving the planet’s ecological problems.”46 This followed Harman’s bold 
proclamation that the entire conceptual premise of industrialized American society 
caused the world’s seemingly unsolvable problems. Harman’s commitment to Huxley’s 
perennial philosophy assumed that there was a ‘true’ essence within that could be 
accessed with tools, like psychedelics. Christian mysticism, Zen Buddhism—or, as is the 
case for Harman, psychedelic agents—could induce experiences where an individual was 
capable of understanding the relationship of themselves to the universe. In Huxley’s 
language, psychedelic chemicals enabled one to transition from a “close belief-disbelief 
system” to an “open, healthy belief system.”47 Certainly, the relativism of the perennial 
philosophy can also be found in humanistic psychology’s “religion of no religion,” what 
Jeffrey Kripal, in his portrait of Esalen Institute, has described as “creatively suspended 
between the revelations of the religions and the democratic, pluralistic and scientific 
revolutions of modernity.”48 
Harman echoed many of the postulates contained in IFAS’s early psychedelic 
research in his subsequent alternative futures research at Stanford Research Institute. He 
left IFAS in 1966 when the FDA halted further research on LSD medical 
experimentation. IFAS was forced to return the remaining funds and close the doors of 
the research center. In 1967, Harman left his position as a professor of engineering-
                                                
46 Harman, “Policies for National Reunification,” 288.  
 
47 Sherwood et. al, “The Psychedelic Experience—A New Concept in Psychotherapy,” 79.  
 
48 Kripal, Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion, 23.  
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economic systems at Stanford University and began working with Stanford Research 
Institute, as the Vietnam War was draining military budgets, forcing the academic-
industrial think tank to diversify their long-range planning operations, in order to capture 
a larger market share in the business sector.49  
Harman joined Stanford Research Institute to direct the Education Policy 
Research Center on a contract sponsored by the Department of Education, to create 
policy solutions for education and society in the United States into the 1990s. Originally, 
Harman was recruited to do “technological forecasting,” the briefly popular social 
scientific practice of identifying the social and political implications of technological 
tools.50 Many of his researchers at the new center were former students from his human 
potential seminars. The Education Policy Research Center had two objectives: 1. To 
determine how education can be best employed to prepare citizens for the evolving 
future, and 2. To determine how education can be employed to “design” the kinds of 
future policy makers desired.51 Though these objectives did not differ dramatically from 
the aims of the disciplines of engineering in the latter half of the twentieth century, for 
                                                
49 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 168; Cyrus Mody also discusses the funding trends that 
redirected many physicists into environmental and more pragmatic applications of physical 
sciences. Mody, “Santa Barbara Physicists in the Vietnam Era,” 74.   
 
50 Different from scenario writing and alternative futures, technological forecasting is a 
quantitative, probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of future technologies “with relatively 
high confidence” (15). Technological forecasting emerged as a “management discipline” around 
1960. Though, developments began in the mid-1940s as a way to “attain “informed judgement” 
through systematic and comprehensive evaluation” (17). The most comprehensive account of 
technological forecasting is by OECD’s Erich Jantsch, the 1967 state-of-the-art study 
Technological Forecasting in Perspective commissioned by Alexander King, the report 
influenced the direct of planners until the 1970s. Erich Jantsch, Technological Forecasting in 
Perspective (Paris: OECD, 1967).; See also, Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 197-198.  
 
51 Harman, “Alternative Futures and Education Policy.” 
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Harman these aims meant nothing short of an entire reformulation of the conceptual 
premise of modern society.  
Harman stressed that the industrial era lacked appropriate values to counter the 
effects of increasing centralization and concentration of power and unequal distribution 
of wealth. At a presentation on “Planning in the Seventies” sponsored by the American 
Society for Public Administration in 1971, Harman argued: “what was not clearly 
understood in 1960 and is more apparent now, is that a fundamental incompatibility 
exists between these aims [for example, to decrease inequality and enable self-
fulfillment] and the dominant paradigm of the industrial state.”52 Looking back on 
Harman’s vision now, it is unthinkable that a government-sponsored policy outfit would 
be selected to offer such unconventional views for the future of the United States. Yet, 
this is exactly what happened at SRI in the 1970s. It is difficult to pinpoint whether 
cultural and social crisis, pragmatic budgetary diversification, or revolutionary fervor led 
to the sponsoring of the project. However, it was likely to be a mix of all of the above.  
The late 1960s was a period of change for Stanford Research Institute. Following 
the student protests of 1968 against the increase in military-sponsored research and 
development at SRI, Stanford University divested from the organization in 1970.53 
Although it became enmeshed in federal government contracts—included the Vietnam 
                                                
52 Harman, “Planning Amid Forces for Institutional Change,” 9; I thank financial historian Justin 
Douglas for pointing me to the larger critiques of economic growth from American economists in 
the 1950s. See, for example: John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1958).     
 
53In 1977, Stanford Research Institute became SRI International, and many members from 
Stanford University continued to work with the numerous projects of the institute. 
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and Korean Wars—federal contract work was not the original goal.54 Stanford Research 
Institute was a non-profit research institution founded by the trustees of Stanford 
University and a group of West Coast industrialist in 1946 united in an effort toward 
“economic progress, and strengthening of private business on an international scale.”55 
Stanford University received a portion of the profits, and Stanford Research Institute 
accessed the scientists and engineers from Stanford University. As an SRI Committee 
Report from 1969 put it, SRI was crucial for “providing valuable service to business on 
the West Coast.”56 This was a good fit for Harman, as he considered business 
organizations to be an important site for intellectual freedom and self-discovery.57 Like 
                                                
54 As Rebecca Lowen has noted, there is very little written about SRI. Partially this is because 
SRI International has not opened their archives for scholars. For an internal history of the 
organization, see the two volume, “boosterish” history by Weldon B. Gibson, SRI: The Founding 
Years (Los Altos, CA: Publishing Services Center, 1980) and SRI: The Take-Off Days Years (Los 
Altos, CA: Publishing Services Center, 1986). Also: Rebecca Lowen, Creating the Cold War 
University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).; 
Rebecca Lowen, “Stanford Research Institute,” in Marc Rothenberg, ed. The History of Science 
in the United States: An Encyclopedia, Vol. 842, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001), 538.  
 
55 SRI-International Journal, Number 11, 1969.  
 
56 SRI Committee Report, printed in The Stanford Daily, 15 April 1969; Lowen, Creating the 
Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford. 
 
57 “Business has a special role in this transition period,” wrote Willis Harman in “Rethinking the 
Human Spirit,” a talk for the countercultural business group, World Business Academy. “For one 
thing, business is a commanding presence simply in terms of the effect its activities will have on 
the future, for good or ill. Secondly, the business corporation is perhaps the most flexible 
organization ever invented for responding promptly to changes in the environment, once they are 
seen. Thirdly, in recent years, business has attracted many of the very best people and put them in 
top management positions. A lot of these executives can see clearly the necessity for fundamental 
change, even though they may not see for the moment just how their organizations should 
respond. Willis W. Harman, “Rethinking the Human Spirit,” World Business Academy. He was 
also involved in the February 1972 conference at a White House Conference on the Industrial 
World Ahead presided over by President Nixon. Harman was interested in “inclusive growth”—
which is to say that growth is important, but that it should include other indicators of wellbeing 
outside of GDP— something that has become a topic of interest in the contemporary at the 
OECD. See, for example, OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2017: Going for Growth (Paris: 
OECD, 2017). Harman trusted that one must look inward in order to transform society—much 
like countercultural icon Theodore Rozsak proclaimed in his iconic The Making of a 
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Hudson Institute, by the mid-1960s, SRI consisted of a diverse network of international 
offices and laboratories, including centres in Washington, D.C. and New York, 
Switzerland and Tokyo, as well as representatives in Toronto and Milan.58 When Harman 
started at Stanford Research Institute, the center was housed on the Stanford University 
Campus. This meant that there was an intermixing of countercultural intellectual 
activities and business ventures.59  
Consequently, it was by highlighting the importance of change in belief systems, 
including the ecological, spiritual, social and psychological, that SRI secured their first 
contract on alternative futures for the United States Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. In their first research notes from 1967, entitled “Belief Systems, Scientific 
Findings, and Educational Policy,” Harman and his futures group underlined postulates 
from his earlier IFAS research, including that there was:   
                                                
Counterculture (1969)—but Harman did not condone dropping out. Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 
285. In an interview with Kleiner, Harman stated: "Some people really drop out and totally 
change the outward form of their lives. I eventually concluded that right living, for me, means 
being in the establishment, being more or less acceptable to it. But by no means would I be of it. 
My destiny seems to be to help it to change."  
 
58 Though it is difficult to access corporate documents detailing the organizational layout, 
research reports list the regional offices. See, for example, the Advanced Research Project 
Agency sponsored report, Russell F. Rhyne, “The Strategic Setting for Conflict in South 
Thailand,” (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1965), 51.  
 
59 As historians of science have recently shown, the understudied period of the “long 1960s” was 
a time of change that stretched beyond social and cultural movements to science and technology 
as well. David Kaiser and Patrick McCray’s anthology Groovy Science (2016), for example, 
identifies shifts in science and technology practices in relationship to countercultural movements. 
Importantly, this work collapses the division between countercultural movements—assumed to 
be against rationality and technocracy—and scientific experimentation. While meticulous when it 
comes to the nuances in the different strands of counterculture and science, however, these 
efforts are one-dimensional when it comes to business, relying on a simplified narrative of 
commodification laid out by Thomas Frank’s analysis of 1970s advertising in The Conquest of 




1.   Increased emphasis on the connectedness of everything to everything; a kind 
of oneness  
2.   A shift in the locus of authority from external to internal; Growing 
disenchantment with external authorities and increasing reliance on intuitive, 
inner wisdom and authority 
3.   A shift in perceived location of cause from external to internal60 
 
Harman capitalized on two insights from Huxley’s perennial philosophy first, as a way to 
understand psychedelic consciousness, then as a justification for SRI’s alternative futures 
research. The first concept, ‘being,’ presented an idea that there was a higher awareness, 
a “cosmic consciousness,” that, with the proper tools, could enable one to understand 
ultimate reality, the infinite and eternal. In Harman’s words:  “From the vantage point, 
one’s own growth and creativity, and one’s participation in the evolutionary process, are 
seen to be under the ultimate direction of a higher center.”61 Second, ‘awareness,’ the 
concept that individuals experience ordinary perception as a partial perception was used 
as a way to explain the importance of coming to know and understand a greater reality.62 
In this, Harman brought together a belief that society could live more harmoniously only 
if people were granted opportunities to develop and expand their perception, allowing 
them to become aware of the partiality of their understanding of the world.  
In another alternative futures report, for example, Harman points to techniques, 
like psychedelic experimentation, that “jolt the person out of his habitual perceptions so 
                                                
60 Willis Harman, “Belief Systems, Scientific Findings, and Educational Policy,” 5. 
 
61 Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, 101.  
 
62 Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, 103.  
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that he sees—as he has not before—both his own transcendental nature and the and the 
influences of social institutions.”63 Harman suggests that policy research move to a view 
of “man-in-the-universe” that is “immemorial and universal,” a kind of policy perennial 
philosophy.64 Harman set out three hypotheses that guided his futures research, relying 
heavily on the humanistic psychologists and the psychedelic researchers: 1. That the 
potentialities of individuals are far greater than we currently are able to realize; 2. That a 
large portion of the subjective human experience is comprised of unconscious processes, 
embodying things like “intuition and “creativity”—and psychedelic agents could provide 
access to these facilities; and, 3. The limited images of the self that we currently have 
become self-fulfilling.65  Thus, the “mind-expanding” subjective experiences of 
psychedelics could change the pathological beliefs and values that led to the problems in 
the first place. The name psychedelic, mind-revealing, describes what the substances 
were about for Harman: these substances could unlock the doors of the unconscious 
mind.  
Although on the fringes of SRI, Harman’s Educational Policy Research Center 
interacted with the larger advancements in planning at SRI in the late 1960s. By the late 
1970s, Harman’s alternative futures were distributed by SRI’s corporate consulting arms 
to paying multinational corporations. Consulting services, like the Long Range Planning 
Report Service, launched at SRI in 1958, provided contextual mapping of future business 
environments and distributed the most widespread reports on longer-range technological 
                                                
63 Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, 32. 
 
64 Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, 32. 
 
65 Harman, “The New Copernican Revolution,” 4.  
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forecasts.66 Later, it became the popular Business Intelligence Program, dedicated to 
“research and report on the economic, technological, social, and political changes 
occurring in the business environment and their potential impacts on business…for 
making better plans and decisions.”67 SRI executive Weldon Gibson acclaims Harman’s 
contributions, noting they were “not just limited to gauging the future for corporate or 
government planning,” but they also included “mystical” concerns that framed the way 
corporations addressed “more holistic concepts of a planet of limited capacity” and “the 




Alternative Futures at SRI   
 
When Harman secured the contract from the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare in 1967 he did not have a clear idea of how he would create alternative 
futures for the next thirty years. Although he held steadfast to his conviction about the 
failures of the dominant paradigm, Harman had no systematic method to validate his 
                                                
66 Jantsch, Technological Forecasting in Perspective, 174; For a fee of $4,0000, companies 
received the Long Range Planning Service (LRPS), a package comprising: 40 Long Range 
Planning Reports per year on technological, economic, social, or political changes; special 
Research studies; access to the “Planning Library” at SRI; and consultations. 400 companies and 
agencies were members by 1966. See, Jantsch, Technological Forecasting in Perspective, 299.  
 
67 Bill Royce, “A History of Strategic Management and Planning at SRI: LRPRS. LRPS. TAPP. 
CSP. BIP. DA. SMP. Etc.” (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, March 31, 1985), Art 
Kleiner Collection, Box 3:3, Folder 2, Futures Library, Oxford University.  
 
68 Weldon B. Gibson, “Chapter 14: Business Consulting and Development,” SRI: The Founding 
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findings. At first his group experimented with Hudson Institute’s “Standard World” 
scenarios, later moving to other mathematical methods and technological forecasting. 
However, these did little to confirm their hypothesis regarding the undesirability of the 
guiding principles of modern society.69 Harman articulates his struggle over the use of 
methods in one policy briefing document in 1970:  
 
A conflict exists between the basic premises of a democracy—that man is, by 
virtue of his transcendental nature, endowed with reason, will, and a valid sense 
of value—and the reductionistic, deterministic, physicalistic premises of the 
predominating behavioral-science and sociopolitical theory found in the 
universities which train the society's leaders. Sociology has shifted from its 
earlier emphasis on the semi-philosophical "humanities" approach to an emphasis 
on techniques and empirical studies, with the implication that man is a creature of 
his drives, habits, and social roles, and in whose behavior reason and choice play 





Several issues were at stake in selecting an appropriate methodological approach, some 
of them reminiscent of Kahn and Mann’s critiques in Military Planning in an Uncertain 
World. Like Kahn and Mann, the SRI group aimed at the conceptual limitations of purely 
quantitative analysis, as numbers were unable to capture the pluralism of views across 
different social organizations and individuals that constituted particular social and 
cultural environments.71 Harman claimed that if the method concentrated too much on 
                                                
69 Russell Foote Rhyne, The Act of Choosing: A Context-Matching Theory, and Its Practical 
Implications (New York: IUniverse, 2003), 232.  
 
70 Harman, “Context for Education in the Seventies,” 6.  
 
71 Russell F. Rhyne, “Projecting Whole-Body Future Patterns—The Field Anomaly Relaxation 
(FAR) Method,” Education Policy Research Institute (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 
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theoretical and rational analysis, it excluded irrational or unconscious forces.72 However, 
the specific methodology that could even comprehend the complexity of social worlds, 
and fluctuating subjective perceptions, was up for debate.  
           Harman eventually contracted former RAND and SRI operations analyst and 
management consultant Russell F. Rhyne from the research consultancy Johnson 
Research Associates in Santa Monica, California.73 Rhyne’s critiques of social planning 
systems based only in quantification, and his disenchantment with simulations for 
planning longer term social systems, and his previous work developing non-normative 
futures for business and military strategy, made Harman and Rhyne a good match. When 
Rhyne began to construct SRI’s alternative futures, he built from contextual work he 
pioneered at Johnson Research Associates for corporate long-term clients and the 
Defense Department on contingent patterns and alternative world projects, a technique 
that would have little long-term influence. These alternative worlds described a plausible 
future environment where-in the future might play out, and importantly, included 
alternative evolutions of the environment that would enable one to examine present 
strategies. One inspiration, a 1968 report, “Contingent United States Patterns” focused on 
creating alternative future contexts through a complex bracketing of alternative politic-
economic and technological developments. These originated from Rhyne’s more 
                                                
72 Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, 122. 
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influential counterinsurgency work, notably in SRI’s Counterinsurgency Surveillance 
Analysis Project in the early-to-mid 1960s,74 and at the RAND Corporation.75  
Harman and Rhyne, both trained as engineers in the physical sciences, understood 
social systems to be much more complex and less predictable than physical systems.76 At 
the same time, Rhyne and Harman did not outright reject empirical strategies common to 
physical engineering. Instead, they struggled to combine intuitive and calculative 
techniques, attempting both to attend to subjective experience and to validate these 
through the empiricism of the scientific method. Rhyne justified the necessity of 
introducing inventive methodologies in this way:  
 
Many efforts by physical-science engineers to redesign social systems indeed 
have been crass and in a sense brutal. That has happened largely because 
atomistic approaches (This and this and therefore that) that work rather well in 
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the “hard” sciences have been carried over unthinkingly into the “soft” (and more 




To reiterate, one must not understand Rhyne’s assertion as an outright rejection of “hard” 
sciences. In fact, Rhyne and Harman assumed the “rule-based” science methods should 
be utilized once subjective perceptions of the environment were represented. “The 
explicit focus on alternative, whole-body projections that is, [a self-consistent portrait of 
a future] was produced by the discovery that the corporate ten-year plan of Douglas 
Aircraft Company was being founded on component plans (submitted by the several 
divisions of the company) that were embedded in different, mutually exclusive pictures 
of what the world might be like,” Rhyne once explained.78  That is, Rhyne and Johnson 
Research Associates offered a way for SRI to synthesize diverse perceptions about the 
future that could supposedly be empirically substantiated.  
The method, what Rhyne called Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR), mixed social 
field theory and mathematical relaxation to created non-normative, “quasi-organic 
whole-body futures.” The descriptions of the technique are vague and complicated, and 
frankly, unconvincing. Namely, Rhyne attempted to capture the complexity of qualitative 
social environments through intuitive methods while satisfying the empiricists with 
mathematically relaxation techniques, with dubious success. In the first research report 
for the EPRC in 1971, “Projecting Whole-Body Future Patterns—The Field Anomaly 
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Relaxation (FAR) Method,” Rhyne emphasized the importance of method, insisting it 
was “an operational, practical, workaday tool.”79  
The actual FAR technique lacked precision—even Rhyne admits that some steps 
are “difficult to retain clearly within one’s own mind, difficult to explain to others, and 
difficult to adjust in response to criticism unless it is given some structure.”80 However, 
the technique generated alternative future “trees” of “comparably plausible alternative 
scenarios” that aimed to “bracket” the future through “sequentially credible way[s] in 
which the contextual pattern[s]” might unfold.81 While there is nothing particularly 
insightful about Rhyne’s convoluted methodology, both the trees and the resultant 
scenarios, understood as a step-by-step process for imagining alternative future 
possibilities, provide an example of corporate scenario planning’s convoluted historical 
genealogies. The spiritual and methodological rebellion of the alternative future histories 
were intentionally complicated, relying more on transcendental idealism than on 
verifiable methodologies. SRI’s alternative future histories trees were evolutionary in 
inspiration, echoing Jesuit priest and paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin’s phylogenetic 
understanding of evolving consciousness.82  
Regardless, the alternative future trees developed from two primary modes of 
analysis. The first was semi-qualitative: Rhyne attempted to apply the social field theory 
methodology from the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin to analyze complex fields of 
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seemingly unquantifiable “social sectors.”83 Lewin’s commitment to Gestalt holism, a 
reaction to the piecemeal approaches in experimental psychology based upon measurable 
independent variables and associated responses, was part of the reason for his warm 
reception into later American countercultural strains.84 German Jewish émigré Kurt 
Lewin came to the United States in the mid-1930s, after completing his doctorate at the 
University of Berlin, a center for Gestalt psychology. Lewin was recruited by 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1945 to set up the Research Center for Group 
Dynamics where he made advancements in the fields of action research and group 
dynamics. His research on group dynamics built the foundations for sensitivity training 
and the National Training Laboratories.85 Although Lewin gained considerable fame in 
the interwar period, many found his grand theories dubious, lacking the controls 
necessary for experimental psychological investigation.86 
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Like Lewin, however, Rhyne maintained that outcomes and any process of 
change were the product of complex and interacting forces making up the surrounding 
environment, what Lewin called a “field.”87 Rhyne drew from one of the premises of 
Lewinian field theory: the theoretical vision that individuals and groups, and their 
“multitude of co-existent interdependent” variables, must be understood in the context 
with the, in another one of Lewin’s words, “total situation.”88 Lewin primarily used field 
theory as a means to analyze and change group behavior by constructing the 
psychological “forces” influencing an individual’s behaviors in their indeterminacy.89 
This “total situation” was more than lists or abstract theoretical language; Lewin 
preferred “topological maps,” building from the mathematical and geographical study of 
topological space rather than conventional Euclidean models.90 Topological space, in 
Lewin’s words, enabled one “to speak in a mathematically precise manner of equality 
and differences of direction, and of changes in distance, without presupposing the 
“measuring” of angles, directions, and distances, which is usually not possible in a 
sociopsychological field.”91 This would, Lewin contended, avoid the “classificatory 
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pigeonholes” that scientific methodologies forced upon group analyses.92 Lewin’s aim 
was nothing short of the philosophical reorientation of social psychology to the task of: 
“1. The integrating of vast areas of very divergent facts and aspects… [i.e. cultural, 
political, economic, etc.] 2. The treating of these facts on the basis of their 
interdependence…3. The handling of both historical and systematical problems…4. The 
handling of all “sizes” of objects or patterns…5. Problems of “atmosphere” (such as 
friendliness, pressure, etc.).93 Social field theory was used by RAND operations analysts 
and organizational change management theorists even as it was overlooked by a postwar 
psychological profession moving towards empirically verifiable methodologies.94  
Historians of science in the collaboratively written How Reason Almost Lost Its 
Mind have written about Lewin’s field theory as a “methodologically defined” 
“heightened space of observation and intervention” as it was taken up by American Cold 
War era social scientists, like Leon Festinger and Paul Lazarsfeld.95  This critique is part 
of a larger argument that Cold War social scientists operationalized rationality, 
attempting to guide decision-making processes through rigid rules and tight, 
experimentally controlled conditions. They describe Lewin’s “total situation” as a 
“mechanism” for standardization by creating “consistency” in “comparable units of 
behavior,” opening them up to intervention.96 Certainly, part of this formulation is 
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correct. Yet, flattening Lewinian field theory’s complicated intellectual inspirations 
under rationalism or positivism is limited.97 Though it was taken up by some Cold War 
psychologist instrumentally, as a way to control social situations, others, like Rhyne, 
followed Lewin’s more utopian theoretical visions.  
Lewin’s field theory emerged from the concerns of Gestalt psychology, a German 
school of thought, offering a “holistic view” based upon subjective perception and the 
contextual environment, what some theorists call “atmospheres.”98 As critical scholars 
Javier Lezaun and Nerea Calvillo have argued, Lewin’s contribution to social sciences 
was more than an elaboration of experimental laboratory conditions. Lewin’s fields also 
attempted to “make explicit” the atmospheric conditions of the environment “conducive 
to the proliferation of staged but undermined events.”99 Alternative futures were not 
simply “a function of economic, demographic, technological, sociological, and political 
variables,” Harman once argued.100 Just as important were the affective atmospheres, 
including: “individuals’ values and aspirations, attitudes and prejudices, beliefs and 
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disbeliefs, visions and despairs.”101At the same time, field theory allowed for the 
abstraction of systemic social problems, like economic inequality and racism, into 
individualized affective dimensions and perceptions.  
What Lewin’s field theory provided for Rhyne, and subsequently Harman, was a 
way for each alternative future to feature a descriptive framework of indeterminate 
component elements, including affective dimensions and perceptions (what Rhyne called 
“sectors”) and alternative conditions for each sector (called “factors). The sectors in 
Rhyne’s first alternative futures report “Projecting Whole-Body Future Patterns,” 
included economics, internal politics, science and technology, foreign relations, and U.S. 
demographic patterns and world population. Rhyne bracketed each alternative future—
specifically, no more than six sectors and five or six alternative factors for each future—
in order to examine of all the possible combinations which would be internally self-
consistent so as to not be overwhelmed by hundreds of possible combinations (Figure 6). 
For example, the sector U.S Economics included the factors: prosperous, free-enterprise; 
slow growth, free enterprise; depression, free enterprise; prosperous, government control; 
unsuccessful, government control; non-expanding, successful; communalism. Rhyne’s 
grandiose vision articulated a multitude of factors and sectors in order to call attention to 
a wide range of possibilities. Rhyne then evaluated the combinations of factors within 
sectors through a seemingly complex matrix. 
 
                                                





Figure 8. “Lewinian Social Field Map.”102 
 
 
Then, there was the secondary quantitative method: generating “schematized whole 
conditions” through a matrix of pairs in an effort to ‘scientifically validate’ the findings. 
Future context, however, was tricky, as each perspective needed to be understood within 
a whole future and by a whole group (for example, of managers or war strategists). 
Rhyne argued that the matrix of pairs, a “most nearly mechanical” operation, was 
necessary to expand the rigour of the operation. As Art Kleiner documents in The Age of 
Heretics, it was at this point that the SRI’s alternative futures researchers utilized SRI 
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forecasts, coding the trends onto punch cards, and feeding them into mainframes.103 This 
created hundreds of futures. The resultant alternative futures, a combination of sectors 
and factors, was strangely algorithmic; for example, one scenario was called 
“E3I3S1D1H1F1.” Then, researchers analyzed the scenarios for internal consistency, and 
discarded those without it.104 For example, a scenario of a prosperous, growing economy 
could accompany rigid, “cybernetic bureaucracy.” The final results of the self-consistent 




Figure 9. “Tree of Alternative Future Histories (Adept-Inept Dimension).”105 
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In their first attempt, SRI created five main futures (solid lines) and secondary 
alternatives (dotted branches) derived from over forty “highly plausible” alternative 
futures stretching thirty years into the future.106 The trees each focused on changes in a 
pivotal element impacting the future. The first was the degree to which society would be 
open, flexible, tolerant of diversity, decentralized or authoritarian, violent, and 
bureaucratic. The second was the “degree to which a society is adept in the Faustian 





Figure 10. “Tree of Alternative Future Histories (Open-Closed Dimension).”108  
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Harman rarely mentioned the details of the scientifically dubious FAR 
methodology in his EPRC reports. Frankly, he focused more on the resultant alternative 
future trees and scenarios that derived from Rhyne’s FAR method. From the trees, the 
SRI group narrated five scenarios of alternative futures, including, “Violence Escalated,” 
where trust and confidence throughout society breaks down, and authorities increasing 
rely on force as a means to maintain control, while bureaucratic structures and solutions 
remain inflexible.109 In yet another, a continuation of the unlikely “Standard World” from 
the Hudson Institute, what SRI called “Status Quote Extended,” high economic growth 
prevails, and pollution problems are brought under control.110 And yet, growth and 
economic inequality problems continue to plague urban and rural areas. In a departure 
from others, the scenario ““War” on Ecosystem Imbalance,” includes a largescale effort 
to reduce pollution, and a redistribution of the flows of material wealth, eliminating 
domestic poverty.111 The SRI futures group became fixated on the appropriate means to 
enable the massive social changes in this last scenario, what they began calling a 
transcendental “New Society.”   
 Harman defined change in the terms of normal science processes called 
paradigms, following the popular and yet contentious theoretical framework in the 
sociology and history of science at the time from physicist turned historian of science 
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Thomas Kuhn.112 Different from Merton’s normative paradigms, and the narrower aims 
of Kuhn’s, Harman used paradigm to describe the basic, yet limited way, of “perceiving, 
thinking, valuing, and doing, associated with a particular vision of reality.”113 Harman 
relentlessly pushed against what he imagined to be the “dominant paradigm” of industrial 
society—a favouring of the rational and the empirical— that structured the basic 
assumptions around which policies were built. Harman’s team argued that the crises 
undergirding the macro-problem meant that a “paradigm shift” was necessary, and that 
the “dominant paradigm,” based primarily on industrial assumptions that privileged 
positivistic science and command and control over technology, was bound to fail.  
Harman identified the Western scientific-model, one that did not allow for 
“tolerance of ambiguity in the basic concepts and of multiplicity of models of the 
universe,” as the problem.114 “The inadequacy of technoscientific values and premises to 
guide human affairs is a central issue,” Harman wrote in one of his first SRI policy 
briefs: “in the absence of a thorough re-examination of basic premises and values, 
[technoscientific values] add to the problem rather than to its solution.”115 These political 
critiques of technoscience were also developed and expanded by critical historians of 
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technology, like David Noble and Langdon Winner, works that would have considerable 
influence on the fields of science studies.116 In other words, certain strands of science 
studies and corporate scenario planning have entangled genealogies, something not often 
expressed in the scholarly literature.  
Harman utilized Kuhn’s paradigm shift as a framework to understand the 
breakdown of the dominant industrial paradigm. In a May 1971 report “Planning Amidst 
the Forces for Institutional Change,” Harman pointed to inadequacy of the dominant 
paradigm—a prerequisite of a Kuhnian paradigm shift— as evidence that a new 
paradigm might be emerging:    
 
 
Kuhn uses the term “dominant paradigm” to refer to the basic way of perceiving, 
thinking, and doing, associated with a particular vision of reality, largely 
embodied in unquestioned, tacit understanding transmitted primarily through 
exemplars. Thus, applying this concept to the whole society, a paradigm is more 
than an ideology or a world view, and less a total culture. Kuhn documents the 
sequence of phenomena that tend to accompany the breakdown of influence of an 
old paradigm and its replacement by a new one. Growing awareness of problems 
which appear to be intrinsic to, and unresolvable within, the old paradigm is one 




Differently, the transcendental paradigm, was characterized by “a metaphysical asserting 
transcendental man” that “fundamentally” challenged the dominant “industrial-state” 
paradigm.118 One must note that throughout Harman’s alternative futures the aim was not 
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to theorize the future per se, but to understand the foundational “unconscious processes” 
that play a role in both individual and social change—what one might call a 
worldview.119 Alternative futures, for Harman, were essentially ordering patterns for an 
inherently uncertain future. Continuing in the language of Kuhn, Harman suggests that 
"you see the Gestalt or you don't; it appears plausible and useful or it doesn't".120 Like 
Kuhn, Harman understood that the motivations for the paradigm shift were not rational 




Changing Images of Man       
 
 By the early 1970s, Harman’s transcendental visions that pulled together critiques 
of technoscience and economic growth with corporate planning gained traction. For 
example, in February 1972, Harman debated alternative futures at a White House 
Conference on the Industrial World Ahead presided over by President Nixon. It was the 
first U.S government conference exclusively concerned with business interests, and the 
first one on the future. Speaking on a panel with Herman Kahn, Harman admitted that 
little could be done to change the future, even towards his transcendental scenarios. 
However, Harman asserted that one has a choice whether or not to attempt to identify the 
forces shaping the future:  
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The extent to which our deliberate actions can affect the future is undoubtedly 
limited...Continuity of cultural change, institutional inertia, unexpected events, 
and subliminal social forces conspire to shape the course of history and to thwart 
attempts to design the future. Quite apart from our desires, the transformation 
postulated in these remarks is either upon us or it is not—it is not our choice to 
make. However, we can choose either to understand and move with the tides of 
history, whatever they may be—or to attempt to resist them.122  
 
 
Harman made clear that the future was not explicitly controllable, as he asserted the 
importance of comprehending the possibilities. These possible alternative futures, rather 
than being value-neutral, or disinterested like Hudson Institute’s, could be distinguished 
by the way “society seeks resolution of its dilemmas.”123 This version of alternative 
futures as transcendental possibilities from the late 1960s gained traction at a time amidst 
larger societal concern about the negative effects of modernization that spread beyond 
countercultural movements.  
Even as the transcendental scenarios of Harman’s team gain popularity in the 
business world, however, changing goals at SRI, and the oil shocks and stagflation 
leading to the redirection of long-term planning efforts at SRI, halted Harman’s 
alternative futures research. The alternative futures reports by Harman’s group would be 
rejected by Department of Education over debates about its usefulness and its scientific 
approach. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare eventually cut the funding 
for the SRI center in 1972, in search of more immediate-term policy problems, believing 
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Harman's obscure, long-range analysis unusable.124 However, for Harman being 
“unusable” by the government bureaucracy only redoubled his efforts.   
Harman continued exploring the long-term alternative futures approach in 1972 at 
the Center for the Study of Social Policy at SRI, a center he founded after the closure of 
the EPRC. The Charles F. Kettering Foundation, established by Charles Kettering, the 
“mercurial” engineer responsible for the creation of the cash register, provided the 
funding for the widely popular 1974 study, “The Changing Images of Man.”125  At the 
time, the Kettering Foundation sought to support “high leverage,” “risky” social policy 
research ideas.126 “The Changing Images of Man” study, led by Harman, continued his 
original alternative futures research, concentrated on the conceptual foundations that 
would support the transcendental paradigm in the future, what they identified as “images 
of nature of man in relationship to the universe.”127  
Changing Images of Man was written in dramatic prose by the mythologist 
Joseph Campbell, and featured contributions by psychologists B.F. Skinner and Carl 
Rogers, microbiologist René Dubos and anthropologist Margaret Mead and over twenty 
other heavyweight intellectuals from the humanities and engineering, to the United 
Nations and British Intelligence. In this, it continued the postwar vision of academic 
                                                
124 Markley and Harman, Changing Images of Man, xviii.  
 
125 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics; The document gained wide-spread notice thanks to journalist 
Marilyn Ferguson’s bestseller The Aquarian Conspiracy (1980). Ferguson has been credited with 
catapulting the “New Age” into the spotlight in her study of pioneering experimentation in the 
fields of parapsychology to holistic medicine. Willis Harman, and Changing Images of Man, 
were important sources for Ferguson.  
 
126 Markley and Harman, Changing Images of Man, xviii.  
 
127 Markley and Harman, Changing Images of Man, xix.  
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interdisciplinary collaboration as a crucial feature to fixing the problems of American 
liberal democracy.128 The report built from the argument that imaging futures was 
important from Dutch futurist Fred Polak's The Image of the Future (1973). Polak 
asserted that that admen and strategists, and their corporate interests, had hijacked the 
future, and what was needed was imagined positive alternative futures for a future of 
“Western civilization.”129 At the same time that it posited a transcendental paradigm, 
Changing Images of Man distanced itself from the bureaucratic regulations of civil rights 
and the radical politics of some counterculture movements, neglecting to engage 
substantially with gender or race. In this way, SRI’s corporate scenario planning efforts 
collapsed what were generally considered systemic problems—like economic inequality 
and racism—into individualized fields made up of abstracted “factors” and “sectors.” 
While drawing upon many countercultural intellectual resources as I have described in 
the chapter, including critiques of economic growth and technoscience, many within the 
research group, including Joseph Campbell, feared the “individualism” and 
“rootlessness” of the countercultural movements.130  
Subsequently, the transcendental paradigms from Changing Images of Man were 
taken up by SRI’s Business Intelligence Program, a future business environment 
consulting service started in the 1950s. In a 1973 report “Life Ways and Life Styles,” 
                                                
128 Jamie Cohen-Cole, “The Creative American: Cold War Salons, Social Science, and the Cure 
for Modern Society.” ISIS 100, no. 2 (2009): 219-62. 
 
129 Fred Polak, The Image of the Future, trans. Elise Boulding (Amsterdam: elsevier, 1973); 
Jenny Andersson and Egle Rindzeviciute, “The Political Life of Prediction / The Future as a 
Space of Scientific World Governance in the Cold War Era,” Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences 
Po, no. 4 (2012): 1424. 
 
130 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 284.  
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social economist Arnold Mitchell offered diluted a version of Harman’s alternative 
futures that was distributed to multinational corporations (Figure 9). Utilizing an 
expanded version of Kuhn’s paradigm (that he gleaned from Harman), Mitchell defined 
paradigms as “a useful way of clustering diverse values” that paralleled his analysis of 
changing “life ways and life styles.”131  
 
 
Figure 11. “Contrasting Paradigms”132  
 
 
Rather than a push for transcendental images of the future, based upon rethinking the 
conceptual premises of industrial society, Mitchell suggested categorizing consumer 
preferences based upon countercultural values, like critiques of industrialization and 
capitalism. Mitchell’s uptake of Harman’s transcendental scenarios would, a decade 
later, provide the basis for the widely successful corporate psychographic market 
                                                
131 Mitchell, “Life Ways and Life Styles,” 32.   
 
132 Mitchell, “Life Ways and Life Styles,” 33. 
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segmentation methodology VALS (Values, Attitudes and Lifestyles) that allowed 
advertisers to differentiate groups not by demographic characteristics, but by social 
values.133 That is, in the 1970s, Harman’s transcendental futures based upon psychedelic 
and metaphysical epistemologies informed marketing strategies for multinational 
corporations.   
Harman’s association with psychedelic experience and the science of 
consciousness would ultimately go on to alienate him from Stanford Research Institute in 
the mid-1970s as the social climate for spiritual and intellectual experimentation 
changed. Harman felt defeated and reoriented his research to reconciling unknowable 
phenomenon and science together. He left Stanford Research Institute to lead The 
Institute for Noetic Sciences—the non-profit think tank led by astronaut, and Gaia 
hypothesis proponent, Edgar Mitchell. However, his alternative futures would live on in 
scenario approach as some members of SRI like Peter Schwartz moved to the Shell’s 
Group Planning department, and eventually went on to found the Global Business 
Network with fellow SRI researcher, and former philosophy professor, Jay Ogilvy.   
Following the development of SRI’s alternative futures—from 1960s psychedelic 
experimentation to 1980s corporate marketing psychographics—reveals a more complex 
portrait of corporate scenario planning, one that exceeds a narrative of the 
commodification of countercultural ideas. Corporate scenario planning came to life at 
SRI by way of Willis Harman, a disenchanted electrical engineer immersed in the 
countercultural ethos of the Stanford campus in the sixties and seventies. While building 
from some aspects of the countercultural lifestyle, including the search higher 
                                                
133 Adam Arvidsson, "General Sentiment: How Value and Affect Converge in the Information 
Economy," The Sociological Review 59, no. 2 (2011): 39-59. 
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consciousness, Harman and associates entangled these quests, not with radical political 
activisms, but with ‘rationalist’ planning strategies. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to 
show the ways that SRI alternative futures complicated the normative sense of 
“rationality” and the reified concept of counterculture as generally understood in the 
history of science.134 Secondarily, this chapter advances the claim that corporate scenario 
planning relied upon critical examinations of technoscience, connecting some 
genealogies in science studies and business strategy. In the next chapter, I will draw out 
the ways that the attention to values, and the focus on subconscious processes, had a 
foundational impact on scenario techniques at the multinational energy and 
petrochemical corporation Shell. The transcendental scenarios attracted the attention of 
Shell as oil planners Pierre Wack, Ted Newland and others visited Harman at Stanford 
Research Institute before writing scenarios on the turbulent price of oil in mid-1970s, 
scenarios that would profoundly change the image of corporate scenario planning.135
                                                
134 Historian Howard Brick argues that “the counterculture” was not monolithic, but instead 
compromised a multiplicity of “defiantly non-conformist attitudes, uninhibited behavior, and 
generalized dissent,” Howard Brick, Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 
1960s (New York: Twayne, 1998), 113-14; also in Weidman, “Between the Counterculture and 
the Corporation,” 136.  
 













By the mid-1970s, scenario techniques originally developed by Hudson Institute, 
Stanford Research Institute, and a handful of other think tanks and consulting firms, were 
implemented and transformed by a variety of multinational corporations with varied 
success. Yet, it was the story of the ‘unconventional’ economic planner Pierre Wack, 
leader of the multinational energy and petrochemical company Shell’s “elite” London-
based scenario planning team, that catapulted the obscure speculative narrative-based 
decision-making technique into strategic management legend.1 In a 2003 article from 
                                                
1 The story of Pierre Wack has been told numerous times in the strategic planning literatures. See 
Art Kleiner, “Consequential heresies: How ‘thinking the unthinkable’ Changed Royal Dutch/ 
Shell,” Currency Magazine (1989); Kleiner, The Age Heretics: A History of the Radical Thinkers 
Who Reinvented Corporate Management, 121-154; Art Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future,” 
Strategy & Business Issue 30 (Spring 2003), http://strategy-business.com/article/8220; Pierre 
Wack, Shell’s first scenario team leader, wrote “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead,” Harvard 
Business Review (Sept. 1985): http://hbr.org/1985/09/scenarios-uncharted-waters-ahead and 
“Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” Harvard Business Review (Nov. 1985): 
http://hbr.org/1985/11/scenarios-shooting-the-rapids/ar/1; See also, the second head of the Shell 
scenario team, Peter Schwartz’s The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an 
Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1991), 7-10; Group Planning member Arie 
de Geus’ The Living Company: Habits for Survival in a Turbulent Business Environment 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 46-51; Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline: The Art 
& Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990), 167-173; 
Global Business Network member Joel Garreau’s “Conspiracy of Heretics,” Wired 2, no. 11 
(1994): 98-158; Global Business Network intern Cynthia Selin’s “Professional Dreamers: The 
Past in the Future of Scenario Planning,” In Bill Sharpe and Kees Van der Heijden (editors), 
Scenarios for Success: Turning Insights into Action (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 27-52; 
Kees van der Heijden’s, the fourth head of the scenario team, The Art of Strategic Conversation; 
Peter Cornelius, Alexander Van de Putte and Mattia Romani, “Three Decades of Scenario 
 136 
Strategy & Business, a business journal for corporate executives sponsored by the former 
management consulting firm Booz-Allen & Hamilton, business journalist Art Kleiner 
described how Pierre Wack trained Shell’s managing directors to foresee a complex array 
of unexpected political and economic contingencies impacting the oil industry.2 
Combining spiritual metaphors and business jargon with Shell’s financial 
accomplishments, Kleiner explained at length how Wack’s ‘esoteric’ nature enabled him 
to adapt scenario planning, and alert Shell to upcoming changes in the Arab world of the 
late 1970s—including the effects of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), fluctuating energy supply and demand, the accompanying energy 
crises based upon escalating oil prices, and the increasing pressures to address 
environmental and social problems.3 This “art of seeing” was not something any 
                                                
Planning in Shell,” California Management Review (Vol 48: No. 4, Fall 2005), 92-109; Thomas 
Chermack, The Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack, (New York: 
Routledge, 2017); Former Shell planners Angela Wilkinson and Roland Kupers wrote “Living in 
the Futures,” Harvard Business Review (May 2013): http://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-futures and 
The Essence of Scenarios.  
This story is also part of the critical academic literature. See, for example: Robbie E. 
Davis-Floyd, “Storying Corporate Futures: The Shell Scenarios,” in George E. Marcus (editor), 
Corporate Futures: The Diffusion of the Culturally Sensitive Corporate Form (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997); George E. Marcus, ed., Para-Sites: A Casebook against 
Cynical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 404; After Oil, (Edmonton: 
Petrocultures Research Group, 2016); R. John Williams, “World Futures,” Critical Inquiry 42 
(Spring 2016); Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, The Whole 
Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 186-194; Susie O’Brien, ‘“We Thought the World Was Makeable”: Scenario Planning 
and Postcolonial Fiction’, Globalizations 13, no. 3 (3 May 2016). All heavily rely on the text 
created by Art Kleiner and the Harvard Business Review texts by Pierre Wack without 
considering the literature critically. 
 
2 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
 
3 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” Also, Sharpe and van der Heijden, Scenarios for 
Success: Turning Insights into Action. There are alternative narratives from Shell insiders. See, 
for example, Michael Jefferson, “Shell Scenarios: What Really Happened in the 1970s and What 
May be Learned for Current World Prospects,” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 79 
(2012): 186-197 and Wilkinson and Kupers, The Essence of Scenarios.  
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corporate planner could achieve. As Kleiner explained it, Wack and his “brilliant” 
planning team from the 1970s represented a “golden age” of scenarios that was now past, 
as contemporary corporate leaders were not being trained appropriately to see future 
uncertainties.4 Kleiner specifically credited Wack’s spiritual teachers—including the 
mystic philosopher G.I. Gurdjieff who Wack encountered in weekly salons during his 
university days in World War II Paris, and the Hindi mystic Svamiji Prajnanpad, who 
mentored Wack in midlife—for teaching Wack to expand his perceptions of reality.5  
This account of how ‘Eastern’ mysticism influenced Pierre Wack’s adaptation of 
scenario planning rapidly spread in the 1990s through management books like The Age 
Heretics: A History of the Radical Thinkers Who Reinvented Corporate Management and 
The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. In the pages 
of business journals like Harvard Business Review, Wired, Fortune, and Strategy & 
Business, with titles like “The Man Who Could See the Future,” “Living in Futures,” and 
“Professional Dreamers,” business journalists presented a tale that the elite, London-
based Group Planning team at Shell were the ‘heretical’ ‘gurus’ of planning under 
uncertain conditions.6 This “art of seeing” was not a capability one could develop “in a 
                                                
4 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
 
5 For Prajnanpad, cultivating the “art of seeing” was a way of expanding normal perceptions, 
through things like guided meditation. Wack was not the only French technocratic disciple of 
Prajnanpad, suggesting a larger tradition of postwar French engineers interested in ‘Eastern’ 
mysticisms. Another one of his students, Daniel Roumanoff, was a commercial engineer and 
economic advisor to the French Embassy in the 1970s. He introduced Pierre Wack to the work of 
Prajnanpad, providing the details of his ashram in India to Wack. Roumanoff wrote a dissertation 
on his teachings in French. Kleiner, The Age Heretics, 134; “Pierre,” Svâmi 
Prajnânpad:Biographie, ed. Daniel Roumanoff (Paris, 1993).  
 
6 See, for example, Ron Bradfield et al., “The Origins and Evolution of Scenario Techniques in 
Long Range Business Planning,” Futures 37 (2005), 800. However, Hudson Institute’s 
“Corporate Environment Study” widely disseminated scenario planning as an adequate aide to 
corporations planning in uncertain conditions, and Royal Dutch/Shell was an active, paying 
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set of workshops—or even through an elite agency of analysts and internal consultants.”7 
While maintaining that scenarios were not about predicting the future, this literature 
paradoxically linked Shell’s economic successes in the 1970s to the enlightened thinking 
techniques of its scenario practitioners. These publications, crafted by an entire industry 
of unacknowledged business journalists, ghostwriters, talented editorial staff, and a 
financially endowed publishing infrastructure, disseminated the fantasy that Pierre Wack 
conducted scenario planning as a kind of “in-depth training” that could only be achieved 
by those who “devote[d] their careers to increasing their collective awareness of the 
outside world.”8 The case of Shell’s scenario techniques, as an historical episode tied to 
the fantastic imaginary of a visionary economist and corporate storyteller, provides an 
occasion to examine a decisive shift in beliefs about late-twentieth century decision-
making authority from staid corporate planners and their mathematical tools to corporate 
strategists with their big philosophical ideas and compelling presentations.   
This chapter highlights how the rising industry of “thought leadership” 
journalism of the late-twentieth century transformed beliefs about Shell’s 1970s scenario 
planning techniques, and was a significant contributor to the technique’s contemporary 
legitimacy in the discipline of strategic management. In the hyper-competitive business 
                                                
participant (See Chapter 2). Another early experiment with corporate scenario planning at 
General Electric took place in the Business Environment project in 1967, before Royal 
Dutch/Shell’s more famous use of corporate scenario planning. Ian Wilson, “Future Forecasting 
for Strategic Planning at General Electric,” Long Range Planning, (June 1973): 39-42. However, 
even with scenario planning, GE saw a steep drop in market share in the 1980s. Kleiner, The Age 
Heretics and Gill Ringland, Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1998). 
 
7 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
 
8 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
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environment of the 1990s, one increasingly driven by the idea of innovation—the notion 
that the newest, and boldest, ideas led corporations to future success—multinational 
corporations like Shell relied upon the “charismatic authority” of their decision-makers.9 
By identifying the importance of what historian of science Steven Shapin calls the 
“personal equation” in contemporary corporations facing “radically uncertain futures,” 
the chapter shows how corporate scenario planning exceeds conventional understandings 
in the history of science of impersonal planners that sought to operationalize calculative 
rationality.10 However, as this chapter demonstrations, the “charismatic authority” of 
“thought leaders” like Pierre Wack was produced and promoted by a business publishing 
industry that was invested in the selling the success of corporate scenario techniques 







                                                
9 I build from historian of science Steven Shapin’s account of sociologist Max Weber’s 
charismatic authority in his study of contemporary industrial scientists. Shapin, The Scientific 
Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation.  
 
10Shapin, The Scientific Life, 10.    
 
11 Michael Jefferson, Roland Kupers and Angela Wilkinson have made clear it is an urban legend 
that scenarios enabled Shell to anticipate the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis. Though, they admit the 
coincidental timing of the scenario techniques and these crises that led to scenario’s popularity. 
See, for example, Jefferson, “Shell Scenarios: What Really Happened”; Kupers and Wilkinson, 
The Essence of Scenarios.  
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Pierre Wack as Thought Leader  
 
The term “thought leader” emerged in 1995 as a marketing tool: in the inaugural 
issue of Strategy & Business, editor-and-chief Joel Kurtzman used the term in an 
interview series on prescient business ideas with leading management thinkers of the 
mid-to-late-twentieth century, like the “father of modern management” Peter Drucker, 
the disruptive innovation expert Clayton Christensen, and female-empowerment 
evangelist Rosabeth Moss Kanter.12 Kurtzman made famous the term “thought leaders” 
to vaguely describe business leaders who addressed “big questions” and “whose insights 
are valid and important.”13  
Critiques of this late-twentieth century figure of the “thought leader” have 
emanated from numerous academic domains, including political science, history, and 
anthropology. In his 2017 book The Ideas Industry, political scientist Daniel Drezner has 
argued that the propagation of foreign policy ideas has come to be dominated by 
“thought leaders”— those who promote their one big idea that will “change the world”—
where in the midcentury “public intellectuals” reigned.14 Historian of science David 
Sessions has identified how the pursuit of high paying gigs for television, public 
                                                
12 Joel Kurtzman, “In This Issue,” strategy + business Issue 1 (October 1, 1995), 
https://www.strategy-business.com/article/11895?pg=0; Art Kleiner, “Remembering Joel 
Kurtzman,” strategy + business (April 10, 2016), https://www.strategy-
business.com/blog/Remembering-Joel-Kurtzman?gko=8dd48 
 
13 Joel Kurtzman, Thought Leaders: Insights on the Future of Business (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1998), 1. This book, itself a publishing alliance between the management consulting company 
Booz-Allen and Jossey-Bass Publishers, drew on the “intellectual capital” of its top consultants 
and academics.  
 
14 Daniel Drezner, The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans, and Plutocrats are 
Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2017), 9.  
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speeches, and book deals has made thought leadership “more of a marketing principle 
than a philosophical insight,” where thinkers are prone to “bloat their expertise and hustle 
in so many markets that they end up selling fakes.”15  
In the corporate realm, one of the most well-known examples of thought 
leadership’s shortcomings is articulated in historian Jill Lepore’s eviscerating critique of 
Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s theory of “disruptive 
innovation.”16 Disruptive innovation, a mainstay in contemporary Silicon Valley, 
proposed companies that radically ‘disrupt’ an industry are more successful and 
competitive than those seeking to gradually improve a product. However, Lepore has 
revealed that Christensen’s case studies, the ‘proof’ of disruptive innovation—like the 
disk-drive industry and mechanical-excavator industry—were based on “dubious” 
sources and “questionable” logic.17 Specifically, Drezner argued that it was because 
Clayton Christensen, a “bold, risk-taking entrepreneur,” appealed to a “plutocratic 
worldview” that disruptive innovation took Silicon Valley by storm.18  
The “charismatic” entrepreneur of the twenty-first century—who could be 
considered one brand of thought leader—is the subject of historian of science Steven 
Shapin’s The Scientific Life: A Moral History (2008).19 Shapin revisits German 
                                                
15 David Sessions, “The Rise of the Thought Leader,” The New Republic, 28 June 2017. 
 
16 Jill Lepore, “The Disruption Machine: What the gospel of innovation gets wrong,” The New 
Yorker, 23. 
 
17 Lepore, “The Disruption Machine: What the gospel of innovation gets wrong.”; Also, Sessions, 
“The Rise of the Thought Leader.” 
 
18 Drezner, The Ideas Industry, 199; Also, Sessions, “The Rise of the Thought Leader.” 
 
19 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation.  
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sociologist Max Weber’s concerns about the loss of charismatic leadership and trust to 
impersonal routinization and bureaucracy in the modern industrialized world.20 
Challenging Weber’s argument, Shapin contextualizes and seeks to legitimate the 
“charismatic authority” demanded of contemporary scientific entrepreneurs.21 He 
advocates that “trust, familiarity, and personal virtues” are essential attributes for those 
looking towards an uncertain future, instead of part of a scientific persona that has been 
“lost” in the contemporary.22 When researchers, those who “speak on behalf of nature, 
technology, and the future,” face the “radical normative uncertainties” of late modern 
technoscience, they rely on personal virtues, Shapin argues.23 In the face of 
uncertainties—where there is no known direction for future ventures—investors, 
consumers, and others, look to individuals with “personally embodied leadership” that 
both “participants and commentators” call “charisma” for reassurance.24  
This “charismatic authority,” however, is not an essential characteristic of 
specific individuals, as Shapin’s account implies, intentionally or not. Though charisma 
                                                
20 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, 3-4; Max Weber, 
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., eds. Gunther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, trans Ephraim Firschoff et al. (Berkeley: Univerity of California Press, 1978).  
 
21 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, 267.  
 
22 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, 3.  
 
23 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, 312.  
 
24 Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, 267. Shapin remarks 
that it is known that there will “be a market for a product” like an improved razor blade, “which 
people are reasonably believed to want.” However, in the case of innovative technologies that are 
“substantially new thing[s] in the world,” the needs are less clear. “People at the time of an 
investment decision do not know [what] they want,” Shapin contends. In none of the “high-tech, 
biotech, and organized nonprofit research” directed at the future, “can patterns for success be 




is most often a capacity attributed to particular individuals, it is actually produced 
through relationships in particular historical and cultural environments.25 Business 
sociologist Rakesh Khurana, in his Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational 
Quest for Charismatic CEOs (2002), has underscored this aspect of Weberian charisma 
as he scrutinized the corporate decision-making process of CEO hiring over the last 
twenty years.26 Specifically, Khurana describes how CEO hiring generally rules out 
qualified candidates, and systematic searches, in favour of a small number of celebrity 
outsiders who are considered to possess “charisma,” and are thought of as saviors.27 This 
ability to inspire public confidence and motivate employees, however, often comes at a 
price of tangible knowledge about the organization, that become problems only after the 
fact.28 Different from Shapin, Khurana understands “charisma” as a social product that 
relies on a kind of “magic” that must be recognized by others in order to be effective.29 
  
                                                
25 I follow what feminist theorist Sara Ahmed names “affective economies,” referring to the 
historically contingent social arrangements that allow for the circulation of emotional states that 
come to be seen as a property of specific individuals. Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” 249.  
 
26 Specifically, Khurana argues that to understand charisma as a “characteristic inherent in certain 
types of individuals” is to “miss his [Merton’s] most important insights.” Charismatic authority 
derives from “a particular set of social relations and the cultural context within which those 
relations are embedded.” Rakesh Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational 
Quest for Charismatic CEOs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 157. 
 
27 Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs.  
 
28 The case of Enron hiring Jeffrey Skilling as the CEO in 2000, and Enron’s subsequent fraud 
scandals in 2001, is a primary example Khurana uses to support his claim that charismatic 
leadership is often perilous. Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for 
Charismatic CEOs, x-xi.  
 
29 Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs, 157.  
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This chapter emphasizes the role that thought leadership journalism played in 
helping to produce and legitimate the charisma of Pierre Wack. Instead of highlighting 
his training in macroeconomics, or his technical proficiencies in economic forecasting, or 
his decades of experience as Chief Economist at Shell Française, publications 
concentrated on his charismatic presentation skills, his profound phrases and metaphors, 
and his spiritual practice. In recovering the labours of the thought leadership editorial 
process, the chapter proposes that the legitimacy of Shell’s scenario techniques cannot be 
understood without this unacknowledged act of translation.30 To make this argument, the 
                                                
30 My use of the term translation is in critical conversation with the sociology of translation, an 
important theoretical tool for some genealogies in science studies and business strategy. The 
sociology of translation, developed primarily by science studies scholars Bruno Latour and 
Michel Callon in the mid-1980s, raised the question of how things, like theories, concepts, and 
objects, materialized through networks of heterogeneous relations. The sociology of translation 
(more often called actor-network theory) focused on the successful enrollment—what Callon 
called ‘the art of interessement’—of allies into this process of materialization. Science studies 
scholars engaged with the domains of business generally use translation to describe how 
successful strategies “must integrate itself into a network of actors who take it up, support it, 
diffuse it.” Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, “The Key to Success in 
Innovation Part 1: The Art of Interessement,” International Journal of Innovation Management, 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002): 202. Actor-network theory has also recently been used by business 
historians to understand how the colossal four volume commissioned history of Shell, The 
History of Royal Dutch Shell written by Jan Luiten van Zenden, Joost Jonker, Stephen Howarth 
and Keetie Sluyterman in 2007 (and called by Ponzoni and Boersma “one of the greatest 
achievements in commissioned corporate history” (125)) has helped to legitimate business 
history as an academic discipline. Elena Ponzoni and Kees Boersma, “Writing History for 
Business: The Development of Business History Between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Production of 
Knowledge,” Management & Organizational History, 6, 2 (2011): 123-143. It has also been 
highlighted by Shell business strategists as relevant for long range strategy professionals seeking 
to keep their “innovations innovative.” Rafael Ramirez, Leo Roodhart and Willem Manders, 
“How Shell’s Domains Link Innovation and Strategy,” Long Range Planning, vol 44 (2011): 
250-270. In contrast to these theoretical uses, this chapter does not seek to identify how scenarios 
operated in order to improve business strategy. While actor-network theory often presumes 
science studies can provide epistemological understanding to unaware actors, this chapter argues 
Shell planners were cognizant of the translation acts they were attempting. Thus, this chapter 
seeks to historicize translation as an approach to late-twentieth century corporate scenario 
planning. In doing so, it suggests actor-network theory shares epistemological strategies with 
other domains, like strategic management. See also, Steve Woolgar, Caterlijne Coopmans, Daniel 
Neyland, “Does STS Mean Business?” Organization Vol 16(1) (2009): 5-30.   
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chapter examines the disparities between what Shell scenario planners understood they 
were doing in the mid-1970s, and how their decision-making process was later 
articulated to a wider business audience in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this way, 
the chapter attends to the central argument of the dissertation that corporate scenario 
planning differs in crucial ways from conventional understandings that mid-to-late 
twentieth century corporate megastructures are guided by impersonal planners who 
sought to operationalize rationality, and control decision-making processes through 
commanding authority and rigid rules.   
The chapter begins by recounting the tale of how Pierre Wack used his esoteric 
training to develop scenario planning in order to strengthen Shell’s strategy, as it has 
been conveyed by business journalists. In this version, scenario planning became an 
‘enchanted,’ ‘unconventional’ methodology enabling a “remarkable” few to clearly see 
troubled futures ahead, and support their corporation’s flexible responses.31 Then, the 
chapter shows how Shell’s scenario techniques from the 1970s were actually based upon 
‘business as usual’ principles of profit margins and risk strategy in the face of the limited 
supply of cheap oil that were central to Shell’s planning department even before Wack 
joined. And, finally, the chapter cracks open the enchanted tale that circulated in thought 
leadership pieces—their own kind of “inscription devices”—and demonstrates how an 
unacknowledged network of commissioned business historians and storywriters, 
                                                
31 “Remarkable men” would become a trademark of Shell scenarios. It was journalist Art Kleiner 
that first presented Wack’s interest in “remarkable people,” defining it as meaning 
“unconventional,” not in the mystical terms other critical scholars have prescribed to it. Kleiner, 
“Consequential Heresies.” The idea of “unconventional” men leading corporate planning efforts 
supported Kleiner’s thesis that there are heretical corporate actors remaking postwar business. 
Kleiner, The Age Heretics.    
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including editors and ghostwriters, helped to produce and disseminate a narrative that 
framed Pierre Wack as a visionary thought leader by way of scenario planning.32 The tale 
of Wack emerged with the rise of the publishing company Doubleday, a niche publisher 
housed within the large publishing company Currency, that formed in 1989 by editor 
Harriet Rubin to promote business “thinkers, not just doers” who “rebel against the status 
quo.”33 Rubin’s first commission in 1989, by the firebrand business journalist Art 
Kleiner, provided the primary account of Pierre Wack as a corporate heretic.34 Kleiner 
went on to ghostwrite the two other leading accounts from former Shell planners: Peter 
Schwartz’s The Art of the Long View (1991) and Arie de Geus’ The Living Company 
(1997).35 This version of Wack as a visionary thought leader rebelling against outmoded, 
                                                
32 Inscription devices—what Latour defines as “a written trace that makes the perceptive 
judgment of the others simpler”— have played an important role in helping science studies to de-
emphasize cognitive and social peculiarities of scientists in laboratory science practice. Bruno 
Latour, “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” In Science Observed, Karin Knorr-
Cetina and Michael Mulkay (editors), (London: SAGE Publications, 1983): 161. See also Bruno 
Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013). This chapter suggests that inscription devices play an 
important role in the critical study of corporate techniques in addition to laboratory practice. On 
studying corporate techniques, see Chapter 1. My use of the term inscription device, similar to 
my use of other theoretical tools in actor-network theory, is critical. Thus, this chapter seeks to 
identify how Shell planners utilized their thought leadership texts as public relation tools.  
 
33 E. Scott Reckard, “Succeeding by reading in the ‘80s: Authors jump on “In Search of 
Excellence” bandwagon,” Chicago Tribune (24 December 1989).  
 
34 See Kleiner, “Consequential Heresies: How ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ Changed Royal Dutch/ 
Shell.”   
 
35 I build from business historian Christopher McKenna’s argument that ghost-writers have 
played an important role in twentieth-century corporate strategy, and should not be ignored. Like 
this chapter, McKenna’s article unearths the intellectual labours required to create Alfred Sloan’s 
ghost-written classic, My Years with General Motors: “John McDonald, however, was not the 
only person hired to assist Alfred Sloan on this mammoth project. Alfred Sloan also required a 
secretary, Catherine Stevens, to transcribe his reminiscences and, equally important, someone to 
comb through the corporate archives of General Motors to unearth the firm’s early history. What 
Alfred Sloan and John McDonald needed… was ‘a long-term research assistant, preferably a 
trained historian, to work with us.’” Christopher D. McKenna, “Writing the Ghost-Writer Back 
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“mechanistic” business planning, provided the model for not only a new sense of 
scenarios, but also for what Currency/Doubleday could offer to its executive 
readership.36 This notion that Pierre Wack’s thought leadership led to Shell’s economic 
success did not originate solely in the internal operations of Shell, or even in the 1970s. 
Expanding the analysis to include how the Shell scenarios have been formulated, 
communicated, and disseminated, the chapter concludes by reflecting on how the story 
surrounding Shell scenario planning should be of as much interest to historians and 
science studies scholars seeking to understand the import of corporate scenario 
techniques. By examining the differences between the accounts, it becomes clear that the 
story of how scenarios became corporate strategies is anything but transparent. This 
quandary also raises important questions for how historians should study contemporary 
corporate techniques that are often obscured by a corporation’s investment in 
establishing its own histories.37 The history of Shell’s scenarios is mired in the accounts 
from planners who were invested in Shell’s success. Specifically, it arose in business 
journals, some sponsored by management consulting firms, whose existence relied 
entirely upon convincing corporate executives that their journals were capable of “laying 
out an agenda covering which issues are worthy of thought.”38 More than this, historians 
and critical theorists, presuming that the scenario accounts were straightforward, have 
                                                
In: Alfred Sloan, Alfred Chandler, John McDonald and the Intellectual Origins of Corporate 
Strategy,” Management & Organization History, 1:2 (2006): 112. 
 
36 Kleiner, The Age Heretics, 125-126.  
 
37 Justin Douglas, Bretton Fosbrook, Kira Lussier, and Michelle Murphy, “Knowing 
Corporations: Towards a Critical Corporate Studies,” unpublished manuscript.   
 
38 Kurtzman, Thought Leaders: Insights on the Future of Business, 1.  
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helped to reify this storyline.39 Many have uncritically cited Shell scenario team’s 
“heretical” ability to navigate uncertainties by looking beyond quantitative models and 
embracing a countercultural ethos, without providing the important context for how this 
account developed.   
 
 
The Reperceptive Scenario  
 
Before examining how this tale was produced and why it matters, this chapter 
first recounts the story of how Pierre Wack developed scenario planning in the 1970s. 
The details of this tale—reported mostly by Shell insiders, and commissioned 
historians—has structured understandings of the role Pierre Wack played in Shell’s 
economic success. At the same time, the fact that only Shell insiders have had access to 
this material and have organized and financed the creation of the only public collection 
of Shell’s archival records on scenarios makes it difficult to ascertain with any certainty 
what ‘actually happened’ or even the precise details, including the organizational 
structure of Shell’s planning group or the day-to-day operations of the group.40  
                                                
39 In Fred Turner’s book From Counterculture to Cyberculture, for example, the history on 
scenario planning is derived entirely from Art Kleiner’s The Age of Heretics. Turner, From 
Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, The Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
Digital Utopianism, 186-194; see also, After Oil; Williams, “World Futures.”  
 
40 Former Shell scenario team members Napier Collyns and Angela Wilkinson gifted the Pierre 
Wack Memorial Library to Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford, creating what 
would become the Oxford Futures Library in the mid-2000s. Originally this collection was a 
fixture of one of the Global Business Network offices in The Hague, Netherlands. Art Kleiner’s 
archive was added in 2016, as well as former RAND and Institute for the Future researcher 





Figure 12. Pierre Wack at Shell Française, 1968.41  
 
The story of Pierre Wack and Shell scenarios began in the late 1960s, a time of 
existential crisis for the long-term future of Shell. The ever-present question was: “what 
will happen when the oil runs out?”42 Shell was a multinational corporation, consisting of 
                                                
41 Chermak, The Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack, 274.  
 
42 De Geus, The Living Company, 31. 
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more than 300 companies in over 100 countries around the world, and employing over 
170,00 people.43 All 300 companies were co-owned by a pair of holding firms, one 
Dutch and one British, that merged in 1906 to sell petroleum. They turned over more 
than $100 billion dollars a year.44 During the 1940s and 1950s, exploding postwar 
demands for oil were met by the profitable westward exportation of oil from the Middle 
East, a strategy most petroleum companies assumed would continue.45 However, as early 
as 1967, inspired by the work from Daniel Bell’s Commission on the Year 2000, the 
Studies and Policy division of Shell posited the plausibility of an “eventual downturn in 
the growth of the oil business, which may well come at or soon after the end of the 
century.”46 In the face of these potential future discontinuities, Shell was actively 
searching for innovative ways to understand and navigate the uncertainties.  
Scenario planning at Shell, like the other case studies in this dissertation, emerged 
at a moment wherein sophisticated midcentury mathematical procedures—rational, 
model-based approximations of future demands— that promised to revolutionize 
planning came under fire in corporate planning departments.47 Specifically, in 1965 Shell 
began using a then state-of-the-art quantitative financial prediction system known as 
                                                
43 De Geus, The Living Company, 10; Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 
vol. 3 of A History of Royal Dutch Shell, 4.1. 
 
44 De Geus, The Living Company, 10. 
 
45 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1990), 422.  
 
46 Shell Group Planning, “Post Objectives Period: A Special Survey of Energy in the World 
Political and Economic Environment for the Years 1985-2000” (Royal Dutch Shell: Studies and 
Policies Division PL/2: December 1967). Pierre Wack Collection. Futures Library. University of 
Oxford; See also Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 222-223. 
 
47 See, for example, Beck, “Corporate Planning for an Uncertain Future,” 13. 
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Unified Planning Machinery (UPM).48 When it was implemented, Shell planners claimed 
UPM would convert an entire succession of global activities for the multinational 
corporation—from oil extraction to consumer gas delivery—into estimates and statistics 
based upon the latest trends. UPM forecasts assumed the expansion of Shell was a self-
evident long-term planning strategy, following the trends of rapid economic growth of 
the 1950s and 1960s.49 However, UPM provided only “surprise-free” predictions that 
were increasingly unusable in the face of what were expected to be "non-linear and 
disruptive changes.”50 For example, the formalization of OPEC in the late 1960s changed 
the profitability of expansion, and led to suspicions that a turbulent oil future lay ahead.51 
Additionally, diversification strategies that gained prominence in the 1960s were also 
doubted; the same strategies that had incidentally helped propel Shell to decentralize, and 
also hastily enter the fields of nuclear power, coal, and metals in the mid-1960s.52  
 In 1966, Shell began experimenting with scenarios from Hudson Institute, not in 
planning but in other company divisions like the Exploration and Production division, in 
order to assess the “political risks” of investments.53 Though the Exploration and 
                                                
48 For discussion of UPM, see Wilkinson and Kupers, “Living in the Futures”; Jefferson, “What 
Really Happened”; Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead.”  
 
49 Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 96.  
 
50 Kupers and Wilkinson, The Essence of Scenarios, 28. 
 
51 In the late 1960s, Middle Eastern oil-producing countries, including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Iraq and Libya, formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in 
order to derive economic benefits over the oil being exported from their lands. This was a 
particular problem to petroleum companies like Shell that relied on cheap oil from the regions. 
See, See Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 13, 93.  
 
52 Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 93-95.  
 
53 Jefferson, “What Really Happened,” 187.  
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Production division assessed the “technical risks” of investment decisions, they had yet 
to include social and political constraints.54 The economist Ted Newland from the 
Exploration and Production division had been tasked with a new project on Long Term 
Studies at the Shell Headquarters in London, and directed to think open-endedly about 
the future, after Shell executives learned that Exxon was working with Hudson Institute’s 
conclusions from The Year 2000.55 Elsewhere in the company, Shell consultant James 
Lovelock—the British critical biologist responsible for the Gaia hypothesis—was also 
experimenting with scenarios in response to Kahn and Wiener’s The Year 2000.56   
In 1967, Shell consolidated these efforts into a stand-alone division called Group 
Planning; this new division was an attempt to move away from the single-line energy 
forecasts that UPM provided—a deterministic extrapolation of oil production or demand 
based upon past trends—that were deemed insufficient for the longer-term future of 
potential oil shortages. Instead of focusing solely on calculative forecasts, Group 
Planning also began developing plausible stories about how the business environment 
might change. The former Head of Economics for the Exploration and Production 
division Jimmy Davidson became the leader of the new division at the London 
Headquarters.57 In 1967, the economist Ted Newland also joined Group Planning, and 
                                                
54 Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 222.   
 
55 Wilkinson and Kupers, “Living in Futures.” See Chapter 2 on “The Year 2000” studies from 
Hudson Institute. See Chapter 5 for Shell consultant James Lovelock’s “Outlook 2000” study, a 
Shell response to Hudson Institute.  
 
56 For more on James Lovelock’s work for Shell, see the conclusion. James Lovelock, “Some 
Thoughts on the Year 2000,” Contracted by Shell (1966). Professor James Lovelock Collection. 
Science Museum, London.  
 
57 Chermack, Foundations of Scenario Planning, 44.  
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began attending the Hudson Institute lecture-seminars to develop his understanding of 
scenario planning methodologies. The same year, Pierre Wack, then head economist at 
Shell Française, began study the long-term future of Shell strategy in a planning exercise 
called the Horizon Year Study; he too attended Hudson Institute’s seminars.58 Similarly 
based on Hudson Institute’s research, Wack investigated the hypothetical liberalization 
of the French oil market based upon the uncertainties in the supply of natural gas.59 
Following these studies, Shell economists began developing and presenting scenarios to 
senior executives as one way to engage with uncertainty. Yet, scenarios had not proved 
useful enough to be implemented across the organization at that time. The 
experimentation with scenarios, however, continued.  
Pierre Wack joined Group Planning at Shell’s London headquarters in 1971 to 
lead a newly created scenario team with Ted Newland. There were eight other members 
of the scenario team for most of the 1970s, predominantly economists and Shell veterans, 
including Ted Newland, Gareth Price, Napier Collyns, Hans DuMoulin, Michael 
Jefferson, and Graham Galer.60 Together this scenario group developed the trends and 
storylines for the scenarios booklets of the 1970s. When Wack was recruited to join the 
scenario team at Shell, he introduced Shell to a metaphysical approach to effectively 
make sense of the incalculable social and geopolitical forces that became part of the 
scenarios. He was also responsible for charismatically narrating plausible stories about 
how the future could unfold. It was not a cognitive capacity so much as an ability to 
                                                
58 Wilkinson and Kupers, “Living in the Futures,” 4.   
 
59 Chermack, The Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack, 46.  
 
60 Chermack, The Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack, 86.  
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properly frame a situation—a worldview. More than a decade after the fact, Wack 
explained the significance this way:  
 
 
Strategies are the product of a worldview. When the world changes, managers 
need to share some common view of the new world. Otherwise, decentralized 
strategic decisions will result in management anarchy. Scenarios express and 
communicate this common view, a shared understanding of the new realities to 





Scenario were presented in order to simultaneously provide a shared worldview and 
unsettle the fixed worldview of the future held by Shell’s executives. As Wack explained 




Scenarios deal with two worlds; the world of facts and the world of perceptions. 
They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision-
makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic 
significance into fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial—
more often than not it does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience 




This meant that the scenario team scanned the business environment to build the 
scenarios. Then, they presented scenarios across the large multinational corporation as a 
way to deal with the world outside of the corporation while engaging with the inner 
                                                
61 Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead.”  
 
62 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
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worlds of the executives. Though it had a predictable pattern, scenario planning was a 
method of patient revelation. Kleiner explained it this way:  
 
You research present key trends; you determine which are predictable and which 
are uncertain; you decide which uncertainties are most influential; you base some 
stories of the future on those uncertainties; you spend some time imaginatively 
playing out the implications of those stories; and then you use those implications 
to start all over again and develop a sense of the impending surprises.63 
 
 
At a presentation for members of the Global Business Network in the early 1990s—a 
consulting firm formed by former Shell planners that sold scenario to large 
corporations—Wack clarified the purpose of planning was “not to produce a document: 
What will the world of energy look like in ten years’ time? The purpose of planning is to 
change the mental map of critical decision makers.”64 
According to this tale, scenarios were more philosophical than technical: how 
could one learn to see the future economic turbulence while accepting that future 
predictions were impossible? And, how did one encourage executives to change their 
inner models of reality? Nevertheless, the process of finding out the ‘mental models’ of 
the decision makers often began with nothing more than interviewing executives with 
open-ended question like, “suppose I was a wizard,” what would you want to know about 
the future?65 Though part of a much longer history in free-form questioning from 
                                                
63 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
 
64 Wack, “Planning in Turbulent Times,” video of presentation at GBN. Undated. Pierre Wack 
Collection. Futures Library. University of Oxford.  
 
65 Kleiner, “Wack @ Curemont,” Transcripts of interview between Pierre Wack and Art Kleiner, 
53 pp. Pierre Wack Collection. Futures Library. University of Oxford. 
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humanistic psychology, not an uncommon practice in late twentieth century business, 
Shell scenario planners often inflated the outcomes of the experimental methods.66  
The midcentury information revolution brought with it increasingly sophisticated 
mathematical procedures promising to revolutionize planning; but, according to Pierre 
Wack, they actually had “conditioned” Shell’s corporate managers to “have great 
difficulty to perceive change.”67 Crucially, Wack’s aim was to train executives to see 
future certainties and uncertainties anew. The direction of some of future forces were 
“predetermined” –they could be easily identified as they were consequences of what had 
happened in the past. Often, these forces consisted of macroeconomic indicators such as 
supply and demand, GNP growth rates and changes in the business cycles. Wack 
understood the predetermined elements of the future to be “typical cyclical fluctuations” 
foundational to macroeconomic theory; it was the ‘non-economic’ factors of people and 
politics that were prone to behave unpredictably.68 The 1973 “Rapids” scenarios, for 
example, explored economic growth, oil supply, and oil price options, specifically 
focusing geo-political conflicts to suggest the oil business was about to undergo a period 
of turbulence (Figure 13). In one scenario, oil prices rose slowly. In the second, oil prices 
crashed, something few oil companies considered. And, in yet another, oil prices rose 
                                                
66 Kleiner, “Wack @ Curemont”; on practices from humanistic psychology, see Grogan, 
Encountering America: Humanistic Psychology, Sixties Culture and the Shaping of the Modern 
Self. 
 
67 Pierre Wack, “Scenarios and the Gentle Art of Re-Perceiving: One Thing or Two Learned 
While Developing Planning Scenarios for Royal Dutch/Shell,” (Manuscript, Harvard Business 
Review Dec 1984). Pierre Wack Collection. Futures Library. University of Oxford. 
 
68 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
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quickly, and remained high.69 The chart was meant to help “reframe our manager’s 
outlook” from “the calm upriver of the traditional environment” to “the turbulence of the 




Figure 13. “The Rapids” Diagram  
presented to Shell Management Directors in 1973.71  
 
 
                                                
69 Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead.” 
 
70 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
 
71 Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead.” 
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The directions of other forces—like geopolitical and social developments—were 
uncertain. Though scenarios often assumed market forces to be predetermined, they did 
not imagine “the economic” to be unencumbered by erratic social and political factors.72 
Thus, though “economic disruptions,” were most often the “predetermined factors; 
uncertain were the reactions to it,” wrote Pierre Wack.73 To parse and explore the 
predetermined and uncertain elements, Shell scenario planners made use of a wide 
variety of experimental techniques. For example, most scholars note how the 
development of this perspective came from introspective activities and uninterrupted 
exchange: weeklong retreats in secluded locations, like the austere monastery in the 
mountaintop town of Lurs in the south of France.74 Group Planning colleague Napier 
Collyns described Wack as capable of  seeing “truths about the future that others could 
barely imagine.”75 Former Shell scenario editor and academic Betty Sue Flowers 
described Wack as “a kind of wild man whom could be found in his Shell office, in the 
most sterile building in London, sitting on his floor amidst a haze of puja sticks, 
meditating, to come up with his stories about the future of oil and gas.”76 
 Others, like former Group Planning member Michael Jefferson, attributes the tale 
of scenarios to Wack’s ability to “’package’ the story lines” and captivate his audience 
                                                
72 This differs from the way of understanding “the economy” as a container, see Mitchell, Rule of 
Experts; Murphy, The Economization of Life; and the Introduction.  
 
73 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
 
74 This May 1974 retreat was original documented in Kleiner, The Age Heretics.  
 
75 Napier Collyns and Harbin Tibbs, “In Memory of Pierre Wack,” Netview 9, no. 1 (1998): 3.  
 
76 Davis-Floyd, “Storying Corporate Futures,” 172.  
 
 159 
with his “references to proverbs…[and] analogies” in order to “fix his points in the 
imagination” of Group Planning members and executives.77 Fred Turner has called 
Wack’s scenarios “corporate performance art.”78 This understanding was shared by Ted 
Newland, who reflected on the importance of Wack’s charismatic scenario presentations:  
 
 The first thing to say is the presentation of scenarios is at least as important as 
the creation of the scenario and the process. I’m talking at the highest of effective 
levels, not down in the engine room of the planning department. You’ve 
got to have the right mix of talent in presenter and creator if you want to 




Wack’s scenario presentations were filled with parables, to gain interest in the stories 
told about the future. Wack often began his scenario presentations with a prosaic 
observation about how the flooding of river could be foreseen if one looks to the glacial 
run-off at the upper part of the river:  
 
I happen to know the Ganges pretty well, from stream to mouth. It’s a very 
extraordinary river. Now, if you know that it had a monsoon rain at the upper part 
of the basin, you can be sure that within two days, some extraordinary floods are 
going to happen at Rishikesh, which is at the foothills of the Himalayas. And 
there days later in Moradabad, which is northweast of Delhi. And again four or 
five days later in Benares.80  
 
 
                                                
77 Jefferson, “What Really Happened,” 193,194. 77 
 
78 Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 187.  
 
79 Chermack, The Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack, 54.  
 
80 Wack, “Scenarios and the Gentle Art of Re-Perceiving: One Thing or Two Learned While 
Developing Planning Scenarios for Royal Dutch/Shell.” 
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The stories were not about “fortune telling” or “crystal-ball-gazing,” Wack once 
remarked, but about focusing on the implications in the future for things that have 
already happened, much like his river explanations of the Ganges.81  
It was not until 1989 that business journalist Art Kleiner first expressed the idea 
that Wack’s narrative-style of explicating corporate futures arose from his “mystical 
journey” into Eastern spirituality (though others, like critical scholars R. John Williams 
and Fred Turner, have reiterated this more recently).82  Kleiner described how Wack’s 
changed awareness began during his encounters with the mystic G. I. Gurdjieff in his 
weekly salons during World War 2, and continued during his travels in India, Thailand, 
and Japan.83 During his time at Shell, he met his final spiritual mentor, the Hindi mystic 
Svamiji Prajnanpad, who, in addition to Gurdjieff, informed his search for “remarkable 
people” who cultivated an “art of seeing.”84 Wack’s understanding of “remarkable 
people” (what would become a trademark of Shell scenarios thanks to Kleiner) has been 
                                                
81 Wack, “Scenarios and the Gentle Art of Re-Perceiving: One Thing or Two Learned While 
Developing Planning Scenarios for Royal Dutch/Shell.” 
 
82 Williams, “World Futures,” 528; On how organic thinking and “Eastern philosophy” in late-
twentieth century American corporate management theories promised the “spiritual 
and therapeutic potentials of capitalism,” see Williams, “Technê-Zen and the Spiritual Quality of 
Global Capitalism,” 17. 
 
83 The Greek-Armenian mystic G.I. Gurdjieff was a controversial figure in Paris during World 
War II who ran the Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man at Fontainebleau. For a 
discussion of Gurdjieff’s approach to understanding multiple temporalities, see Williams, “World 
Futures,” 488-493.  
 
84 Though many, including Turner and William, attribute Wack’s interest in “remarkable men” to 
his time with Gurdjieff, Wack was much more pragmatic about it: “By remarkable, I mean 
someone outstanding, someone unique and remarkable people were people who were extremely 
acute observers and were very interested in things. Not the conventional type—it has nothing 
mystic… had nothing to do at all with the sense of Gurdjieff.” “Wack @ Curemonte,” pp. 52-53. 
Pierre Wack Collection. Futures Library. University of Oxford. 
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partially attributed to Gurdjieff’s pseudo-autobiographical book Meeting with 
Remarkable Men (1960). In the text, Gurdjieff describes “remarkable men” as those who 
“stand out from those around him by the resourcefulness of his mind.”85 Yet, Wack 
attempted to correct this understanding. Wack’s pursuit of remarkable people was not 
mystical at all according to him; it was a search for people with “unconventional” 
insights, who were “acute observers with a keen unending curiosity.”86 Thus, the 
understanding of Wack’s art of “seeing,” like his quest for “remarkable men,” exceeded 
Wack’s own articulation. It was Kleiner who defined Wack’s “seeing” in the language of 
intuition: “a frame of mind beyond observation: the cultivated ability to connect patterns 
and causes.”87 Elsewhere, Kleiner suggests that Wack was hired to bring “awareness” to 
Shell.88 In one of only a handful of published texts from Wack on scenarios, he uses 
obscure metaphors to define “seeing.” In one place, “seeing” the divergent forces making 
up the future was akin to watching waves from “a large rock dropped in a lake”; 
elsewhere, creating narrative stories were ways to “shoot the rapids” of turbulent future 
forces.89  
Kleiner suggests there was something specific about Wack’s ability to “see” 
interacting future forces and provide Shell with the necessary ‘competitive advantage’ 
against companies clinging to antiquated straight-line forecasts. By presenting “two or 
                                                
85 Kleiner, The Age Heretics, 157; quoted in Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 187.  
  
86 Kleiner, The Age Heretics, 135.  
 
87 Kleiner, The Age Heretics. 
 
88 Kleiner, “The Man Who Saw the Future.” 
 
89 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
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more” stories about how the future could come about, Shell’s scenario could “break” 
limited “perceptual world framework” passed down by economic quantification.90 That 
is, Shell scenarios claimed to be more than narrative articulations of “what if?” pushed to 
the furthest degree of plausibility, like the scenarios of the Hudson Institute. In his 1985 
Harvard Business Review reflection on the scenario process at Shell, Pierre Wack boldly 
declared that Shell’s scenario techniques provided “something very precious: the ability 
to reperceive reality.”91  
 
 
World Oil Scenarios and Cold Reality  
 
This tale of how Pierre Wack rescued Shell from the limitations of rational, 
model-based planning systems contradicts accounts from other Shell economist and 
planners that worked alongside Wack in Group Planning. For example, in 1979, former 
Shell scenario team member Hans DuMoulin, Head of Energy and Oil Economics, and 
John Eyre, an energy and oil economics analyst, were the first to publish on the internal 
Shell scenario planning efforts. Reflecting back four years after the first massive increase 
in oil prices in 1974, DuMoulin and Eyre, presented scenario planning as a useful 
“methodology for coping with uncertainty”:  
 
                                                
90 Wack, “Scenarios and the Gentle Art of Re-Perceiving: One Thing or Two Learned While 
Developing Planning Scenarios for Royal Dutch/Shell.” 
 
91 Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids.” 
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There have been many conflicting forecasts of future energy developments, 
ranging from ‘no problem’ to alarmist warnings of another, even greater, shock to 
come—a second energy crunch. The latter view has tended to predominate. The 
multiplicity of forecasts would itself be confusing enough and undoubtedly 
contributes to indecision and lack of action by policy-makers, but the picture is 
still further obscured by the current situation. At the time of writing (October 
1978), oil consumption is only just back where it was five years ago, energy 
supply is in potential surplus and the sense of urgency seems to be gone. What is 
the truth? Is the second energy crunch, so widely predicted, real or not? If it is, 
how can the confusing messages be rationalized so that the actions necessary to 
deal with it can be set in motion?92  
 
 
Dumoulin and Eyre go on to describe scenarios as “sets of heuristic hypotheses about the 
future” based upon “the selection, construction and quantification” of forces shaping the 
future.93 At the time, Shell Group Planning was heavily invested in Hudson Institute’s 
“Corporate Environment Study” discussed in Chapter 2, and their articulation of 
scenarios reflects this relationship.  
 This section reviews the characterizing Shell scenarios from Shell insiders during 
the late 1970s in order to highlight how scenarios were originally described as techniques 
to deal with the problem of growth due to the uncertain supply of cheap oil. Though most 
histories of Shell scenarios focus on Pierre Wack’s most-cited articles from Harvard 
Business Review, Wack’s articles were neither the first articles on Shell’s methods nor 
the first to be awarded with an HBR McKinsey Prize for “groundbreaking management 
thought.” Thus, an important place to understand how articulations of the Shell scenarios 
                                                
92 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” Energy Economics 1, no. 2 
(1979): 76-86. 
 
93 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 76.  
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changed in the mid-1980s is to examine accounts from other Shell scenario team 
members and executives.  
Originally submitted to Harvard Business Review, DuMoulin and Eyre’s paper 
“Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” was rejected in the late editorial process and 
subsequently submitted to the second issue of Energy Economics, a journal covering 
econometric modeling of energy systems.94 DuMoulin and Eyre designate their process 
as a way of identifying “a hardcore of information, some solid facts on which we can 
base” future plans.95 The article emphasizes the importance of understanding 
uncertainties as “barriers to growth,” and thus threats to the oil business, something that 
would lose centrality in later articulations of Shell’s scenario approach.96 In one section, 
DuMoulin and Eyre foreground the central tenets of the “economic progress,” meaning 
that:   
 
at least for the next two decades, a high proportion of people in the industrialized 
world will want further economic progress. Growth, in the sense of increasing 
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95 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 77.  
 
96 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,”78. 
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DeMoulin and Eyre describe two archetypal scenarios that were introduced in 1974 
based on high-growth and low-growth scenarios: World of Internal Contradictions and 
Business Expands (formerly Belle Epoque).  
 
 
Figure 14. “World of Internal Contradictions” and “Business Expands”98  
 
Essentially taken verbatim from Hudson Institute (including the chart-style 
presentation, see Figure 14.), “World of Internal Contradictions” described a low-growth 
world due to increasing national interests, government intervention, and alienation, while 
“Business Expands” described a high-growth world due to effective governance leading 
to wealth creation. This alternative future is propelled by the recognition that “the profit 
motive” is “natural and desirable provided it is exercised responsibly and takes into 
                                                
98 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 78. 
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account the changing social dimensions.”99 Besides being particularly dichotomous and 
simplistic, this description of the scenario process supports William Irwin Thompson’s 
earlier critiques of Hudson Institute scenarios: They were invested in a particular idea 
that increased enterprise was the only means of measuring progress, and that the growth 
of the corporation—with its industrial metaphors—came at the expense of society and 
the environment.100  
Secondarily, DuMoulin and Eyre discuss how Shell incorporated social 
dimensions into their descriptions of alternative futures, distinguishing them from 
forecasting frameworks. As I have discussed before, changing values and lifestyles were 
introduced to corporations as non-quantifiable factors that influenced the business 
environment in the 1970s. Building from Stanford Research Institute’s work, though 
unacknowledged, DuMoulin and Eyre describe how Shell began to account for the ways 
that  social and political changes were barriers to their economic expansion: in their 
words, social dimensions were “likely to be as important, if not more important, than the 
purely economic dimensions.”101 These changes included, “suspicion of large scale 
technology, the environmental movement, concern with the quality of life, rejection of 
materialism, and changing attitudes to employment and worker participation” (Figure 
15).102  
                                                
99 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 78. 
 
100 See Chapter 2 on this debate. Thompson, At the Edge of History and Passages about Earth: A 
Double Book, 142-151; World Opinion Forum. Margaret Mead, Herman Kahn, William Irwin 
Thompson -  Nuclear Power. The Next Century.  
 
101 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 78. 
 






Figure 15. “The Social Dimensions Influencing the Business Environment”103  
 
 
DuMoulin and Eyre conclude with three possibilities for future energy outlook 
based upon oil supply and demand by combining social changes, technological 
developments, alternative energy possibilities, and the behaviours of OPEC.104 These 
uncertainties, captured in the terms of oil supply and demand, were constrained by three 
exploratory scenarios: “mirage,” “mini-crises,” or “abrupt fall of supply” (Figure 16). 
Through the framework of DuMoulin and Eyre, Shell scenarios are calculative, 
instrumental means of examining the threats (both imagined or real) in the future 
business environment. Though these are arguably one way that scenarios have come to 
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be articulated, especially in sectors like banking, this is not how Shell scenarios have 
been understood.105  
 
 
Figure 16. “The Next Oil Crisis?”106  
 
 
In 1980, Shell managing director André Bénard’s “World Oil and Cold Reality,” 
was the second article to be published on Shell scenarios. Derived from a lecture he gave 
at Harvard Business School in April 1980, it was published by Harvard Business Review, 
receiving the McKinsey Prize in 1980. Like DuMoulin and Eyre, Bénard highlights how 
oil prices could no longer be understood in traditional economic supply-demand 
calculations. While Bénard does not go into great lengths describing his understanding of 
                                                
105 See, for example, Justin Douglas, “Manufacturing Crises: A History of the Bank Credit Card 
Infrastructure.” PhD dissertation in progress, University of Toronto, 2017.  
 
106 DuMoulin and Eyre, “Energy Scenarios: A Learning Process,” 78. 
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the scenario process (he was not a member of Group Planning), he defines scenarios as 
“coherent sets of economic and social circumstances that could emerge from our present 
environment.”107 They were useful, as Bénard explains, because oil prices no longer 
worked as predictors in purely economic equations. Thus, Bénard stresses that scenario 
techniques were “much more conducive to forcing people to think about the future than 
the forecasting techniques.”108 
 Scenarios, Bénard indicates, focused on the paradoxical economic nature of oil in 
the 1970s. While with “every other commodity, a rising price tends to stimulate supply,” 
this was not the case for oil.109 The problem, as understood by Bénard, was that there was 
“no readily available alternative for OPEC oil” meaning that “at higher price levels 
supply will decrease.”110 Thus, energy market stabilization could only be attained 
through diversification strategies of the oil companies. Bénard concludes that this means 
creating more “energy efficiency, alternative energy sources, and technology transfer” to 
OPEC nations, would be the only way to change the “teetering oil supply-demand 
balance.”111 It is important to point out here that none of these Shell executives and 
planners understood scenario planning to be an unconventional business tool. These two 
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articles make no mention of Pierre Wack— not his spiritual background, and not his 










"Meaning is hot, and it's going to get hotter.  
This is the age of disenchantment,  
and people are looking for something more,  
for an antidote to the masochism of work." 
 
-   Harriet Rubin, Executive Editor of The Age of Heretics112 
 
 
   The tale of Pierre Wack and scenario planning did not arise out of thin air. It was 
promoted by a rising business publishing industry that, with the help of ghostwriters and 
editors, produced “thought leaders,” like Pierre Wack. One could argue that it was the 
slump in Art Kleiner’s journalism career in the mid-1980s that helped to launch Pierre 
Wack as the guru of corporate scenario planning.113 The first person Kleiner worked with 
as a freelance journalist, after leaving his job as the editor of counterculture figure 
Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogue, was Harriet Rubin, the established editor of the 
                                                
112 Brian Dumaine, “Why Do We Work?”  Fortune (December 26, 1994, Vol. 130, No. 13):  196-
205. 
 
113 In the Wired article “Confessions of a Ghostwriter” Kleiner describes how he “fell into 
ghostwriting in 1989, during a slump in my journalism career. Established but neither flush nor 
famous, I was delighted to get this relatively well-paid work helping business stars write books.” 
Art Kleiner, “Confessions of a Ghostwriter,” Wired 6.10 (October 1998): 65.  
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New York publishing company Doubleday.114 Rubin was introduced to Kleiner in the 
late 1980s just as she was building a new line of business publications—a publishing 
imprint of Doubleday called Currency— targeting a rising generation of disaffected 
business leaders.115 She was inspired by bold “individuals” who were driven to success—
and there is no better example than her sympathetic portrait of Ayn Rand. 116   
Rubin, a distinguished poet and writer, wanted Currency to give life to these 
idealistic business figures in order to enliven what was imagined to be a boring (i.e. 
“status quo”) understandings of business management and organization. Doubleday was 
initially hesitant that there would not be an audience for books about, in words from the 
publicity materials, the “thought leaders,” that could “start a fire in our minds.”117 
However, most of the publications, including the flagship book in the new line, Herman 
Miller Chief Executive Max DePree’s Leadership is an Art (1987), sold thousands 
immediately.118 In the late 1990s, Currency/Doubleday became the go-to source for 
publishing “thought leaders across a range of creative disciplines to help us navigate and 
                                                
114 Art Kleiner first became acquainted with Shell’s Group Planning when he was hired to help 
them to setup their computer conferencing system in the mid-1980s.  
 
115 Rubin recalls the idea for Currency came to her in the late 1980s when she was having lunch 
with a friend working on an MBA at Harvard Business School. Seeing all the impenetrable 
business books (elsewhere, she called them “dull” and “badly written”), her friend asked why 
someone didn’t publish books business people would like to read. Rubin wanted them to be 
beautifully voiced, providing an “almost poetic” version of corporate pasts and futures. Personal 
communication with Rubin; Reckard, “Succeeding by reading in the ‘80s: Authors jump on “In 
Search of Excellence” bandwagon.”   
 
116 Harriet Rubin, “Ayn Rand’s Literature of Capitalism,” New York Times, 15 September 2007.  
 
117 Reckard, “Succeeding by reading in the ‘80s: Authors jump on “In Search of Excellence” 
bandwagon.”  
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succeed in an uncertain and rapidly evolving world.”119 Rubin contends that 
Currency/Doubleday became the model for thought leadership that other publishers 
aimed to replicate.120 Currency/Doubleday is a later iteration of a longer tradition of 
journalists crafting the “epistemic and social virtues” of “technoscientific innovators” 
from the 1960s and 1970s, a confluence of countercultural sentiments and the changing 
significance of “innovation,” “science” and “technology.”121 As media scholars Fred 
Turner and Christine Larson have argued, entrepreneurial network cultures and social 
media technologies have amplified the production and dissemination of reputations and 
ideas.122 
 Kleiner’s initial commission from Rubin was an article for the pilot to the 
publishing house, a magazine called Currency Magazine, that would feature 
‘unconventional’ (i.e. ‘enchanted’) business leaders. Though Currency Magazine did not 
survive, it was instrumental to the founding of Fast Company.123 It was Shell scenario 
team member Napier Collyns who suggested to Rubin that Pierre Wack and the scenario 
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process at Shell be featured as a blueprint for what Currency/Doubleday could offer 
(though, other scenario team members Peter Schwartz and Arie de Geus, members that 
Kleiner would later ghost-write for, were also identified as potential thought 
leaders124).125 The other ideas, General Motors and the quality movement, Dow Chemical 
and corporate environmentalism, and the use of psychiatrist Elisabeth Kubler-Ross’ work 
on grief by the ‘dying’ company Amtrak, were eventually scrapped. This article, 
“Consequential Heresies: How ‘thinking the unthinkable’ Changed Royal Dutch/ Shell,” 
ended up focussing only on the compelling story of Pierre Wack and Shell Group 
Planning.126 The article presented the thesis that Wack had changed corporate planning 
by being an unconventional “heretic.” Wack as a “heretic” would become a larger 
argument of Kleiner’s, a claim he articulated at the beginning of The Age of Heretics: the 
mid-to-late-twentieth-century was “an age where unconventional ideas become 
conventional wisdom rapidly. And that’s a good thing, because the future of industrial 
society depends on our ability to transcend the destructive management of the past and 
build a better kind of business.”127  
                                                
124 Personal communication with Art Kleiner.  
 
125 Collyns, former Group Planning member, was working on public relations for Shell in New 
York at this time. The 1980s was a difficult time for Shell’s image, and public relations was an 
important component to combat the negative publicity surroundings its role in environmental 
contamination. In addition to spills in California, and legal actions for toxic waste dumping at 
former facilities in Louisiana and Colorado, the 1989 explosion of an offshore oil platform in the 
North Sea, forced Shell to reckon with its image.  
 
In addition to connecting Rubin and Kleiner to write about Wack, Collyns brokered the deal for 
Wack’s articles on scenarios to be published at Harvard Business School. Personal 
communication with Harriet Rubin and Napier Collyns.  
 
126 The Global Business Network eventually republished and distributed “Consequential 
Heresies” to the companies it wrote scenarios for.   
 
127 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 3. 
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More than providing the platform for Kleiner to disseminate Wack’s story, the 
editorial work of Currency/Doubleday helped to create the tale. After his original 
heresies article, Kleiner received an advance from Rubin on what would become The Age 
of Heretics, a book that profiled corporate visionaries who created change in large-scale 
organizations after the postwar period. In developing his heretics thesis, Kleiner made 
comparisons between corporate change makers and monastic types—like heretics, 
reformers, mystics, and protesters—and positioned these heretics against the stagnancy 
of scientific management techniques. A heretic was “someone who sees a truth that 
contradicts the conventional wisdom of the institution to which he or she belongs and 
remains loyal to both entities.”128 In The Age of Heretics, Kleiner inserted his own 
critiques of “mechanistic principals,” and positioned his corporate heretics as more 
evolved:  
 
I think that a consistent new truth common to all of the heresies in industrial society 
is the idea that society can’t be planned, designed, and governed in a mechanistic 
fashion. We should indeed, use mechanistic principals to organize effectively. But 
when we get caught up by the seductive arrogance of those principles (and the way in 
which they seem to provide all of the answers), our organizations become intolerable. 
They don’t cohere. They don’t sustain themselves or the people in them.129  
 
 
As Kleiner would describe later, the entirety of The Age of Heretics was devoted to 
showing a business audience, “how they weren’t in the business of making money, even 
                                                
 
128 Kleiner, The Age of Heretics, 4.  
 
129 James Evers, “An Interview with a Utopian Corporate Heretic,” Training & Development 
52.06 (June 1998): 63.  
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if they thought they were.”130 Additionally, Kleiner wanted to convey to “countercultural 
people” “the idea that you can’t make a better world, in our time at least, by fighting the 
system head-on. It has to be done by somehow enlisting corporate people to redesign 
their efforts from within.”131 This message would be a through line connecting the texts 
Kleiner ghostwrote for Currency/Doubleday.  
The first ghost-writing assignment that Currency/Doubleday gave to Kleiner was 
a sprawling, disorganized 1200-page manuscript from a then obscure systems scientist 
from MIT Sloan School of Management, Peter Senge. The book would become the 1990 
best-seller, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 
though originally it was meant to be a co-authored publication with Shell Group Planning 
member Arie de Geus. Kleiner helped Senge crystalize his theory of “organization 
learning,” meaning, a corporation that encourages learning and dynamically changes in 
response to opportunities and threats. At the same time, Kleiner inserted his own 
conclusions about the “heretical” postwar transformations in business strategy. Kleiner’s 
earlier work on Wack and scenario planning featured in The Fifth Discipline, identifying 
Group Planning at Shell as an ideal learning organization.132 Shell’s use of scenarios to 
get at the “mental models” of the decision makers, argues Senge (by way of Kleiner), led 
Shell to “fortunes.”133 Later, Kleiner ghost-wrote another influential text on 
organizational learning, Arie de Geus’ The Living Company. In The Living Company, de 
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Geus argues that corporations should be viewed as biological entities that learn, adapt, 
and evolve, not as machines.134 Again, de Geus identified Shell scenario planning as the 
model experimental method to enable a company to learn, adapt, and be agile.135 Another 
of Kleiner’s ghost-writing assignments was Group Planning member Peter Schwartz’s 
The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. A 
foundational book on corporate scenario planning that also helped to launch the Global 
Business Network, The Art of the Long View identifies Wack’s goal that the “liberation 
of people’s insights” was the initial inspiration for the “art of the long view.”136   
This story linking Pierre Wack to Shell’s financial success was reiterated by 
Harriet Rubin in public relations pieces for Currency/Doubleday. In the New York Times 
article “Business Books for New-Age Bosses,” Rubin uses the case of Pierre Wack to 
argue that today’s best-selling business books will “preach awareness”: “Peak 
performance is a machine-age ideal. Awareness, on the other hand, comes from applying 
the ideals of scientific discovery to management.”137 In this the story writing of Kleiner 
and the public relation campaign and editing of Rubin, were involved in the 
crystallization of the idea that Shell scenario planning was successful because it was 
spiritually aware and unconventional. When Currency/Doubleday began, Rubin 
encountered the problem that most business leaders she was interested in could not 
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write—and in some cases, could not understand—their significance. As Rubin recalls, “I 
took the ideas” of business leaders like Shell Group Planning members Peter Schwartz, 
“and reworked their manuscripts until my blue pencil became like a sixth finger on my 
right hand.”138 In an interview on his ghost-writing career, Kleiner reflects that his work 
for business leaders was to “crystalize their practice into thought” because “these highly 
paid corporate managers didn’t know how to think about their work.”139 This exercise 
was part of a larger transformation in thought leadership journalism. Kleiner, who in 
1999 became the editor of the management consulting firm Booz, Allen & Hamilton’s 
“thought leadership magazine” Strategy & Business continued to churn out the mystical 
story of Wack, including Kleiner’s widely read post on Wack, “The Man Who Saw the 
Future.”140  
There is ample evidence that Kleiner was well-aware of the role that he played in 
crafting compelling narratives to guide business leaders. In an interview about Kleiner’s 
role in the “marketplace of ideas,” Kleiner emphasized the importance of distinguishing 
oneself and attracting followers: “There are people out there inventing new practices, but 
they’re not necessarily communicating with each other. And they’re not necessarily 
aware of what each other is doing. And all of them are moving knowledge further than it 
would move if they hadn’t been there. But none of them are moving knowledge as far as 
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139 The Bloom Group, “Inside the Marketplace of Ideas: An Interview with Tom Stewart and Art 
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it would be if they were all communicating openly with each other. And they all have to 
make a living. Because they’re all selling their services at the same time, they have to 
balance being competitive against being open and expanding knowledge.”141 Kleiner 
admitted that his job as a thought leadership editor for a management consulting 
company was to “help bring the ideas to their potential”142 
Shell’s scenario story was propelled by an integrated network of former Shell 
planner and associates building the Global Business Network (GBN), a California-based 
management consulting firm that portrayed themselves as the vanguards of the future.143 
GBN was cofounded in 1987 by a group of entrepreneurs, including former Shell 
planners Napier Collyns and Peter Schwartz. Kleiner was not only a member of GBN, 
but he was actively involved in documenting the history of GBN, and in teaching 
scenarios techniques. His work on Wack was largely instigated by Napier Collyns, an 
original member of the Shell scenario team and a founding member of GBN.   
GBN formed in 1987 to research and distribute information about how scenarios 
would help corporations gain a competitive edge in future business environments.144 
Individuals in such fields as high technology and economics, artists and anthropologists, 
and business leaders and management scholars were assembled according to the 
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expertise needed for the consulting project at hand. GBN was built through these 
informal networks, framed by postmodern lingo, and articulated through the most 
unconventional methods, including everything from improvisational dance workshops to 
role-playing exercises exploring the restructuring of the economy.145 In this sense, GBN 
imagined themselves as creative and bold “thought leaders,” revitalizing business at a 
utopian moment in the 1990s.146 The abilities of the select group at Shell, and their 
ability to “see” the uncertain forces impacting future developments, became central to the 
conception of Shell’s success, something that was possible to see only in hindsight. 
However, GBN failed to foresee the collapse of the technology bubble in 2000, one it 
heavily profited from. More than this, the company that acquired GBN during the crash, 
Monitor Group, once known as the purveyors of scenario planning, went bankrupt and 
was acquired by Deloitte shortly after the 2008 financial crash. 
What this all means is that the mythical understanding of corporate scenarios— 
the spiritualization of the process, the heretical nature of Pierre Wack, the influence of 
scenarios in financial success—has acquired the status of myth. In “cracking open” the 
inscription devices this section complicates the mystical story of Shell’s scenario 
planning. It shows how the story, what looks at the outset like a bizarrely interconnected 
series of radical ideas about corporate planning, were most often written (or ghost-
written) by Kleiner, and often commissioned by Currency/Doubleday editor Harriet 
Rubin. All of these efforts coincided with the efforts of Global Business Network to 
distinguish themselves as management consultants for the uncertain future in the 1990s.   
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Though Wack had spiritual guides, and filled his scenarios of corporate futures 
with metaphors and narratives, it was not Wack who described his narrative approaches 
in the existential, heretical terms that would later be ascribed to it. The most reputable 
scenario planning projects trace their origins to the work of Shell, and Pierre Wack in 
particular, including the now defunct Global Business Network, and the thriving Oxford 
Scenarios Programme at Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford.147 In 2016, 
the Oxford Futures Library at Saïd Business School, housing Pierre Wack’s book 
collection, a Shell report repository, and personal notebooks, became a permanent fixture 
of the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford. Books and articles continue to 
circulate the idea that Shell’s corporate scenario planning encourages thinking about 
corporate futures (an “open” and “irreducibly uncertainty” terrain) better than others by 
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The Art of “Seeing” Shell   
 
This chapter interrogated the historical understanding of Shell scenarios. In doing so, the 
chapter identified the network of translators, mostly Shell insiders, that produced the 
myth that Pierre Wack’s heretical contributions led to Shell’s economic success even 
though a direct connection to Shell’s improved strategy or financial success was 
questionable. The chapter revealed how the rising industry of “thought leadership” 
journalism of the late twentieth century transformed beliefs about the multinational 
energy and petrochemical company Shell’s scenario planning techniques from the 
1970s—by producing and promoting the “charismatic authority” of the “thought leader” 
Pierre Wack—and was a significant contributor to the technique’s contemporary 
legitimacy in the field of strategic management.  
Business historians and some former Shell planners have established that Shell’s 
scenarios from 1973 and 1979 played no specific role in anticipating the oil crises and 
subsequent stagflation.149 Even as histories continue to praise Wack for being able to 
skillfully “see” the future, former Shell planners admit the scenarios sometimes “fell 
short of expectations, were misunderstood, or were marginalized for political reasons.”150 
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In the celebratory, insider history of scenario planning at Shell, The Essence of 
Scenarios, former planner Angela Wilkinson and executive Roland Kupers conclude the 
scenario process at Shell did not have an exact function in furthering the core business. 
The evidence about the direct connection to strategy, they admit elsewhere, was 
“circumstantial, at best”; it’s job was “never to produce explicit strategy.”151 Some 
former Shell employees have been more damning, finding the scenario insights to be 
nothing more than an overview of what one could read in the Financial Times.152 Many 
members of the larger Shell organization called scenarios an “enormous distractions from 
the core business” that “led to wasting very large sums of money by encouraging a race 
down blind alleys.”153 This “unusual corporate function” had “on at least three 
occasions” been almost discontinued as a Shell planning technique, following similar 
critiques scenarios faced at Hudson Institute and Stanford Research Institute.154  
The interesting question is not whether the tale of Shell’s scenarios is ‘made up,’ 
but why so many corporations and business leaders have decided to believe it. This 
chapter recovers the labours of the editorial process, and suggests that the rise of 
corporate scenarios cannot be understood without this unacknowledged act of translation. 
However, in attempting to recover the labours of the translation, the chapter identified 
the difficulties of articulating what happened, when the archives are restricted, and the 
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histories are obscured by corporate histories and commissioned authors. One of the 
challenges for historians of corporate techniques is how to articulate a coherent argument 
concerning methods like scenario planning without reifying the social and cognitive 
peculiarities of charismatic thought leaders, like Pierre Wack. This is where sciences 
studies could play an important role in the critical study of corporate techniques, so long 
as there is cognizance that there can be considerable overlap in theoretical tools between 
corporate strategists and critical science studies scholars.155 
                                                
155 Inscription devices, acts of translation, and enrollment, for example, are theoretical tools that 
have enabled me to understand the success of Shell’s scenario planning techniques just as they 
have been used to Shell strategists to articulate their own success. On inscription devices, etc. 
See, Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life; on the critical study of corporate techniques through 
the tools of science studies, see Douglas, et. al., “Knowing Corporations: Towards a Critical 













“The task of management is to create the conditions to maintain 
the ongoing modes of shaping meaning and action possible.” 
 
-Francisco Varela, “Planning and Enacted Corporate Environments,” 




Why did mid-to-late twentieth century corporate strategists utilize scenario planning to 
inform long-term business decision-making? What intellectual tools did these corporate 
scenario planners consolidate in an attempt to explore and exploit future uncertainties? 
By charting how Hudson Institute, Stanford Research Institute, and Shell transformed 
scenario planning to confront the contingent uncertainties of the future, like political and 
social changes and economic turbulence, this dissertation makes three primary 
contributions. First, the project of this dissertation has been to articulate a history of one 
future-oriented technique that originated in the postwar US military establishment. In 
other words, the dissertation has attended to the techniques of scenario planning, 
focusing on how the methodological considerations structured the creation of corporate 
                                                
1  Francisco Varela, “The Science and Technology of Cognition,” Contract by Shell (1986). 
Oxford Futures Library, University of Oxford.  
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future imaginaries, rather than examining the future images in isolation.2 This line of 
inquiry follows historians that have examined the contested space of the future in the 
postwar period, detailing the diverse methodologies struggling to push the limits of what 
could be known and what possibilities could be imagined.3 At the same time, by 
highlighting the way that corporate scenario planners utilized the work of philosophers 
such as Aldous Huxley and Fred Polak to make sense of the future uncertainties, the 
dissertation has demonstrated how the history of corporate scenario planning unsettles 
the distinctions between the closed futures of the military forecasters and the 
emancipatory open futures of the philosophers after the late 1960s.  
Second, this dissertation challenges the idea in science studies and the history of 
science that postwar business decisions have been exclusively guided by probabilistic 
calculus from sophisticated, computer-assisted data gathering and analyzing techniques. 
Alternative modes of decision-making—and a general awareness of the limitations of 
calculative strategies—existed alongside the increasing technical capacities in mid-to-late 
twentieth century corporate planning departments. Scenario techniques, while developed 
by postwar US military strategists, were used in multinational corporations and 
consulting firms to make sense of the uncertain contingencies presented by changing 
                                                
2 It follows historian Jenny Andersson’s argument that historical inquiry should attend to future 
methods, and move away from “cultural history of utopias and images of the future.” Andersson, 
“The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” 1414.  
 
3 See, for example, on techno-utopianism, Patrick McCray, “Visioneering Technological 
Futures,” in W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space 
Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 1-20; 
on DELPHI, see Olaf Helmer, “Analysis of the future: The DELPHI method” (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 1967), pp. 1-1; on the sciences of prediction, see Andersson, “The Political 
Life of Prediction.”  
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social and political environments of the mid-to-late twentieth century: peak oil, 
geopolitical turmoil, economic recession, consciousness concerning the negative effects 
of industrialization, and the fracturing of public values. However, computer techniques 
and data generation and analysis maintained a central role in corporate planning and 
strategy departments.  
 Even though scenario practitioners remained marginal characters in strategic 
management of the late twentieth-century, focusing on their historical efforts has 
revealed a much more complex portrait of rationality in decision-making technique than 
the historiography of the postwar sciences currently reveals. As scenario strategists 
moved from the calculability of forecasting, they experimented with heterogeneous non-
calculative techniques and intellectual resources from the disciplines of sociology to 
postmodernist critical theory, drawing together sometimes contradictory rational and 
irrational methods. Corporate scenario planners did this as they sought to rescue 
management strategies from the limitations of technocratic approaches, approaches that 
were incapable of analyzing social and political forces—domains they considered to be 
incalculable. In this, corporate scenario practitioners were inspired as much by the 
humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow and the epistemology of science of Thomas 
Kuhn as they were by the cybernetic theories of Warren McCulloch and 
Gregory Bateson. Others were inspired by James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, 
psychedelic experimentation, mathematical engineering contingency methods, and the 
mysticism of Svamiji Prajnanpad.  
Corporate scenario planning gained momentum in the innovation-driven business 
environment of the 1990s. Though scenario planning was a relatively alternative, and 
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obscure, decision-making technique before the late 1980s, the rising thought leadership 
industry propelled scenario planning into the catalogue of mainstream strategy tools. On 
the one hand, scenario planning is an alternative approach to decision-making that 
struggles to bring the virtues of the imaginative to bear on the future in systemic ways. 
On the other hand, the varying success of this experimental technique for contemplating 
uncertainty became obscured by a rising industry of thought leadership. In this, the 
dissertation has shown how late twentieth century scenario planners have relied upon 
charismatic authority to reassure multinational corporations about speculative efforts that 
can only be deemed successful in hindsight.  
 Third, the dissertation shows corporate scenario planning efforts do not just come 
from postwar military operations research and systems analysis. Corporate scenario 
planning was also importantly animated by epistemologies that are often positioned as 
tools to counter capitalism—like critical biology and post-structuralism—fields closely 
associated with some genealogies in science studies. In the following pages of the 
conclusion, the dissertation provides one final example of this entanglement in order to 
campaign for a more entangled and complex portrait of the legacies of the science studies 
discipline.  
After learning about the role of the late twentieth century thought leadership 
industry in the popularizing corporate scenario planning from the last chapter, it may be 
tempting to cast corporate scenario practitioners as scheming entrepreneurs seeking to 
extract profit by selling scenario planning techniques, nothing like critical science studies 
scholars. But this understanding would fall short. Critical theorists in fields from the 
biological sciences to anthropology partnered with scenario planners at Shell and the 
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California-based management consulting company Global Business Network beginning 
in the late 1980s. These corporate organizations used their theories of biological and 
machinic self-organization as intellectual resources for rethinking nondeterministic 
decision-making through scenario planning at the same time that critical theorists used 
these intellectual resources as counter-epistemologies of capitalism. By tracing how 
corporate scenario planners adapted their strategies and enrolled alternative intellectual 
ideals to face changing social and political environments—including theorists from 
science studies—this conclusion aims to critically engage with the historical 
entanglements. This is especially important as we begin conversations anew about 
alternative futures—what feminist science studies theorist Donna Haraway calls futures 
“otherwise”— in the age of climate and financial crisis.4  
 
 
Learning from Corporate Scenario Planning  
 
One place this collaboration between corporate executives and critical intellectuals 
occurred was not in a corporate boardroom, but in the Sonoran Desert, 50 miles north of 
Tucson, at the lauded construction site of the Biosphere II at the inaugural Shell Learning 
Conferences in May 1987.5 The head of Shell Group Planning Arie de Geus—a seasoned 
scenario practitioner— gathered an elite group of intellectuals, including, as mentioned 
                                                
4 Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan ©_Meets_OncoMouse™: 
Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
 
5 “Excerpts from the “Learning Conferences,” 1986-1988,” transcribed by Art Kleiner. Stewart 
Brand Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University.  
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before, James Lovelock and Francisco Varela, as well as the American anthropologist 
Mary Catherine Bateson, and executives for what would become the beginning of the 
Global Business Network.6 The goal of this series of conferences was part of a larger 
effort of Shell’s that animated their early corporate scenario planning efforts: to 
understanding how they might adapt to uncertain future environments in order to outlast 




Figure 17. Learning Conference Participants James Lovelock,  
Mary Catherine Bateson, and Francisco Varela7 
 
 
The foundations for the Learning Conferences began with a 1983 Shell Group 
Planning study headed by de Geus entitled, “Corporate Change: A Look at How Long-
Established Companies Change,” which detailed the planning strategies of 30 long-lived 
multinationals, some as old as the seventeenth century, including East India Companies 
                                                
6 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View,  
 
7 From left: James Lovelock, British Library Archives. London, United Kingdom. Mary 
Catherine Bateson, Getty Images. Francisco Varela, Mind and Life Institute. 
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and the Hudson’s Bay Company.8 The study drove the planning group, which included 
members from Shell’s scenario planning team including Napier Collyns and Peter 
Schwartz, into a larger quest to understand how large and complex organizations, like 
Shell, could harness the latest intellectual resources on organizational change in to secure 
Shell’s continued longevity.  
Shell was known as being capable of drastic change: Originally, the British Shell 
Transport and Trading were sellers of oil for lamps in the Far East, while the Royal 
Dutch oil company imported kerosene from Sumatra.9 The two companies remained 
separate until a mid-1950s reorganization by McKinsey consolidated the organization, 
while keeping it spread over two central offices.10 However, by the late 1980s, the 
answer to how there could be life for Shell after oil was no longer centrally-controlled 
diversification or acquisition and merger policies, something scenario planning helped 
the organization grapple with in the mid-1970s.11  
The Learning Conference discussion began over desert walks and cookouts, 
discussions, cocktails hours, and elaborate dinners made from vegetables grown onsite in 
the Arizona desert. While Shell’s name was on the conference, corporate executives from 
Volvo, AT& T, and Shell paid to think alongside the likes of Lovelock, Varela and 
Bateson—whose document of one of her father Gregory Bateson’s cybernetic 
                                                
8 Royal Dutch/Shell Group Planning PL/1, “Corporate Change: A Look at How Long-Established 
Companies Change (September 1983); de Geus, The Living Company, 239.  
 
9 de Geus, The Living Company, 10.  
 
10 de Geus, The Living Company, 196. 
 
11 de Geus, The Living Company, 10.  
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conferences entitled Our Own Metaphor provided a self-conscious, meta-analysis and a 
language for the methodology of the Learning Conferences.12 Other intellectuals 
included MIT artificial intelligence researchers Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert, and 
the computer scientist Danny Hillis.  
The Learning Conference is just one of many spaces where critical biological 
theories became fruitful metaphors for rethinking Shell’s planning process. This 
conclusion identifies the critical biologists that acted as heavyweight consultant-
academics, specifically Lovelock and Varela, and examines how Shell seized upon their 
theories of biological organization—specifically the Gaia hypothesis and autopoeisis— 
as crucial metaphors for rethinking Shell’s planning at the executive level, both funding 
and working alongside them as they continually developed their critical biological work.  
Shell enlisted Whole Earth Review founder and countercultural figure Stewart 
Brand to assemble these intellectuals in a wide range of fields, including ecology, 
cybernetics, anthropology, and biology, to explore how corporations might make use of 
metaphors in mechanical and biological systems in to understand change in complex 
organizations.13 After the first Learning Conference session at the Biosphere 2, they 
                                                
12 “Excerpts from the “Learning Conferences,” 1986-1988,”; Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own 
Metaphor: A Personal Account of a Conference on the Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human 
Adaptation (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972). The Learning Conferences followed the arguments 
developed in Gregory Bateson’s seminal text, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), that the mind 
existed in the larger environment, and that ecological thinking could be applied to planning 
methods. See, for example, Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York, 1972), 
438: Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind.  
 
13 Stewart Brand, “Notes Toward a Description of the Shell Learning Conferences,” Shell PL/13 
(21 August 1986). Stewart Brand Papers. Special Collections, Stanford University; Brand made 
connections to Shell through his work at the MIT Media Lab, where he wrote his 1989 book The 
Media Lab: Inventing the Future at MIT (New York: Penguin Books, 1989); see also, Turner, 
From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 181-186.  
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would meet again at Volvo’s post-industrial anti-assembly line factory Kalmar in 
Sweden with participant and Volvo CEO Bo Ekman. At the human potential movement’s 
infamous Esalen Institute in California during another Learning Conference, they 
participated in improvisational workshops and, with participant Mary Catherine Bateson, 








Figure 18. Shell Learning Conferences: Biosphere II, Volvo Kalmar, Esalen15 
 
It was not until the early 1990s that Shell planners began describing their 
multinational corporation as a living organism, and their planning processes as emerging 
out of a contingent network of relations. In his 1988 Harvard Business Review article, 
“Planning as Learning,” de Geus describes the planning process as “an emerging one.”16 
                                                
14 The conversations from the 1987 Learning Conference at Biosphere 2 provided the framework 
for Bateson’s 1988 book Thinking AIDS, see Mary Catherine Bateson and Richard A. Goldsby, 
Thinking Aids (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1988). 
   
15 From left: Biosphere II, Getty Images; Volvo Kalmar, still image from Volvo Kalmar promo, 
“Volvo Kalmar,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aI7ornrCKnM; Esalen Institute, The LIFE 
Images Collection/Getty.  
 
16 Arie de Geus, “Planning as Learning,” Harvard Business Review (March/April 1988): 70-74.  
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Shell Group Planning member Peter Schwartz, in his influential The Art of the Long 
View, described multinational corporations as functioning “like organisms as their 
complexity... approach[es] that of biological systems.”17 In the foreword to de Geus’ The 
Living Company, MIT management theorist Peter Senge suggested that, “seeing a 
company as a living being implies that it creates its own processes, just as the human 
body manufactures its own cells, which in turn compose its own organs and bodily 
systems.”18  
Brand envisioned the conferences as an extension of the interdisciplinary 
approach of the mid-century Macy Conferences, and especially the work of one of his 
mentors, Gregory Bateson.19 Like the Macy Conferences, the Learning Conferences 
helped to liberate conceptual tools from their scientific disciplines, extend the scale, and 
abstract the model in the form of metaphor.20 The rationale behind the Learning 
Conferences, to be exact, was to understand learning in complex organizations, be they 
made up of humans, nations, neural nets, species, ecosystems, computers, or 
corporations.21 If the first order cybernetics of the Macy Conferences inspired a 
generation of management theorist to imagine the corporation and its planning practices 
as made up of feedback loops that could be modelled, described, analyzed, reconfigured, 
and controlled, the Learning Conferences was an expression of a version of second-order 
                                                
17 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 98-99. 
 
18 Senge in de Geus, The Living Company, 3.  
 
19 Brand, “Notes Toward a Description of the Shell Learning Conferences.” 
 
20 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literatures, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 80. 
  
21 Brand, “Notes Toward a Description of the Shell Learning Conferences.” 
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cybernetics. In the framework of the Learning Conferences, corporations and planning 
became part of evolving and self-regulating entities made up of diverse beings in 
contingent and changing conditions.  
James Lovelock, for example, was known for the development of the Gaia 
hypothesis that he created with another well-known critical biologist, Lynn Margulis.22 
The Gaia hypothesis developed in the scientific field of atmospheric chemistry, and 
posited that the earth could be conceptualized of as a living system that produces the 
conditions for its own maintenance.23 While the Gaia hypothesis is often explained in the 
simplistic language of holism, environmentalism, or as a New Age fad, the Gaia 
hypothesis was much more nuanced. In Lovelock’s own words: 
  
Gaia is an evolving system, a system made up from all living things and their 
surface environment, the oceans, the atmosphere, and crustal rocks, the two parts 
tightly coupled and indivisible. It is an ‘emergent domain’ - a system that has 
emerged from the reciprocal evolution of organisms and their environment over 
the eons of life on Earth. In this system, the self-regulation of climate and 
chemical composition are entirely automatic. Self-regulation emerges as the 
system evolves. No foresight, planning or teleology are involved.24 
 
 
The Gaia hypothesis was revolutionary in biology for the way it reformulated the 
relationship between organizations and environments. The Gaia hypothesis travelled 
                                                
22 Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock, “Biological Modulation of the Earth’s Atmosphere,” 
Icarus 21, no. 4 (1974): 471-489. 
 
23 Margulis and James Lovelock, “Biological Modulation of the Earth’s Atmosphere.” 
 
24 James Lovelock, Healing Gaia: Practical Medicine for the Planet (New York: Harmony, 
1991), 11.  
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outside of atmospheric chemistry partly due to Lovelock and Margulis’ work of drawing 
together multiple scientific disciplines.25 Yet, much less known, is the fact that Lovelock 












Figure 19. “The Quest for Gaia”26 
 
In the late 1960s, Cambridge biologist Lord Rothschild, the director of Shell 
Research, began to provide financial support to the institutionally orphaned Lovelock.27 
                                                
25 Isabelle Stengers, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism (Luneburg: Open 
Humanities Press, 2015), 44.    
 
26 James Lovelock and Sidney Epton, “The Quest for Gaia,” New Scientist (February 6 1975): 
304-306. 
 
27 James Lovelock, Homage to Gaia: The Life of an Independent Scientist (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), xiii. Lovelock argues that Lord Rothschild was one of the first biologists 
to acknowledge the importance of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis in the late 1960s.   
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One of Lovelock’s first reports on Gaia was published in New Scientist with Sidney 
Epton of Shell Research in 1974.28 Lovelock thanks Shell for being the only agency that 
supported his work on Gaia originally when other academic institutions were hesitant.  
 Lovelock also produced a report for Shell on the long-term prospects for their 
corporation in the late 1960s in response to Daniel Bell’s Commission on the Year 2000, 
and Kahn and Wiener’s work in particular. Different from Kahn and Wiener, Lovelock 
provided an alternative scenario concluding that industrial companies would be focused 
on profiting from products that alleviated pollution in 2000 because they would be so 
concerned with global pollution problems.29 Lovelock concluded: “By 2000 a large 
proportion of the total energy turnover is going towards the avoidance of ecological 
disaster; then we can be sure that Shell will be in the business of counter-measures for 
profit. This might be its major activity.”30 Elsewhere, Lovelock credits this speculative 
research as the beginning inspiration for his continued research on Gaia.31   
 
 
                                                
28 Lovelock and Epton, “The Quest for Gaia,” 306.  
 
29 James Lovelock, “Some Thoughts on the Year 2000,” Contracted by Royal Dutch/Shell 
(1966). James Lovelock papers, Science Museum, London.  
 
30 Lovelock, “Some Thoughts on the Year 2000.” 
 




Figure 20. Lovelock’s Thoughts on the Year 200032  
 
Francisco Varela was another Learning Conference participant. Varela, along 
with fellow Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana, were responsible for developing a 
theory of biological autonomy in cellular organization that transformed the science of 
cognition.33 Their theory of autopoeisis posited that living systems, like cells, could be 
                                                
32 Lovelock, “Some Thoughts on the Year 2000.” 
 
33 Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots 
of Human Understanding (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1987). 
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best understood as entities that called forth the conditions of their own existence. Put 
differently: autopoeisis was defined as a property of a living system that enabled it to 
change “without loss of organization.”34 This insight was not only important for the 
development of Lynn Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis— that posited that 
cooperation, not only competition, was a central process in evolution—Varela’s theories 
of autopoeisis were taken up by critical scholars looking for non-representational ways to 
theorize organization.35 Though autopoeisis is often understood as being limited to living 
systems—as this was Maturana’s intention—Varela, like Bateson, had no qualms with 
the extension to other complex organizations.  
Like Lovelock, Varela consulted for Shell, when he lived in Paris beginning in 
the 1980s. He was friends with Shell scenario practitioner Arie de Geus.36 One important 
Shell Group Planning document was the translation of Varela’s research into actionable 
principles for Group Planning, contained in the 1986 report “The Science and 
Technology of Cognition.”37 In it, Varela detailed what he saw as the four stages of the 
science of cognition: from cybernetics to the cognitivist to the self-organization 
alternative to, finally, the enactive alternative. More importantly: he provided Shell with 
implications this research had for executives thinking about planning as a dynamic 
                                                
 
34 Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, 
xxi.  
 
35 Lynn Margulis, "Symbiosis and Evolution," Scientific American 225, no. 2 (1971): 48-61; For 
example, Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995).  
 
36 de Geus, The Living Company.   
 
37 Varela, “The Science and Technology of Cognition.” 
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process of learning. In one section “Planning and Enacted Corporate Environments,” 
Varela described the takeaway this way:  
 
As in any cognitive system, environment and organization are correlative terms: 
an organization enacts their environment through their effective actions. A 
pathway or style of enactment is the same as the organization’s reality, which, in 
turn, brings forth future enactments. From this point of view the task of 
management is to create the conditions to maintain the ongoing modes of shaping 




 To understand how Shell took up these metaphors to think about organizational 
change in the context of corporate scenario planning, we can look at de Geus’ 
understanding of self-organization and autonomy in his development of “the Corporate 
Immune System” in his book The Living Company. Building from the Learning 
Conferences, de Geus suggested that Shell—though seen as a unity from outside— was 
actually “a movement… a multiplex… a structure of structures…”39 This meant that “in 
crises, the environment diverges from those elements” that were harmonious before.40 In 
one section called “Parasites” de Geus suggested:  
 
The less a company operates in control of its environment, the more open it 
should be: foreign bodies and ideas will be able to enter easily. That is as it 
should be; indeed, it becomes a strength of the company. However, the company 
can never be sure how these bodies and ideas will behave, once inside. Every 
intruder has a choice: it can select a symbiotic relationship or it can pursue its 
own benefit, to the exclusion of all others.41   
                                                
38 Varela, “The Science and Technology of Cognition.”  
 
39 de Geus, The Living Company,    
 
40 de Geus, The Living Company,  
   
41 de Geus, The Living Company, 197.    
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Just as Varela described the way an immune system used its openness to regain its 
balance with intruders, so did de Geus identify the way that successful corporations must 
use their open tolerance to react with intruders symbiotically rather than parasitically.   
At the same time that corporations were struggling over the terms of dynamic 
organizational systems in the late twentieth century, critical theorists were similarly 
struggling with the relationship between biological and machinic organization. The 
French philosopher Félix Guattari, another friend of Francisco Varela’s, appropriated 
autopoiesis to think through organization of machines and institutions in his final book, 
the anti-capitalist rethinking of subjectivity, Chaosmosis.42 Feminist science studies 
scholar Donna Haraway, in the now canonical “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” was at the 
same time thinking through the porous boundaries between biological and technological 
entities in what she called “cyborg sciences.”43 This is not to say that these theoretical 
tools were the same. Instead, the aim has been to show how corporate scenario planning 
has invested in diverse and contradictory epistemologies with heterogeneous politics. In 
this, it is important to wrestle with the contradictory epistemological commitments if we 
are to build truly alternative possibilities.  
 
Future Alternatives?  
 My hope is that this historical account of the ways that twentieth century 
corporate scenario planners have imagined future alternatives is valuable to historians of 
                                                
42 Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm.  
 
43 Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in 
the 1980s,” Socialist Review, no. 80 (1985), 70–71. 
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science, but also to critical science studies scholars. Specifically, the aim has been to 
confront the ways that corporate scenario planners relied upon a surprisingly varied 
assortment of intellectual influences with varied politics. Corporate scenario planners 
consolidated these resources to engage with future uncertainties as they waged critiques 
against mathematical tools and calculative techniques, techniques many felt ill-equipped 
to face what was considered to be ultimately unknowable. Irrespective of the certainty 
with which Herman Kahn approached the use of scenarios, he nonetheless remained 
cognizant of the speculative nature of the venture: There is “a basic view that emphasizes 
discontinuity inconsistency, arbitrariness, disorder, and chance; that is, unpredictability 
of the specificity and uniqueness of actual events and conditions.”44 In this case, Kahn 
continued, one “can emphasize the uncertainty of the future but include the concept that 
much of this uncertainty is basic and not governable by either objective or subjective 
probabilities, or indeed any serious analysis.”45 Yet by the late 1980s corporate scenario 
planners legitimated their efforts through charismatic maneuvers that ultimately obscured 
the experimental, uncertain nature of their efforts. By recovering the efforts of mid-to-
late twentieth century corporate scenario planners, my aim has been to explore how 
historical analysis that is alert to the entanglements between science studies and 




                                                
44 Herman Kahn, “Choosing a Perspective on the Future,” American Outlook (June 1, 1998).  
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